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ABSTRACT 
Herbert G. Klein was one of the important political figures of the mid to late 20th 
Century.  Born in 1918, Klein’s career spanned 63 years.  He retired as Editor-in-Chief of 
Copley Press, a company he worked for from the start of his career as a young journalist 
covering an up-and-coming Richard Nixon and was active in public affairs up to his 
death in 2009. Klein is best known as longtime advisor to Richard Nixon, and was with 
Nixon at peak moments in his career, including the Checkers Speech, as well as Nixon’s 
1960 and 1962 campaigns.  Upon Nixon’s election as President, Klein became the White 
House Director of Communications, a new position Klein was tasked with designing.  
For four years, Klein is known as one of Nixon’s chief advisors.  But then, for reasons 
historians never have fully explored, he disappears from Nixon’s political landscape as 
well as from scholarly and public prominence.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish Herbert G. Klein as a formative 
figure in the Richard Nixon White House, whose contributions to Nixon’s television 
strategies, their subsequent impact on the President’s actions and attitudes and eventual 
fall, have been largely overshadowed in the scholarly literature. The work draws from 
previously unexplored materials on Klein in the Nixon Library.  The account is notable 
for the first examination of Klein’s only known oral history, lessening a gap in the 
existing literature on Nixon’s aides and his relationship with the media. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF HERBERT KLEIN 
Introduction 
 Herbert G. Klein was arguably one of the important political figures of the mid to 
late 20th Century.  Born in 1918, Klein’s career spanned 63 years.  He retired as Editor-
in-Chief of Copley Press, a company that employed him from the start of his career as a 
young journalist covering an up-and-coming Richard Nixon and again decades later as an 
executive until his death in 2009. Klein is best known as a longtime confidant to Richard 
Nixon.  Upon Nixon’s election as President, Klein was tapped to serve as the White 
House Director of Communications, a new position Klein was tasked with designing.  
For four years, Klein was one of Nixon’s chief advisors, but for reasons historians have 
never fully explored, he disappeared from Nixon’s political landscape as well as from 
scholarly and public prominence.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish Herbert G. Klein as a formative 
figure in the Richard Nixon White House whose contributions to Nixon’s television 
strategies, their subsequent impact on the President’s actions, attitudes and eventual fall.  
His work has been largely ignored in scholarly literature. This dissertation draws from the 
Nixon Library and fills a significant gap in the existing literature on Nixon’s aides and 
his relationship with the media. 
The role of communicator within the White House has held a degree of 
significance throughout history. Those who serve as a conduit by which the public can 
understand the President, his positions, and his Administration face a compelling 
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dichotomy. It is one in which they must serve the public ensuring the credibility of the 
holder of the nation’s highest office while also managing the Office in maintaining and 
engraining its image in historical memory. Already a formidable balance to maintain, 
instability ensues when truth and image find themselves in such immediate conflict as 
they did during the presidency of Richard Nixon. While existing literature on Nixon and 
the press establishes the significance of the credibility gap as well as the impact his 
attitude had on the truth, little is discussed of the individual responsible for balancing the 
two.  
This study argues that although Klein provided Nixon advice as to how to handle 
the press, Klein’s openness with the press and inclination to suggest the point of view of 
the press resulted in his dismissal from Nixon’s inner circle. The argument is supported 
by research that includes an overview of Klein’s early life and career, his time with 
Nixon during Nixon’s campaigns, the creation of the Office of Communications, and 
ultimately his frustration with Nixon’s attitudes toward the press that culminated in his 
alienation from the team and his resignation. The dissertation concludes with lessons 
learned.  
 Klein, Director of the Office of Communications and a career newsman, knew 
and worked with Nixon from the late 1940s onward. Klein played a significant role in the 
development of Nixon’s relationship with and response to the press. Additionally, those 
at the forefront of Nixon’s historiography have theorized, but not fully investigated, that 
Klein provided the President with the best counsel but his friendly demeanor with the 
press resulted in his outsider status with the inner circle.  
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Considering the existence of a Klein within the Nixon Administration and the 
formative television press strategy that he pioneered, there exists a clear gap in the 
literature where comprehensive and substantial analysis of just how Klein influenced the 
rise and fall of the Nixon Administration. Despite the fact that ample literature exists 
about Nixon, his era and his legacy, and that most of that literature positions Klein as a 
central figure with ties to Nixon that go further back than any of his more studied aides, 
there remains no comprehensive work on Klein and his contributions to the press legacy 
of the Nixon White House. The existing literature provides a wealth of information to 
help frame this dissertation while establishing a need for further investigation into the 
less well-known, yet important figure of Klein. This historical study seeks to fill this gap.  
Literature Review 
An initial search of the existing literature revealed no study on Klein nor his role 
within the White House. A search of all available databases (including the complete 
Communications & Mass Media database, database of American Doctoral Dissertations, 
Historical Abstracts, and the Military & Government Collection) for “Herbert G. Klein,” 
with no time constraints, resulted in only 62 entries, most of which are periodicals, not 
scholarly journal articles. Of the seven journal articles that did appear, two were written 
in 1969 and 1970 and three were book reviews of Klein’s own work. Searches for 
“Herbert Klein” or “Herb Klein” generated just under 900, but the vast majority of those 
results were not in relation to Herbert G. Klein. However, a search of the same databases 
for “Richard Nixon” results in 33,491 results. When “Richard Nixon” and “Herbert 
Klein” are used as keywords, 36 results appear but consist mostly of periodicals or book 
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reviews. A search of "Office of Communications" and “Herbert Klein,” two entries result, 
one of which is a journal article with a single sentence regarding Herbert Klein’s role as 
the first Director of Communications. When a search is conducted for “White House” and 
“Herbert Klein” 22 results appear, over half of which are Klein’s obituaries. When 
“Director of Communications” and “Herbert Klein” is searched 22 results appear, again 
most of which are Klein’s obituaries. No journal articles appear. A search of surrounding 
terms related to Nixon's aides, image, and press management was undertaken. The 
articles referenced in the literature review were a result of searching surrounding subjects 
in an attempt to find references to Klein in footnotes and indexes as major studies had not 
been conducted on him or his contributions to the Office of Communications. The journal 
articles that provided some substantive, though limited discussion of Klein, were 
included in the body of the literature.  
Study of the aides within the Administration is limited due to the availability of 
primary sources. Nixon himself has been dissected across numerous disciplines. Of the 
literature that deals with Nixon’s image, there is little mention of Nixon’s team as image 
creators.1 Instead, they operate largely through a psychohistorical lens, juxtaposing 
Nixon’s upbringing and temperament with his presidential personality. While most of 
these works fail to focus specifically on Klein, there are a few that provide valuable 
understanding for the purposes of this research project.   
                                                
1   Druckman, James N. "The Power of Television Images: The First Kennedy-Nixon Debate Revisited." The 
Journal of Politics 65, no. 2 (2003): 559-71.; Brown, Steven R. 1978. "Richard Nixon and the Public 
Conscience: The Struggle for Authenticity." The Journal of Psychohistory 6 (1): 93.; Bill O. Kjeldahl , Carl 
W. Carmichael & Robert J. Mertz (1971) Factors in a presidential candidate's image, Speech Monographs, 
38:2, 129-131.; Sheldon, Catherine A., and Lynne M. Sallot. "Image Repair in Politics: Testing Effects of 
Communication Strategy and Performance History in a Faux Pas." Journal of Public Relations Research 21, 
no. 1 (2008): 25-50. 
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Link and Glad’s 1996 work “President Nixon’s Inner Circle of Advisers,” 
examines the advisors of Nixon, a significant work in light of the limited research 
available that focuses on the aides themselves. However, this work largely deals with the 
organizational structure and the relationship between the President and his aides, not the 
aides and their relationship with each other.2  It does note the absence of focus on 
advisors in most interpretations of administrations, particularly in the case of aides such 
as Klein.  
Kumar, evaluates the consistent turbulence of the Office of Communications 
noting that:  
While the Office of Communications is vital to the communications of an 
effective presidency no matter who serves as chief executive, the position of 
communications director has proved to be a volatile one. Since its creation in 1969, 
twenty-two people have headed it. That is less than a year and a half per director. There 
have been approximately the same number of press secretaries, but that position has 
existed since 1929, forty years more than the Office of Communications. The casualty 
rate of communications directors reflects the difficult environment he or she operates in 
as well as the multiple and sometimes conflicting demands placed on the person.3  
Kumar contends that, “In the period from President Nixon forward, 
communications was featured as an important factor in how the day began.” However, 
                                                
2   Glad, Betty, and Michael W. Link. "President Nixon's Inner Circle of Advisers." Presidential Studies 
Quarterly (1996): 13-40. 
3   Kumar, Martha Joynt. "The Office of Communications." Presidential Studies Quarterly 31, no. 4 (2001): 
609-634. 
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the work neglects providing significant information on Nixon’s own aide, Klein and the 
origins of the Office of Communications. Instead, it focuses on administrations following 
Nixon’s.4 Where Klein is mentioned, Kumar labels Klein’s directorial style primarily as 
that of a “press advocate” over a “strategist,” “planner” or “events manager” though 
implied that all those roles are part of the contemporary position of Director of the Office 
of Communications.5  Based on the review of the literature, this is not uncommon in 
existing studies dealing with the Office of Communications. This further suggests Klein’s 
unique status as a friend of the press in an Administration known for its combative 
relationship with it.  
Kiousis and Stromback’s study examines the links between presidential 
communication and public opinion. Through the analysis of PR activities, speeches and 
press conferences between 1961 and 1997, the researchers determined a positive link 
between presidential news conferences and foreign policy job approval and between 
presidential speeches and general job approval ratings. While this sheds some light on the 
areas in which Klein was involved, particularly as they pertain to communications 
strategy and news conferences, the longitudinal study does not dive deeply into the Nixon 
Administration. In fact, despite the study’s focus on the link between communication and 
image, there is no mention of Herbert Klein at all.6  
                                                
4   Ibid., 617. 
5   Ibid., 622. 
6   Kiousis, Spiro, and Jesper Strömbäck. "The White House and Public Relations: Examining the Linkages 
Between Presidential Communications and Public Opinion." Public Relations Review 36, no. 1 (2010): 7-14. 
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Klein is mentioned in Walcott and Hult’s study. They suggest that among Nixon’s 
major innovations were “to supplement the press operation with a variety of carefully 
organized, aggressively managed public relations structures…”7  Klein is credited with 
the task that the researchers consider a significant contribution of the Nixon 
Administration in shaping White House interaction with the press but an in-depth 
analysis of Klein is absent.  
 “The Caretakers of the Presidential Image” positions Klein and Ziegler within 
Nixon’s White House. Ziegler was recognized as dealing only with the White House 
press corps while Klein dealt with all other media. Swartz suggests that the technological 
evolution of “potential and real Presidential power have caused a steady progression 
toward specialization in Presidential press relations, calling for image caretakers ever 
more specialized in the arts of mass persuasion, i.e., public relations, opinion formation, 
advertising, electronic media.”8 “On the Margin: Between Journalist and Publicist,” 
provides further insight into the precarious dynamic of image-building and truth-telling, 
though it does not handle Klein in depth.9  
This is echoed in Towle’s study “On Behalf of the President: Four Factors 
Affecting the Success of the Presidential Press Secretary” that positioned Klein as a 
central figure over Nixon’s press secretary: “One factor which made Ziegler’s position in 
                                                
7   Walcott, Charles E., and Karen M. Hult. "George Akerson's Legacy: Continuity and Change in White House 
Press Operations." Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2008): 599. 
8   Burkholder, Donald R. 1974. The Caretakers of the Presidential Image. Presidential Studies Quarterly 4/5: 
35-43 
9   Swartz, James E. 1983. On the Margin: Between Journalist and Publicist. Public Relations Review 9 (3): 11-
23 
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the Nixon White House more uncertain was the creation of the post of Director of 
Communications held by Herb Klein…Ziegler was technically a subordinate of Klein at 
the beginning of the Nixon Administration.”10  Ron Ziegler himself described Klein 
“…as much a vital part of the presidential and communications history as Jim Hagerty 
is.”11  In addition, a careful assessment of Haldeman’s diary entries, later compiled and 
annotated as a popularized book, suggests the routine involvement of Klein in decision-
making early in Nixon’s first term.12 
In a similar vein, Hassencahl posits that there are rare examples within the Nixon 
Administration where Nixon was able to navigate the press and his image but doesn’t 
investigate the individuals who motivated or contributed to those moments. Upon further 
investigation of the instances that were noted as positive, Klein was a significant figure 
though not mentioned in the research. The researcher wrote, “Rarely was there ever a 
middle-of-the-road between Nixon and the press; either Nixon seemed to be working the 
press to his advantage, or the press seemed to be working against Nixon. Incidents falling 
into the former category include the Checkers Speech that secured his position on the 
Eisenhower ticket; coverage of his confrontation of Nikita Khrushchev in the famous 
                                                
10   Towle, Michael J. 1997. On Behalf of the President: Four Factors Affecting the Success of the Presidential 
Press Secretary. Presidential Studies Quarterly 27 (2): 297-319 
11   Maltese, John. Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of 
Presidential News. University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 
12   H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection. Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. 
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1959 ‘Kitchen Debate,’ which received a positive public response; or the ‘New Nixon,’ 
better able to control the press, that emerged during the 1968 presidential campaign.”13  
Klein’s contention that the Nixon Administration was more preoccupied with 
public relations than it was developing relationships with the press was handled in Cathy 
Franklin Patrick’s dissertation, “Public Relations in the White House: News Management 
by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon,” which delves specifically into the 
management of the news through various administrations, providing a unique look at how 
the Nixon Administration was similar and different to those that preceded it.14 This 
examination is significant in that it provides a historical touchstone and footing for 
investigating an important shift in White House procedure, a shift toward a preoccupation 
with public relations. Again, even though this is a well-known contention of Klein’s, 
Klein is largely absent from the discussion. This dissertation examines the role of Klein 
within the Administration. However, implicit in that role are Klein’s actions and their 
effect on the media themselves. Franklin’s dissertation concerning the presidential 
influence on the media also mentions Klein. Although Klein is mentioned only briefly in 
the more than 300-page dissertation, his mentions are directly connected to news 
management strategy, a primary area of investigation for this research.15 Small’s journal 
                                                
13   Hassencahl, Fran. 1985. Presidents and the Press: The Nixon Legacy. Government Information Quarterly 2 
(3) (1985): 328-9 
14   Franklin, Cathy Rogers. "Public Relations in the White House: News Management by Presidents Kennedy, 
Johnson and Nixon." PhD diss., Ohio University, 1993. 
15   Cheslik, F.E. (1977). Presidential Influence On The Media: A Descriptive Study Of The Administrations Of 
Lyndon B. Johnson And Richard M. Nixon  
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article, “Evaluating Nixon’s Presidency – Without Watergate,” provides relevant context, 
outside of the scandal narrative, though no in-depth discussion of media strategy, Klein 
or the struggle between truth and image.16  
Outside of traditional mass communications and journalism journals, Herbert 
Klein is discussed in the context of communications directions in modern corporate 
management.17 The study notes that Klein created the position of Director of 
Communications and the corresponding office and that the position spilled over into the 
private sector from there. However, there is no further mention of Klein.  
The only existing publication focused on Klein is his own book, published in 
1980.18  Klein recounts his time with Nixon from his early days as a reporter and a young 
Nixon loyalist. As he describes his role in the Nixon White House, the creation of the 
Office of Communication and his relationship with Ron Ziegler, Klein reports that his use 
of television in the White House was pioneering and that he was initially successful in 
creating open communication with the media early in Nixon’s first term. However, he 
also clearly states his regret for ever suggesting that the Nixon White House would be 
open and transparent.19 Even prior to his appointment as Director of Communications, he 
questioned Haldeman’s hesitation to allow him direct access to Nixon, casting it as was 
                                                
16   Small, Melvin. "Evaluating Nixon's Presidency - Without Watergate." New England Journal of History 
1999-2000 56(2-3): 1-13.  
17   Carl, Robert E. 1970. "Communications Direction in Modern Corporate Management.” Journal Of Business 
Communication 8, no. 1: 5-12. Communication & Mass Media Complete. 
18   Klein, Herbert G. Making it Perfectly Clear. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980.  
19   Ibid., 42. 
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one of many “bad omens.”20 Of primary importance was Klein’s suggestion that had the 
President and those around him not rebuked the press representation of a “new Nixon” 
following Nixon’s first presidential press conference, they may have prevented 
Watergate. Klein contended that instead, the Nixon White House refused to accept the 
concept of openness, deciding instead on an “unproductive bully attitude” that resulted 
from an obsession with the media, not a lack of attention to it.21  Additionally, of his 
relationship with Ziegler, and between the press office and the Office of 
Communications, Klein wrote that had the team accepted the need for both offices fully, 
much of the tension might have been alleviated. Instead, following his resignation, his 
office was moved under the jurisdiction of Press Secretary Ziegler.22 Klein acknowledges 
the Nixon Administration fostered a new level of public relations and news management 
in the White House but insists that there would likely be an increase only in Nixon-like 
“gimmicks” to increase public favor of the President, regardless of press access. He 
exemplified this by suggesting that though President Jimmy Carter increased press access 
to the White House, the resulting increase in coverage showed little influence on political 
polls.23  
Klein represents a unique area of investigation in the complex historiography of 
Richard Nixon. His role in the Nixon Administration provides ample fodder for those 
who seek to better understand how Nixon used television to build his legacy, only to 
                                                
20   Ibid., 37. 
21   Ibid., 69. 
22   Ibid., 205. 
23   Ibid., 427. 
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irrevocably tarnish it, in part due to an animosity for those who dominated television. 
Klein sat at the crossroads of that precarious intersection with Nixon for decades prior to 
his inauguration and until his resignation just prior to the Watergate scandal that brought 
down the Nixon presidency. Unlike other prominent aides, Klein advocated both for the 
rights and privileges of the press, emboldening the President to combat feelings of attacks 
on his image through greater relationships with the press as opposed to tighter reins on 
public relations-style image-building. Unlike his counterpart, Press Secretary Ron 
Zeigler, Klein’s position within the Administration afforded him the opportunity to 
pioneer image-building television press strategy, but perhaps more significantly, his 
journalistic conscience prevented him from deserting his obligation to those who sought 
truth. Despite Klein’s considered and seemingly complete self-portrayal, his own account 
begs numerous questions that voluminous scholarly literature on Nixon fails to address.     
  Nixon’s chief biographer, Stephen Ambrose, establishes Klein as an influential 
Nixon advisor up to the point of Klein’s resignation. While Ambrose alludes to Klein’s 
dismissal as a revealing stage that led to Nixon’s own downfall, there is no elaboration. 
Ambrose provides perhaps the most comprehensive work on the Nixon presidency. In 
one volume of the three written, Ambrose postulates that Klein gave Nixon the best 
advice of anyone on his team on how to handle the press, but his close associations with 
the media and inclination to suggest the point of view of the press resulted in his isolation 
in the Nixon White House.24 Though Ambrose mentioned Klein numerous times in his 
works, he does so in passing. However, in each instance Klein is connected to major 
                                                
24   Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: Volume 2: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1989, 297. 
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events in Nixon’s historiography. He is mentioned in regard to the Cuban invasion 
proposal, Martin Luther King Jr.’s arrest, the Nixon-Kennedy debate, Nixon’s 
Khrushchev meeting, Nixon’s gubernatorial campaign and presidential campaigns. In 
fact, even after Klein resigned, he asked the President to appear on national television and 
“give a full exposition of Watergate to the public.”25 This, as did many of his efforts 
while part of the staff, fell on deaf ears. This dissertation investigates Klein’s unique role, 
as mentioned throughout scholarship, and builds on the contention of Ambrose and others 
who studied Nixon and his team, that Klein who is often relegated to footnotes in history, 
was actually an influential figure in the turbulent political-press relationship of the time.    
While delineating Klein’s role within the Administration is the dissertation’s 
primary aim, to be effective one must understand Nixon’s relationship with the media, 
specifically television, and how the television press became a central focus to the 
Administration. Likewise, the investigation of the compounding conflict between truth 
and image provides important context to the greater understanding of Klein’s position 
and eventual resignation. Had no such conflict existed, it is possible Klein would have 
played a minor role. In this regard, Small provides an important and comprehensive 
analysis of the milestones of the Nixon Administration and the long-lasting impact of 
media strategies on the future administrations. However, Small’s 2003 account says 
almost nothing about Klein. In examining Klein, Small limits focus to short mentions of 
Klein’s popularity over other staffers, among legislators, and his eventual alienation from 
                                                
25   Klein, Herbert G. Making It Perfectly Clear. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980, 395. 
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the inner circle due to his transparency with the press.26  Similarly, the chief biographer 
of the pre-presidential Nixon, Gellman, does not even connect Klein and Nixon. At best, 
Gellman provides important anecdotes that add to the relevant historical context provided 
by Small.  
Early in his career, Nixon developed another famous moniker, “Tricky Dick.” 
Where many scholars have used the nickname as a launching point for conceptualizing 
Nixon, Gellman provides an alternative theory. Where Klein is concerned, Gellman 
credits him for boosting Nixon’s “crusade” as a congressman through his favorable 
coverage and notes their budding friendship.27 Overall, Gellman’s work refutes some of 
the most tightly held contentions about the Nixon presidency. However, his most 
significant theory, regarding the scope of this dissertation, is that Nixon was not 
uncommonly or intentionally manipulative or vindictive during his campaigns. Gellman 
paints a much different picture of Nixon than traditionally reported, one of a 
hardworking, man-against-the-odds who triumphed despite unwavering challenges. His 
careful dissection of the myths that created the more recognized image of Nixon is of 
tremendous significance. Considering the prevailing narratives that dominate Nixon’s 
historiography, Gellman’s work is vital. If Nixon’s tactics early in his career were not 
extremely dissimilar from his counterparts, yet his image was disproportionally tarnished, 
a preoccupation with image-building may be justifiable and a preoccupation may be read 
                                                
26   Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003, 46, 232. 
27   Gellman, Irwin F. The Contender, Richard Nixon: The Congress years, 1946-1952. New York: Free Press, 
1999, 139. 
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as a necessity. Klein, who suggested this preoccupation, might then be better understood 
as an outsider later in Nixon’s career.  
Klein is dismissed by another well-known Nixon historian, Herbert Parmet. 
Parmet’s dismissal of Klein’s larger influence is notable for his Richard Nixon and His 
America is known for its sympathetic assessment. Still, according to Parmet, Klein was 
an “old loyalist” against Nixon’s “newcomers” Haldeman and Ehrlichman.28  He also 
proposes that Klein knew Nixon’s personality perhaps better than others early in his 
career and understood that few would be able to persuade him to do other than that which 
he himself had decided. Additionally, Parmet positioned Klein as one of the few within 
Nixon’s inner circle who was truly responsible for how Nixon’s personality came across 
through the media, including Safire, Garment, Buchanan, Rice and Keogh, and excluding 
Ziegler.29 Of significance is the way in which this work approaches the “Age of Nixon.” 
Not only does Parmet provide historical and cultural context to the Nixon narrative, he 
also confronts the prevailing tendency in Nixon’s historiography to focus on Nixon’s 
personality over the strains of the time. For the purposes of this dissertation, Parmet’s 
work is important as it provides insight into reasons why Nixon may have developed 
certain attitudes or tendencies other than a cursory distrust of media, allowing for a more 
three-dimensional examination.  
Parmet’s rudimentary inclusion of Klein is mimicked in Richard Reeves’ provides 
perhaps one of the most intriguing views of Nixon’s proclivity toward isolation. In the 
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case of Klein, Reeves mentions him in only a handful of occasions, but in most, hand-in-
hand with Ziegler during important moments. Reeves also writes of the increasing 
alienation of Klein who was often characterized as too trusting. Additionally, Reeves 
suggests that Nixon’s presidency was not doomed by his relationship with the media, as 
much of scholarship suggests, but that, from the start, it had little chance of surviving. 
Nixon’s isolation, suggests Reeves, led him to suspicions about all of those around him, 
even his closest aides. In addition, he suggests that Nixon on several significant occasions 
operated opposite of his proposed aims, using his prolonging the conflict in Vietnam 
through systematic lying as a primary example. Reeves’ construction of the entire White 
House staff as deeply engaged in a web of secrets and lies provides unique insight into 
the relationships among Nixon’s aides.30  
Rick Perlstein builds on the paranoia that Reeves documents but also fails to 
mention Klein in any substantive way. This is particularly apparent because Perlstein 
discusses the creation of Nixon’s enemies list, variations of which emerged through 
Klein’s office. Perlstein theorizes that Nixon was masterful in harnessing the negative 
energy that existed following his failed presidential campaign and the surrounding 
struggles that marked the 1960s. He suggests that Nixon artfully utilized riots and anti-
war protests as a pathway into the White House. Nixon’s traditional rhetoric, Perlstein 
argues, ushered in a new era of politics and colored the way in which he oriented himself 
against his perceived “enemies.”31 This layer in the historiography of Nixon provides an 
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absorbing assessment of the ways in which Nixon benefited from negative events, 
creating greater depth in the investigation of his response to negative press.  
Of Klein’s role while he was a reporter during Nixon’s early political career, 
Morris focuses on how Klein’s newspaper and reporting served as “the clearinghouse for 
the publicity and advertising of the first campaign.”32 While Morris follows Nixon’s story 
into his pre-presidential years in politics, his telling of the early years of Nixon the man, 
not the politician, provide necessary context when analyzing the relationships and 
decisions of Nixon the politician.  
Matusow makes no mention of Klein. Still, his insight into Nixon’s preoccupation 
with foreign policy that led to the neglect of his economic policies and subsequently 
inhibited his ability to create the new political majority he sought to establish, shed light 
on his fixation with the focus of the press.33 Likewise, Willis makes only cursory 
mentions of Klein.  Published in 1970, the work theorizes that Nixon was actually a 
liberal, something that longtime-friend Klein felt was an impossibility.34  
Scholarship focused on Nixon’s final days in the White House are largely devoid 
of Klein. Due to the timing of Klein’s resignation, this is not wholly surprising. However, 
in the assessment of the moments leading up to those final days, the premature 
resignation of a Director of Communications in a White House criticized for its 
increasingly closed off nature begs an investigation of Klein’s role and why he left. 
                                                
32   Morris, Roger. Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician. New York: Holt, 1990, 297. 
33   Matusow, Allen. Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars and Votes. Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1998.  
34   Wills, Garry. Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970.  
  18   
While White’s, provides key insights into the reaction of the nation to a President who 
seemingly deemed himself above the law, he does so without great attention paid to key 
aides, like Klein.35 White’s work begins with the last of Nixon’s days in the White House 
and then traces back the moments that led up to the resignation of a President. Ultimately, 
White theorizes that Nixon dealt with politics as a war and that desperate times allowed 
for a bending of the rules or a dismissal of them entirely. Similarly, famed journalists 
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein provided their own take on Nixon’s last days in office 
in The Final Days. Woodward mentions Klein only regarding Nixon’s growing disdain 
revealed in a stunning moment on the White House Tapes when he suggests Klein was 
the wrong man for the job, and always had been.36 The omission of Klein by Woodward 
and Bernstein may be due to the timeframe in which their narrative covers. Still, their 
roles as journalists, and likely their interaction with Klein at least to some degree during 
Nixon’s tenure, makes that omission even more striking.  
Nixon himself references Klein throughout his narrative. Nixon mentions his 
longtime relationship with Klein on several occasions.37 His references to Klein position 
him as a primary figure early in Nixon’s career and omits him almost entirely in the 
telling of the later years of his presidency. Overall, he focuses less on relationships and 
staff than he does on political and social events of significance using them to explain, and 
sometimes justify, his more controversial choices. Uniquely, Nixon’s memoirs allow for 
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an unparalleled evaluation of how Nixon himself perceived the events that surrounded 
and involved his Administration. In this work, Nixon documents his time in office 
carefully, but also allocates a significant portion to his assessment of the events 
surrounding Watergate and the controversy that followed. Nixon lays out his take on his 
legacy and how he wants to be remembered through his telling. Nixon, in his own words, 
is a significant contribution to the existing literature of the popular press. While his work 
has been criticized as benign, it functions, to some degree, as a defense against the way 
his legacy has been handled by scholars.  
Maltese provides perhaps the most complete assessment of the importance of 
Klein. Maltese conducted a series of original interviews with Nixon’s close aides 
including H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in the late 1980s, which allow for a 
unique assessment of Klein unavailable elsewhere. Of significance to note is that when 
scholarship focuses on television media strategy within the Nixon White House, Klein 
moves from secondary notation to a primary figure. In his work, Maltese posits that the 
Office of Communications was likely created, at least to a small extent, due to Nixon’s 
need to create a post for his longtime press aide and friend Klein. Because of Nixon’s 
growing “fear and distrust” of a liberal-controlled bureaucracy that might paint the White 
House and his policies in a negative light, he aimed to create something that could keep 
tabs on the potential threat.38 Maltese documents the evolution of Klein’s press 
responsibilities between Nixon’s 1960 campaign and his 1968 campaign from traditional 
press secretary to “Manager of Communications,” when Klein paid greater attention to 
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establishing relationships with local news establishments rather than the “establishment 
media” in Washington and New York.39 This knowledge is significant in that it 
demonstrates the beginnings of Klein’s challenges as a newsman juxtaposed against 
Nixon’s mounting distaste for the fourth estate.  
James Koegh, a former executive editor of Time magazine and part of the 
speechwriting team under Nixon, positioned Klein as the central figure in the White 
House communication strategy. In his book, published prior to the resignation of Nixon 
and before the papers of the Nixon aides were available, he said that Nixon’s 
preoccupation with negative press inherently elevated Klein’s role because a large 
portion of the staff was often involved in communication efforts, and ultimately working 
through or with Klein’s office.40 The assessment of Klein by Nixon’s closest aides, as too 
collegial with the press and too difficult to control, suggests a deeper tension that did not 
simply manifest itself after Klein assumed the role but that was entrenched in the role 
from its inception. William Safire, former speechwriter for Nixon, wrote in his work on 
the Administration, Before the Fall, of a time when Nixon had asked Klein to go after 
two columnists who were critical of the Administration and “Be sure they are cut off.” 
Klein refused, to which Safire reflected, “His routine refusal to carry out these ukases 
was why Old Hand Klein was not in close, and why he emerged from the ruins with his 
reputation intact.”41  
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Likewise, Porter’s work suggests that while Klein was firmly in charge of the 
media in the beginning of the Nixon Administration, unblocked channels that Johnson 
had closed fostered the “idyllic” quality of newspaper articles in the first year of the 
Nixon Administration. However, as the lines of communication between President and 
press began to close, so too did a shift occur between the positions of Ziegler and Klein. 
As Klein began to be moved under the jurisdiction of Ziegler, he moved closer to his 
resignation.42  
Like Woodward and Bernstein’s work, journalists Dan Rather and Gary Paul 
Gates’ book on pre-Watergate operations, provides a natural opening for investigation 
into Klein.43 However, its focus on the two more famous aides within the White House, 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman, proves limited in providing a formidable account of Klein 
and his team. Similarly, Spear’s work, as well as Lashner’s, provides information on 
press relations that is useful in understanding the Nixon White House but provides only 
basic information on Klein as part of the Nixon White House team.44  
Unlike Lashner’s work, in the popular tome, The Selling of the President, Joe 
McGinniss summed up Nixon’s relationship with television saying during his second 
presidential campaign, Klein was significantly involved. However, because it was 
published in 1969, and written soon following Nixon’s campaign, it is a less 
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comprehensive work. Klein himself found McGinniss’ work limited and suggested it did 
not present an accurate view of what occurred.45 Still, McGinniss’ assessment of Nixon is 
of multifaceted importance even though it should be handled with some pause. It does 
shed light on Nixon’s early distrust of the media. It also highlights the significance of 
Nixon’s upbringing on his developing adverse attitudes toward the “eastern 
establishment” and “elite media.”  
While numerous documentary and broadcast works on the Nixon White House 
have been produced for mainstream consumption, many revolve around Watergate and 
Nixon himself. Very little is available on the aides and none primarily on Klein. Our 
Nixon provides perhaps the most important and unique look at the attitudes of the Nixon 
Administration from a nontraditional perspective. This visual record, created by H.R. 
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Dwight Chapin, was discovered in the National 
Archives some 40 years after having been seized by the FBI during the investigation into 
Watergate.46 Compiled into a documentary, the home movies span the period from 1969 
to 1973 and include more than 500 reels of film found in the Nixon Presidential Library. 
Among the footage are home movies from everything surrounding the moon landing; 
anti-war protests to the intimate footage of aides on board Air Force One. The entirety of 
the footage is of the closest aides of Richard Nixon and offers a significant look at the 
attitudes, relationships and even the expectations of those individuals regarding their 
positions within the Nixon White House. Haldeman and Chapin worked closely with 
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Klein during his time in the Nixon White House. This documentary is unprecedented in 
its contextual implications regarding the way those who advised Nixon acted individually 
and in conjunction. 
Newspaper and magazine articles written on the Nixon Administration revolve 
around scandal events of the Administration and Nixon himself. Few significant pieces 
shed a comprehensive light on how the inner workings of the press office in the 
Administration functioned. The articles that are relevant to the scope of this study are few 
and include interviews with Klein during his time in the White House. These interviews, 
due to the time in which they were conducted, do not delve into the nuances this research 
seeks to investigate. However, they do provide insight into the balance Klein was 
attempting to strike between a president hostile to the press and a promise that president 
made at the start of his term to maintain an open White House for newsmen.  In 1970, 
The Washington Post published a profile on Klein in a question and answer format, 
asking the Director of Communications various questions including his opinons on 
books, fishing, what he has read about the media and what newspapers he reads. Though 
the interview fails to delve into the deeper aspects of his role, it is a unique look into 
Klein.47 Similarly, an exclusive interview with Klein headlined “Herb Klein: Nixon’s 
Proved Leadership,” explores policy and elections.48 
The Office of Communications was a new fixture and the dual roles of Klein and 
Ziegler were nontraditional. Largely, early assessments by the media placed Klein, not 
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Ziegler, at the forefront of White House press relations. A Wall Street Journal article, 
noted, “…Washington is wondering who really is the White House Press Secretary. The 
29-year-old Mr. Ziegler, a former Los Angeles ad executive? Or the 50-year-old Mr. 
Klein, journalist and confidant of the President?”49 Robert B. Semple Jr. of the The New 
York Times dissected the press office of Nixon in early 1969, suggesting that it was Klein 
who was truly in control. He wrote:  
Ronald L. Ziegler, Mr. Nixon’s press secretary, briefs the press every morning at 
11 and afternoons at 4…but apart from news about the President’s schedule, and other 
largely routine announcements, these sessions are rarely productive. This is no surprise, 
of course. As a rule, the last man to ask about the innermost deliberations of the 
government is the press secretary, who may be well informed but is also rigidly 
controlled.  
Of Klein he wrote, “He advises Mr. Ziegler…he is perhaps the central cog in Mr. 
Nixon’s effort to acquaint the country with his leading officials.”50  
A review of the existing literature reveals two things. First, that Klein played a 
consistent and significant role in the Nixon Administration where the conflict between 
journalistic truth and presidential image were concerned. Numerous scholarly works as 
well as popular investigations into the Nixon Administration uncover Klein as a longtime 
Nixon supporter, friend and later, condemned outsider of a White House increasingly in 
conflict with the press. Second, despite Klein’s position as one of Nixon’s oldest and 
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closest aides, and Klein’s significant role as the first Director of Communications, a 
comprehensive study of his contributions to the Nixon White House is nonexistent. This 
dissertation fills this gap. 
Statement of Problem 
While research surrounding Richard Nixon and his relationship with the press are 
available, they largely revolve around the scandals that marred the Nixon presidency. 
Because focus is often placed on moments of scandal, such as the reaction to the printing 
of the Pentagon Papers and the investigation of Watergate, prevailing narratives focus on 
the Administration’s relationship with print media and subsequently on the Press 
Secretary. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler was one of the most well-known of Nixon’s aides. 
In many cases, he is painted as a subservient and inexperienced mouthpiece, leading 
researchers back to those who were considered his “handlers” H.R. Haldeman and J. 
Bruce Ehrlichman to better understand Nixon’s relationship with the press. However, 
another significant character, and a former boss of Ziegler, played a major role in the 
press strategy of the Nixon White House, Herbert G. Klein. Klein managed the creation 
of television press strategy in the Nixon Administration. Even prior to his appointment as 
Director of the Office of Communications, Klein had a unique and long relationship with 
the President. He advocated for the success of Ziegler, despite his own expectation that 
he was to win Ziegler’s coveted role of Press Secretary. He pioneered the creation of his 
own office and position.  
Nixon initially admired Klein, a longtime newsman, during his campaign for 
presidency for his poise on television. He tasked Klein with handling television news 
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strategy and urged that he do so as part of the White House team. Nixon had, by this 
time, developed a keen interest in harnessing television despite feelings of hostility 
toward the television press. However, Nixon and some of his aides, primarily Haldeman, 
had little interest in following a traditional White House press model. It was clear that 
between Klein and Ziegler, both of whom worked on Nixon’s campaign, that Klein had 
more experience and connections with the press. According to Klein’s own telling of the 
events, the position of Press Secretary was given to Ziegler, instead of him, because 
Haldeman and Nixon felt Ziegler would be easier to control and wanted to minimize the 
role of Press Secretary within the Administration. As a result, Klein was tasked with 
creating his own position but was instructed by Nixon himself that he should focus on 
television as much as possible.  
The press trusted Klein largely because they were familiar with him. Ziegler was 
a young advertising man and the press questioned his ability to handle the task of 
managing the press. In many ways, the press interacted with Klein as the White House 
press liaison, relieved that he might ensure the President kept his promise of an open 
administration and concerned that Ziegler, under the control of Haldeman, might simply 
be for show. 
It is known that Nixon's difficulties with the media greatly contributed to his 
downfall. At first, Klein’s efforts to establish and maintain an open White House were 
successful. However, over time the frustration of Nixon and his inner circle with the press 
hampered Klein’s efforts. Throughout his time in the Administration, Klein pushed for 
more open relationships with the press but the divergence of his perspective with more 
powerful players in the White House eventually led to his falling out of favor and his 
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eventual resignation. His frustrations while serving in the office he designed coupled with 
his resignation provide an important area of study in the rise and fall of the Nixon 
Administration. The investigation of Klein adds to the existing narratives of how the 
Nixon White House handled the television press, and to the assessment of the attitudes 
and strategies with the television press from the late 1960s through the mid 1970s; 
attitudes that helped create and contributed to the demise of an American President. 
The Presidential Library Papers of Klein reveal his relationships with other aides 
and how he diverged from the anti-press attitudes that emerged. They also reveal the 
distinct strategies that he employed, some that are still in practice today. Of significance 
to note is that Klein himself established the roles and activities of the Office of 
Communications, an office that is now considered a government standard.   
An investigation into the papers of Klein, along with other figures in the Nixon 
White House including Dwight Chapin, Ziegler, H.R. Haldeman and Charles Colson, 
among others, provide insight into the management of the television press and where 
Klein differed from his colleagues. Klein’s own documentation of his time in the White 
House, detailed in his book, provided the researcher a blueprint for key moments of 
frustration and challenge during his tenure. This dissertation explores, through a non-
scandal focused lens, the ways in which Klein influenced and deviated from the 
increasingly hostile attitude toward the television press. 
This dissertation provides a narrative history that reexamines Klein’s role in the 
Nixon Administration and the six years prior as a period when political media tactics had 
continued to blossom. Alongside events and actions occurring during the years of the 
Nixon Administration up until Klein’s resignation in July 1973 that make up the bulk of 
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this study, it provides background on Klein’s involvement in Nixon’s early years in 
politics, Nixon’s campaigns against Jerry Voorhis in 1945 and Helen Douglas in 1950, 
where he was officially deemed with the now-famous moniker “Tricky Dick,”51 and his 
presidential campaign against John F. Kennedy in 1960, which several scholars suggest 
was the true beginning of Nixon’s commitment to managing the television press.52 These 
early campaigns shed light on the emerging relationship between Nixon and the media 
and Klein’s role in that relationship.  
Methodology 
Asa Briggs identifies the purpose of historical study in four ways. First, to obtain 
the knowledge of a people. Second, to compare social structures and populations. Third, 
to reconstruct the lives of families and ancestors, and fourth, “to provide evidence against 
which to judge the societal policies of the present day.” It is Briggs’ fourth assessment of 
the purpose of historical study that best resonates with the aim of this dissertation. The 
historical relevance of Klein within the Nixon White House is discussed within the 
context of contemporary press relations at the closing of this dissertation. Of the study of 
journalistic history, Sloan and Stratt, said that it was about “first, gaining an 
understanding from what others have said about the object of historical study, and from 
the materials available; second, locating the various sources that are applicable to the 
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inquiry.”53 In order to ensure that historical research reaches the highest levels of 
credibility, original sources are a necessity. According to Lousie M. Benjamin, “Primary 
sources are the building blocks of historical research. They are contemporaneous records 
related to the subject under study and they come into being during the time period the 
historian is studying. They are remnants of the past.”54 This dissertation utilizes the 
historical method to the subject of Klein’s role in the Nixon White House. It examines the 
work of Klein through an assessment of primary sources available through credible and 
reputable archives that meet high standards of document handling and preservation. This 
study is supported by sources found in the Presidential Library of Richard Nixon as well 
as the Herbert Klein Collection at the University of Southern California. The Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library is the most complete collection of documents related to the 
Nixon Administration. The Herbert Klein Collection at the University of Southern 
California is the only major collection of Klein’s papers and was donated to the 
University by the Klein family.  
The private papers of Herbert Klein are housed at the University of Southern 
California, Klein’s alma mater, and contain a number of documents pertaining to Klein’s 
time as a journalist. The bulk of the material available pertains primarily to Nixon and are 
documents that went through Klein’s office, are similar to those available in the 
Presidential Library. The documents relating to Klein’s time with Nixon begin with the 
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1956 Vice Presidential campaign. Other documents in the collection include his career 
following his time in the Administration as a media professional and author. Unlike the 
collection at the Presidential Library, the University of Southern California collection 
includes photographs of Klein in his personal life as well as some from his time with the 
Administration and articles, speeches and audio statements made by Klein during various 
portions of his life and career. This collection was gifted to USC in 2008.   
These primary sources include original documents, memos, notes, diary entries, 
photographs as well as oral histories and exit interviews. The sources were studied 
critically and were analyzed while considering their original purpose. The researcher first 
identified the surface content of the material, its major points, what it said and did not 
say, and any surrounding context that would help provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of its purpose.  Additionally, the researcher identified the audience of the 
document, its function at the time of its creation, its source (where it was originally 
found) and the type of source (i.e., private letter, memo, note). These factors allowed the 
researcher to better evaluate the content in the documents and place the content in the 
appropriate historical context. A basic understanding of potential bias, attitudes and 
interests was taking into consideration as well.  
The Primary Evidence 
In order to effectively establish the role of Klein within the Nixon White House, 
procuring original documentation of Klein’s day-to-day operations within the 
Administration, as well as his conversations with White House staff, was critical. The 
most pertinent source material on Klein during his time in the Nixon Administration was 
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found in the Presidential Library of Richard Nixon. In addition to the documents 
available in the Nixon Library, exit interviews and oral histories of Klein, as well as those 
who worked with him are also housed in the archives and were used in the pursuit of this 
research.  
The material of Klein is in the White House Special Files from the period of 1969 
to 1973. However, there is little documentation available for the last six months in which 
Klein served in the White House. Of the documents, the majority are correspondence 
between H.R. Haldeman and Klein. Most of Klein’s documents deal with presidential 
scheduling, press appointments, White House procedures, and media relations. In regard 
to Klein’s correspondence with Nixon himself, those documents focus largely on press 
conferences, television appearances and interviews and were found in the White House 
Action Memoranda file. The White House Action Memoranda file consists of documents 
that outlined projects for Klein’s office. Among the projects requiring action were 
countering critical press reactions, pushing forth the Administration’s view on issues of 
the day, bolstering friendly press and analyzing and responding to polls.    
The oral history of Herbert Klein was conducted as part of The Richard Nixon 
Oral History Project, an initiative of Timothy Naftali in 2006 during his tenure as director 
of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. Videotaped interviews of Nixon officials and 
others who were significant figures during the Nixon Administration were conducted to 
preserve the memories of those who lived during the era. One hundred-twenty interviews 
were conducted within the first few years of the project. The oral history of Herbert Klein 
was available to the public in July 2010.  
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The tumultuous tenure of Richard Nixon encouraged, yet also derailed, other oral 
history projects. The Center for Oral and Public History at California State University, 
Fullerton, collected 200 interviews in the late 1960s and early 1970s and are available 
through the University. However, this project focused primarily on the personal life of 
Richard Nixon and not on his Presidency or the Nixon Administration. Klein was not 
among those interviewed. The Nixon Foundation itself conducted an oral history project 
of the President in the 1970s up to his entrance into the White House. However, the 
Watergate scandal derailed the project and the oral histories have not been released. They 
are presently housed at Whittier College. Other oral history projects were undertaken in 
the 1980s and the 2000s but not completed.  
Herbert Klein’s oral history was conducted on February 20th, 2007, two years 
prior to his death. The interview was conducted by Timothy J. Naftali and David 
Greenberg in San Diego, CA. The transcript of the interview as well as the audio and 
video were accessed in their entirety through the Presidential Library. The duration of the 
oral history is 234 minutes. The oral history of Herbert Klein has not been used in a 
substantive way in existing literature. 
The exit interview of Herbert Klein was conducted on July 13th, 1973 by John R. 
Nesbitt and Terry W. Good in Room 160 of the Old Executive Office Building. The 
interview covers Klein’s work and relationship with Richard Nixon from 1946 to 1969. 
This is perhaps one of the richest, and only, sources of information regarding the early 
relationship between the two. Of significance is Klein’s description of his responsibilities 
as Director of Communications.  
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Summary 
This dissertation utilizes the primary source information located in the 
Presidential Library of Richard Nixon as well as Klein’s Collection housed at the 
University of Southern California. These sources are used to provide a substantive 
evaluation of Herbert Klein as a historical figure worthy of investigation and worthy of 
being elevated within the historiography of the Richard Nixon White House. Through the 
investigation of Herbert Klein’s role in the development of media relations within the 
Administration, as well as his influence on the contemporary construction of press 
relations, this dissertation fills a gap in the existing literature that Klein played a 
significant yet understated role in the tension between hostility and transparency within 
Nixon’s Administration.  
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CHAPTER 2 
1946 – 1968: KLEIN AND THE CAMPAIGN YEARS 
Klein and Nixon Cross Paths 
Fresh out of the Navy, a young Herbert Klein worked as a reporter and editor at 
the Alhambra Post-Advocate, a small newspaper in Southern California, near where he 
had earned his journalism degree at the University of Southern California.55 It was 1946. 
World War II had ended and the U.S. was on the verge of Cold War. President Harry S 
Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, establishing the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission. The United States was in recovery and the nation was looking forward. 
Klein was 28-years-old. As the norm at a small weekly outfit like the Alhambra Post-
Advocate, Klein covered a multitude of beats and executed various tasks at the paper. He 
was assigned to covering politics, though his dream was to be a sports reporter.56 At the 
time, Richard Nixon was a fledgling politician, but making a name for himself. He, like 
Klein, had completed his service with the Navy, something that Klein felt created an 
intangible bond between the two. Nixon was running in California’s 12th congressional 
district. Klein was one of the many young journalists he would meet, but one of the few 
that would remain in close contact with Nixon for the next five decades.  
A 33-year-old Nixon showed great interest in knowing members of the press. He 
visited Klein’s paper regularly, meeting with the publisher, journalists and even the 
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printers.57 Klein recalled how young Nixon looked. Nixon was struggling to appear older, 
perhaps to make him seem like a more seasoned candidate. One supporter had suggested 
he wear a hat to add some age.58 Appearance was a focus early on. Despite Nixon’s 
apparent youth and political inexperience, Klein was quickly impressed with him. 
Although Klein had no particular interest in politics and had even less experience 
covering it, Nixon drew him in. From then, a tumultuous bond began.  
Klein’s budding admiration of Nixon evolved into a friendship, albeit slowly. “I 
listened to him speak, and I listened to him debate, so I became casual friends, not close 
friends at all,” Klein said.59 As the years passed, their relationship took many forms. First 
as friend, then as foe and ending as weathered but loyal companions. Klein was in pursuit 
of a moral truth, and according to Nixon’s biographer Stephen Ambrose, Nixon was in an 
almost constant struggle to protect his legacy from it.60 The two, in their pursuits and 
their personalities, were never fully found themselves on the same page, despite a 
decades long relationship that took them from small-town coffee shop chats to Oval 
Office briefings.   
The following overview of the campaign years (1947-1968) of Richard Nixon 
provides a description of at the emerging relationship between Klein and Nixon and how 
Klein straddled the fence between journalism and politics. The 1968 presidential election 
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introduces Nixon’s emerging television press strategies in greater specificity with less of 
a focus on Klein himself. Klein played a lesser role in this larger campaign but firmly 
situated himself within the growing circle of Nixon advisors, subsequently ensuring a 
position within Nixon’s White House.  
The 1946 and 1948 Congressional Elections 
During his campaign for Congress in 1945, Nixon used the growing propaganda 
movement, and the subsequent mounting fear of communism, to his advantage against 
Jerry Voorhis, a five-term congressman.61 Part of Voorhis’ platform, was a pledge to not 
accept money from communist supported organizations. This included the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC) which was believed to 
have been infiltrated by communist supporters.62 During a campaign debate, Nixon 
suggested that Voorhis was in fact supported by communist-friendly groups. When 
Voorhis denied the allegation, and demanded Nixon produce evidence, Nixon 
dramatically and publicly produced documentation that showed that Voorhis was 
supported by the NCPAC, the National Citizens Political Action Committee.63 While the 
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NCPAC did not have communist ties, Nixon had effectively planted the idea in the minds 
of the public that Voorhis was supported by “the PAC.” Although Voorhis pointed out 
that Nixon was holding a NCPAC document and not holding a document involving the 
controversial CIO PAC, scholars suggest that the false association was enough to plant 
the seed of doubt in the eyes of the public in the midst of the Red Scare. Nixon unseated 
five-term Voorhis and began his transformation into “Tricky Dick.”64 
Klein, who was closely following Nixon by this time, disagreed with the 
conventional interpretation of events when interviewed some 60 years later. “They say 
that was because of communism and this kind of thing, which wasn’t the case. Voorhis 
had not paid attention to this district. He was becoming a nationally famous congressman 
who took pride in what he was doing in Washington, not in [unintelligible] Valley, and so 
he was damaged, I think, when Nixon made it a local, personal campaign in that fashion,” 
he said.65 In fact, Klein didn’t see communism as an issue at all. Debates were centered 
around post-war issues, including jobs and roads, and other less controversial issues. 
Klein had attended all of them and according to him, Voorhis lost not because Nixon was 
“tricky” but because Nixon was more astute with his constituency. Contrary to 
conventional historical narratives, Klein felt Nixon’s strength was his ability to connect 
with people on a personal level. Nixon’s comfort with reaching constituents by speaking 
directly to the people and building relationships with local media began early in his 
political career. Klein recalled, “…I thought Voorhis did not perform well, and I was 
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impressed at how Nixon did perform. I obviously didn’t know how good his ability as a 
debater or anything of this kind, but it was the first time I heard him debate, and I was 
very much impressed, and I voted for him.”66 Others too posited that Voorhis’ loss was 
not entirely a result of “Tricky Dick.” Voorhis emerging political celebrity distanced him 
from locals as much as it ingratiated him to the political elites.67 Still, the prevailing 
narrative of a malicious Nixon remains, and remains a pivotal point in Nixon’s 
historiography. 
Nixon ran for reelection the following term. He wasn’t a managed candidate, 
according to Klein, or at least he didn’t appear as such. He had a campaign committee, 
including Harrison McCall, Frank Jorgensen and Arthur Kruse, but his biggest campaign 
support came from his wife, Thelma Catherine “Pat” Nixon, who was pregnant with 
Nixon’s first daughter, Julie.68 Pat rarely spoke for Nixon, but she traveled with him as 
much as possible. Klein’s support of Nixon resulted in budding relationships with 
Nixon’s family as well. Klein show spirited support on Nixon’s campaign trail as well. 
Klein recalled that he “…went to his last campaign – or his last stand, which was in 
Whittier, and we all dressed up as Indians to come out and beat horns [sic] and beat two 
things to get attention. And Pat Nixon kidded me about that for years afterward.”69  At 
                                                
66   Ibid. 
67   Gellman, Irwin F. The Contender: Richard Nixon, The Congress Years, 1946-1952. S.l.: Yale University 
Press, 2017, 169. 
68   Ibid.; Gellman, Irwin F. The Contender: Richard Nixon, The Congress Years, 1946-1952. S.l.: Yale 
University Press, 2017, 169. 
69   Herbert G. Klein recorded interview by Timothy J. Naftali and David Greenberg, 20 February 2007, the 
Richard Nixon Oral History Project of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. 
  39   
the time, it wasn’t an issue for a young reporter to be involved in the politics in which he 
or she was covering, at least at a minimal level.70 A connection to a candidate, like the 
one Klein was developing with Nixon, was far more advantageous for a small newspaper 
and any concern over potential bias and it would likely have been overlooked in favor of 
access. As a journalist, Klein was cultivating a source. As a supporter and friend, Klein 
was forging a path into American political history.  
Klein used his personal resources to encourage the Pomona chapter of the U.S. 
Junior Chamber of Commerce71 to turn out for some of Nixon’s campaign.72 This was no 
small favor.  Attention from the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce resulted in a 
significant publicity break for Nixon. On January 21, 1948, the Chamber selected him as 
one of the nation’s Ten Outstanding Young Men of 1947. The Pomona chapter awarded 
him the Good Government Award in front of 500 guests at the end of that year as well. 
After that, the same chapter nominated him for national recognition, of which he was 
selected as the recipient.73 Nixon continued to rise in the ranks, winning the nomination 
and then the election.  
During Nixon’s four years in Congress, he and Klein routinely meet during 
Nixon's returns to California. Nixon was friendly with the small newspapers in 
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California. When in California, he would hold breakfast meetings with the editors or 
publishers of small dailies and weeklies, according to Klein.74 He would call various 
reporters as well. “I became more deeply interested because he would come by and we’d 
go out and have a cup of coffee…” said Klein.75 Nixon would talk to him about 
everything from the “Alger Hiss matter” to his growing concerns about the “Washington 
press.”76 Nixon was a little-known politician and Hiss had clout. For someone in Nixon’s 
position to lodge accusations against a figure like Hiss was considered a career risk. 
Klein said Nixon felt the media was establishing him as an exposer, not an investigator, 
attempting to reveal an unforgivable truth about a favorite public figure.77 He was 
worried, Klein recalled, that the “Hiss business” was ruining him and that he would soon 
be forced to leave Congress as a result. The situation with Hiss grew Nixon’s frustration 
with the media’s portrayal of him. Klein sat at the precipice with him and Nixon 
continued to confide in Klein over cups of coffee in California. 
In one of their later chats, Nixon shared his experiences while serving on the 
Herter Committee.78 Congressman Nixon had been chosen to be part of a nineteen-
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member committee to go to Europe, headed by Congressman Christian Herter. The goal 
of the committee was to report on the feasibility of Secretary of State, General George 
Marshal’s post-war foreign aid plan.79 It was a valuable opportunity for a young 
congressman looking to advance his career but Nixon had his reservations. Nixon told 
Klein how he preferred to roam the countryside on foreign travels rather than attend 
embassy parties. He preferred casually meeting with and talking to locals. He enjoyed 
chatting with the locals, hearing their thoughts and learning about their hopes. This 
divulgence stands in stark contrast to the prevailing narrative of a rigid and socially 
awkward Nixon. Where scholarship often suggests Nixon’s personality was primarily 
reclusive, Klein’s telling reveals a more nuanced character, one that felt at peace with 
people. 
Nixon traveled for the Herter Committee but returned an internationalist.80 Klein 
admired this. “...[Nixon] became a real great expert of the century.” His revelation to 
Klein denoted something significant and Klein recognized it. Nixon was far better suited 
for relaxed and unrehearsed conversation with people than he was with stiff formality. 
Klein was privy to the relaxed and personable Nixon and it is this Nixon that drew him 
to, and kept him by, Nixon’s side. Although Nixon’s legacy was marred by perceptions 
of him as an awkward politician, Klein, understood this was a fallacy. According to 
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Klein, Nixon was never truly an introvert, or at least to the extent it has been suggested in 
scholarship. Instead, Nixon simply preferred to relate to individuals one-on-one.81 “My 
friendship developed because we’d have a lot of times together just one on one, and it 
was at ease…” said Klein.82 Klein was becoming a friend of sorts to Nixon, or at the very 
least, an acquaintance.  
Nixon displayed less hesitation toward the press. Klein, of course, was a friendly 
reporter and that undoubtedly made a difference in demeanor, but even so, Nixon’s 
coffee breaks and breakfast meetings with local journalists suggested a politician not 
unfriendly to the press. Granted, the local reporters were far from those entrenched in the 
“Eastern establishment.” However, even as President, Nixon rarely spoke ill of local 
newspaper and media. A revaluation of the somewhat reductive perception of Nixon as a 
long-time and aggressive opponent of all press is required following the evaluation of 
Klein’s unique relationship with Nixon over the entire span of his political career.  
Between the years of 1948 and 1950, Klein and Nixon met frequently. Klein recalled a 
moment in a small coffee shop when the two were simultaneously at crossroads in their 
careers. Nixon was considering leaving the House Un-American Activities Committee.83 
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Klein wondered whether he should stay in the newspaper business at all. He had a few 
offers from other papers but he considered asking Nixon if he might secure a position as a 
Postmaster.84 “I don’t think he was seriously thinking of leaving the Committee, and I 
wasn’t seriously thinking of being Postmaster…but we had just sort of an informal 
friendship during the time,” said Klein.85 Klein and Nixon chatted about their future 
plans, unbeknownst to them that their paths would bring them closer together. 
The 1950 Senate Election 
In 1950, Nixon ran against Helen Douglas for a Senate seat. He made use of 
similar tactics as with Voorhis. Nixon compared Douglas’s voting record to Communist 
Party candidate Vito Marcantonio. He called this comparison the Douglas-Marcantonio 
axis.86 Again, the connection of the two in the minds of the public did not sit well, 
regardless of the actual similarities. Nixon won that election, and with it, the moniker, 
“Tricky Dick.” Klein again denied that the issue with Douglas originated with Nixon and 
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that it had anything to do with communism, “It was states issues and leadership, which 
[unintelligible’ [Nixon’s] philosophy.”87 
 During Nixon’s campaign against Douglas, Klein served as president of the 
Alhambra Chapter of the Junior Chamber. Although Klein served only as an unofficial 
advisor to Nixon during his campaign, he, again, used his position on the Junior Chamber 
to leverage support.88 Nixon himself had been honored by the Junior Chamber earlier in 
his career. Klein used his connections to convince some friends in the Junior Chamber to 
become chairmen of the Nixon Senate Campaign in different cities. “Although I was not 
in the campaign myself, I had these people as key people on his behalf working for 
him…,” said Klein. He would later serve as Nixon’s press agent. Klein extended the 
resources that he had to aid Nixon. His personal support of the future President denoted 
an emerging loyalty that would continue even after Nixon’s resignation decades later.  
 Nixon was still relatively new in government. He had little political experience 
and was running for a big position in state Senate. Although Klein was aware of Nixon’s 
desire to run for Senate, his ambition surprised even Klein. Nixon confided in him when 
he was considering his run, revealing his plans during one of their one-on-one chats. 
Though surprised, Klein had confidence in Nixon, despite his scant two-terms in office. 
Still, Nixon’s previous win was decisive and the Hiss case provided name recognition. 
People knew who he was, and in a year when the incumbent was not running, this was as 
good of a time as any for Nixon to make his move. Klein didn’t discourage or encourage 
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him.89 He just listened, as he had many times before, over coffee with a future president 
of the United States.  
 In September 1950, Klein was promoted to a position as a features and editorial 
writer for the San Diego Evening Tribune. He was asked to work from the paper’s 
Washington Bureau for the two months that coincided with the end of Nixon’s campaign. 
His first story was the attempted assassination of Harry S Truman.90 Nixon took an 
interest in Klein’s work as a journalist, asking him about his coverage of everything from 
his interview with Douglas MacArthur in Japan to coverage of the Bikini atomic tests.91,92 
Over the course of those assignments, Klein sharpened his skills as a political reporter. 
As he was becoming more knowledgeable on big-time Washington government, Nixon 
was building relationships with weekly editors in his district, holding breakfast meetings 
well into his Senatorial term.93 It would seem that the two were priming each other for 
future positions. Klein was learning more about the inner workings of politics from 
Nixon, and Nixon was picking Klein’s journalistic brain about how politics was covered.  
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The 1952 Vice Presidential Election 
 Klein went to work for Nixon in 1952, a little unexpectedly. While larger papers 
had sent reporters to cover the 1952 convention, Klein’s employer couldn’t afford it. In 
fact, he only learned of Nixon’s nomination as Vice President while cutting his lawn at 
his new Pasadena home. The radio played loudly over the hum of his lawn mower. “I was 
surprised, but I thought I was pleased for him, but I didn’t expect any more,” Klein 
recalled.94 Klein received a message days later from James Bassett, a temporarily-retired 
editor from the Los Angeles Times and Nixon’s press secretary, asking that Klein run the 
press in California. Klein was unsure. He didn’t know how it might work out with his 
boss, owner Jim Copley. He told Bassett that he must call Copley. Bassett didn’t. Instead, 
Nixon reached out to Copley personally. Copley approved a leave of absence for Klein, 
and Klein began work on Nixon’s campaign.95  
 Klein worked from Los Angeles throughout the general election campaign, and 
the “fund crisis.”96 Nixon’s spot on Eisenhower’s ticket, as well as his political career, 
were in jeopardy when he was accused of operating an improper political fund.97 In the 
midst of the emerging controversy, Nixon decided to travel the West Coast via train. 
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Klein and his California team were tasked with organizing a rally in Pomona, California 
where Nixon would board the train. The plan was simple. Each time the train would pull 
up to a station, reporters would have the opportunity to phone in their stories. However, 
as the plans were made and the accusations abounded, Nixon suddenly decided to fly 
back to California from Washington and make a speech. “What I remember about the 
speech was that he decided he only wanted to be in the studio with Pat Nixon, no one else 
in the studio, no one in the audience, so he could feel like he was directly talking to the 
people in their living room,” said Klein. This became a staple for Nixon. According to 
Klein, Nixon disliked speaking to large crowds and he much preferred instances where he 
could, at least feel, as though it was just him and the people, no cameras, no screens, no 
press.98 Klein oversaw press relations at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, where 
Nixon was staying.99 
 On September 23, 1952, Nixon spoke directly to the American people via 
television, carefully and meticulously documenting the allegations of misuse of campaign 
funds. He addressed each one in detail. Nixon disclosed his personal finances and spoke 
of his humble upbringings, closing the gap between him and the American people. He 
ended his speech by placing his political future in the hands of the Republican committee. 
He would support Dwight D. Eisenhower regardless of whether he would remain on the 
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ticket in light of the allegations, and pled for the American people to do the same. The 
style of his speech, his candor and his one-on-one televised chat with the American 
people on television was unlike any tactic used by a politician before. Nixon had 
delivered what would become arguably, one of the most famous moments in presidential 
history, the Checkers Speech.100 Scholars suggest the Checkers Speech marked the 
beginning of the television age in politics in addition to saving Nixon’s career.101 Of 
primary significance, however, is the way in which the speech impacted Nixon’s 
perception of the power and use of television. For the first time, Nixon understood 
television as a tool to circumnavigate traditional press and establishment media.  
 No one fully knew what to expect following Nixon’s speech. There was no way to 
reliably gauge instant response. Klein, Nixon’s secretary Rose Mary Woods and Jim 
Bassett were in Nixon’s suite at the hotel when the phone rang. “I can’t get through to 
Western Union, but I just wanted to tell you I really thought that was a great speech,” said 
a voice, presumably from Miami. “…pretty soon we checked and found that Western 
Union was swamped, and it was probably the most powerful speech ever given in politics 
because of the reaction to it by the hundreds and the thousands,” recalled Klein.102  
 One response, or the lack thereof, was particularly noticeable to Nixon. Eisenhower 
was slower to respond to Nixon’s appearance. In fact, Nixon and his team had been waiting 
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in the suite to hear from Eisenhower’s team. Murray Chotiner, a manager of Nixon’s 1950 
campaign and adviser, said to him, “To hell with them,” and convinced Nixon to leave for 
his next stop. Klein felt there was little question that Nixon had done well. The consensus 
among the team, and in Nixon’s own opinion, was that the speech was a success – a pat on 
the back from Eisenhower could wait. When Nixon arrived, Eisenhower greeted him with, 
“That’s my boy.”103 Klein believed there had been debate on Eisenhower’s train that caused 
the delay. Nixon was young and seemingly a bit of a troublemaker. Perhaps Eisenhower 
was debating whether he could be forced off the ticket. If he was considering it, qualms 
were silenced by the influx of telegrams praising Nixon’s address.   
 According to Klein, the Checkers Speech had altered things for Nixon in two 
ways. One, Nixon had learned something important about television that night. Two, 
Nixon wasn’t dependent on Eisenhower in ways he may have previously thought. He had 
the ability to establish his own clout, elicit his own response from the public. “He became 
more independent that night,” recalled Klein.104 Eisenhower won the election with Nixon 
on his ticket and Klein returned to his career in journalism.  
The First Presidential Campaign 
By 1954, Klein traveled on few stretches with Nixon, observing and consulting. 
However, the two remained in contact. Nixon would call Klein to ask him about his 
assignments and Klein, when he was in Washington, would sometimes work out of the 
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then Vice President’s Office.105 Their continued relationship outside of campaign work, 
uniquely situated Klein. He wasn’t merely a staff member, he was a friend; a confidant. It 
also kept doors open for Klein to work on Nixon’s first presidential campaign.  
Klein was assigned to cover the 1956 Republican Convention in San Francisco, as head 
of a San Francisco news team. Soon after, Nixon asked Klein take another leave of 
absence to serve as assistant press secretary to Jim Bassett. Again, Nixon called Klein’s 
publisher directly to ask permission. Again, Klein was granted the time to return to 
Nixon’s side.106  
For Klein, the climax of the 1956 campaign was the nationally televised 
intercollegiate press conference that he planned. Klein and the team invited student 
editors from across the country to meet at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York and 
cover either a real White House press conference or Vice-Presidential press conference. 
Television was handled very carefully and while it had worked to Nixon’s advantage 
during the Checkers Speech, the situation was far more controlled. This would be a test 
for Nixon. Klein knew it was a risky position to put Nixon in, as Nixon was less likely to 
succeed in such a setting, but Klein was confident.107 Klein felt Nixon performed well 
and that the one-hour television show reflected positively on him. The risk paid off and 
served as further proof that when meticulously managed, television could serve Nixon as 
a powerful tool. 
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 In March 1959, just a few months after Klein became editor of the San Diego 
Union, Nixon requested he return to work on his presidential campaign. Klein felt it was 
important for him to stay at the Union in his new position for at least a few months before 
taking a leave of absence.108 Again, Klein asked that his publisher be called for 
permission. Again, Nixon called his publisher and in June of 1959 Klein served as 
Nixon’s press secretary and was considered the Assistant to the Vice President as well. 
He worked with Bob Finch and Leonard Hall on key strategy for Nixon. Jim Bassett, 
Nixon’s previous press secretary, with whom Klein had worked functioned as an adviser. 
The small staff traveled the fifty states, campaigning with Nixon and organizing 
convention activities.109  
Klein’s first assignment was to arrange a delegation to the Soviet Union. Klein 
was tasked with organizing press coverage and negotiating the treatment of reporters by 
the Soviets. This was a task that required careful navigation. Press freedoms were 
distinctly different in the Soviet Union than in the U.S.110 Klein met with individuals 
from the Soviet embassy in small cafés around Washington, D.C. He made a point not to 
be seen during the discussions. He negotiated terms that included an agreement that 
reporters would not be censored during the trip. What he hadn’t considered was 
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negotiating the same for Moscow reporters. This would create a problem for him in the 
future.111 Klein also gained approval for 200 reporters to join the delegation, so long as 
he could find a way to get them there. And he did. Klein, for the first time ever, secured 
an intercontinental jet for the press.112  
On the day of departure, Nixon left on Air Force One. Klein, in the first major trip 
for the Nixon team, boarded his press plane. He waved to his family, who had come to 
visit him in Washington, and in mid-wave, heard a familiar jingle. He was about to fly 
halfway across the country with his car keys in his pocket. Klein quickly stopped the 
plane and hurriedly stepped down the stairs to give his wife the car keys. He had 
accomplished two things that day, organizing a major international press event for the 
future president of the United States, and, as he put it, “saving his marriage.”113  
 The flight got off to a rocky start. A third backup system quit working when they 
reached the John F. Kennedy International airport. One plane switch later and they were 
back on track. Once they reached Soviet airspace, Soviet pilots took over. Despite the 
technical issues, the press plane landed before Nixon’s, as planned. The press plane 
landed and Nixon would be received by a second delegation. No top Soviet officials were 
present to meet Nixon. The muted opening of the trip failed to foreshadow its place in the 
annals of political history.  
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 That same night, Nixon and his wife, Pat, took a stroll through the streets of 
Moscow. Ordinarily this would have been a high-security situation, but no one knew of 
their outing. Nixon enjoyed exploring the streets, outside the stuffy banquet halls and 
boardrooms. The people of Moscow had no idea the Vice President of the United States 
was taking in the fresh air. The press certainly hadn’t been informed. Klein recalled that 
Pat drew attention on their outing that night, not as the wife of the Vice President of the 
United States, but for her shoes. Hers were pointy and the style in the Soviet Union was 
still blocky, square toed.114 Those little interactions were the type that Nixon appreciated. 
Nixon and Pat wandered Moscow, none the wiser. It was just the way Nixon liked it. 
 The next morning, on July 24th 1959, Nixon met with leaders Nikita Khrushchev, 
Leonid Brezhnev and Anastas Mikoyan.115 Reporters weren’t allowed inside the Kremlin. 
However, when Klein arrived at Khrushchev’s office he found two Soviet reporters 
present. Klein insisted that in fairness two American reporters be allowed in as well. He 
sent a member of the KGB to bring two U.S. reporters into the Kremlin, Ernie Barcella 
from United Press International (UPI) and Jack Bell from the Associated Press (AP).116  
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 Klein was present when Nixon met Khrushchev. Nixon and his team 
expected a short meeting. After some shaking of hands, patting of backs and photographs, 
of course, and it would be over. However, after the photographers left, Khrushchev 
delivered a speech about the Captive Nations Resolution, laden with expletives.117 The 
conversation that followed between Nixon and Khrushchev was friendly. In fact, 
although Klein had planned for Nixon and their team to explore the fairgrounds of the 
American Exhibition of 1959, on their own and meet with Khrushchev again later, as 
they were walking out, Khrushchev said, “I think I’ll go on too.”118, 119  Khrushchev, 
Nixon, some 200 reporters and Klein, along with a host of others left for the fairgrounds. 
NBC and Ampex had called on Klein to see if he could steer Nixon and Khrushchev 
toward them, so they could demonstrate a new-fangled technology - - videotape.120 This, 
of course, had not been planned and Nixon – a man who preferred to meticulously script 
his words for appearances in front of the press and particularly for television – was 
spending far greater time with Khrushchev than he anticipated. Klein’s main objective 
was to keep things moving while Nixon and Khrushchev looked through the exhibits. 
Khrushchev dominated the conversation. The debate that is largely regarded as the 
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“Kitchen Debates” began at the television exhibit and ended in the “kitchen.” The 
televised portion of it, Klein recalled, occurred because he had guided the two leaders 
toward the television exhibit.121 Khrushchev was unimpressed by Nixon’s promotion of 
color television and videotaping capability, noting that the Soviets had satellites and had 
already far surpassed the U.S. in technology. Nixon didn’t particularly push back, instead 
conceding that the Soviets had made significant advancements. This dynamic continued 
throughout their stroll through the fairgrounds. Klein advised Nixon, “If you’re going to 
get into any more debates, you’d better get tougher because he pushed you around.” 
Nixon simply responded, “Okay.”122 And what he did next remains one of the most 
remembered moments in Nixon’s political legacy.  
 Khrushchev and Nixon entered the “house exhibit” and started discussing 
the kitchen appliances. Klein, preoccupied with determining where he might lead the 
party next, left as Nixon said “I want to show you this kitchen. It is like those of our 
houses in California.,” to which Khrushchev responded, “We have such things.”123 In the 
time that Klein ventured off to pick their next stop and returned, Nixon and Khrushchev 
were engaged in the “Kitchen Debate,” talking about foreign bases and atomic weapons, 
with cameras and crowds surrounding them.124 The American media response was 
initially mixed with the New York Times suggesting it was little in the way of 
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substance.125 Time magazine, however, suggested it was "managed in a unique way to 
personify a national character proud of peaceful accomplishment, sure of its way of life, 
confident of its power under threat."126 For Klein, this was somewhat of a personal 
victory. Nixon had gotten tougher, as he had suggested, and for the moment, the press 
response was positive. The moment would be remembered as one of Nixon’s best.127     
Alongside the “Kitchen Debates,” in perhaps the most widely discussed and best 
remembered moments in Nixon’s political campaigning history, was his televised debate 
with John F. Kennedy in 1960. Nixon’s run for president in 1960 seemed inevitable after 
his success as Vice President. Klein, was again by his side. However, Nixon structured 
his campaign in a somewhat unconventional way. Bob Finch, the former Lieutenant 
Governor of California, ran his campaign. Finch shared everything with Klein and the 
two functioned as a team, dealing with the press and structure of the campaign 
interchangeably. Others, including Leonard Hall, James Bassett and Bob Wilson were 
brought on to manage other aspects of the campaign.  
Nixon was very much conscious of his “Tricky Dick” reputation and was now 
fostering a new image following a successful vice presidency. Moments like his Checkers 
Speech and the “Kitchen Debates” supported the idea that Nixon was a serious politician 
of substance. He was committed to projecting a man less likely to use gimmicks to win 
votes. Despite rumors and criticism regarding Kennedy’s health and religion, 
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respectively, Nixon opted to avoid the use of either as a political tactic.128 Klein 
acknowledged this but felt Nixon may have been overly conscious of the moniker, at 
times costing himself votes as a result. He recalled a defining moment when Martin 
Luther King Jr. was jailed just weeks before the Presidential election.129 Klein 
recommended Nixon call and talk to him but Bill Rogers, U.S. Attorney General and 
close adviser to Nixon, thought it might impact the Southern vote if they did. Supposedly 
not wanting to seem as though he was campaigning for votes, and not wanting to lose his 
base either, Nixon opted not to make the call. Klein felt that cost him many potential 
African American votes, votes from which he felt Kennedy greatly benefited.130, 131 
Nixon was not blind to the impact of ignoring Klein’s recommendation to make the call. 
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In 1968, when Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated, Nixon made the call to his 
family.  
As the campaign wore on, Nixon gave Klein strict instructions to avoid debates. 
Klein had been courted by numerous news organizations regarding the subject. He used 
his friendships with the press to downplay the issue. This made Nixon’s announcement 
that he was going to debate, during his nomination press conference, an even bigger 
surprise. Though Klein never asked Nixon what changed his mind regarding the debates, 
Klein felt it was Nixon’s concern that if he failed to debate, he would be pummeled by 
the press.132 At the time, Nixon’s relationship with television was largely a good one. It 
had worked to his advantage thus far and so the idea of a televised debate was not 
particularly concerning despite a tense relationship with the press. Still, he preferred 
speaking directly to the public, uninhibited by the filter of the press. This more direct 
setup had worked for him in years prior. Nixon did not favor the optics of a televised 
speech on stage. He knew he would have to be well prepared. 
John F. Kennedy named Leonard Reinsch as his advisor on television for the 
debates.133 Reinsch, from Kennedy’s camp and Klein, from Nixon’s, were responsible for 
most of the negotiating regarding the debate format. Of the three debates, the consensus 
was that the last debate would be the most important. For Nixon’s camp, their strengths 
would best show in this debate as the topics would be on international relations. The first 
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debate would focus on domestic policy, and the second and third would cover general 
questions. Klein realized the mistake when the first debate drew the largest crowd simply 
out of curiosity. Debates like this one were new and drew public interest for their novelty 
as much as for their substance. Nixon’s weakness on the first debate compounded the 
already apparent issues with his make-up. Klein, however, attributed some of Nixon’s 
failings at the debate to Nixon’s propensity to be too polite.134 Nixon seemed determined 
to not let “Tricky Dick” back in, but again, Klein, felt he overcompensated and ultimately 
let JFK into the White House instead. Throughout his time with Nixon, and made more 
evident by the debates, Klein began to surmise that Nixon’s preoccupation with his 
personal image would backfire and ultimately hurt him in the end.  
Although televised debate has become a staple in any discussion of Nixon and his 
animosity toward the media, the impact of the debate played less of a role in Nixon’s 
media relationship than often suggested. A sweaty and unhealthy-looking Nixon 
juxtaposed against a young and energetic Kennedy arguably sparked both popular and 
scholarly conversation on presidential image and the power of television.135 Popular 
narratives suggest that for those who could see Nixon, the consensus was that Kennedy 
had run away with the win. For those who had listened to the debates on the radio, the 
consensus was that Nixon had clearly won. This, however, has been widely debated and 
disputed. If the closeness of the popular vote was an indication (Kennedy beat Nixon by 
less than two two-tenth of a percent) the televised debates did not have as significant an 
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influence as suggested.136 Still, Nixon’s historiography is laden with suggestions that 
Nixon’s distrust and distaste for television were directly related to the televised debates.  
Although Nixon’s physical appearance during the debates may have had less of an 
effect on the popular vote, the subsequent coverage, the descriptions of Nixon in 
juxtaposition with Kennedy arguably had impact enough on Nixon and his evolving 
relationship with the news media. Perhaps of greatest significance in the conversations 
following the debates was Nixon’s belief that he was somehow the victim of the Kennedy 
family and their use of money and influence on the media to work on their behalf, and 
subsequently against him. Nixon wrote in his memoirs that he vowed after that election to 
prevent anyone from having the upper hand in political tactics the next time he entered an 
election.137 Historian and journalist Garry Wills posits that Nixon’s attitude following the 
1960 election suggests the inevitability of Watergate.138, 139 Nixon lost to Kennedy in one 
of the closest presidential elections in the United States. 
Following Klein’s reading of Nixon’s concession, Bob Finch, Don Hughes, Rose 
Mary Woods and Klein flew to Key Biscayne after a short stop in Washington. Klein 
recalled never having seen Nixon so low.140 One evening at the Key Biscayne Inn, where 
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Nixon and his campaign team were having dinner following his loss, the maître d 
informed them that there was a call for Mr. Nixon. Klein took the call. It was Herbert 
Hoover who had received a call from Joe Kennedy. The father of the newly elected 
President had asked if Nixon would meet with JFK. Nixon’s spirits lifted, he called 
Eisenhower first, and then the maître d’s phone rang again. Klein took the call again and 
this time it was Kennedy himself. After both conversations ended, the team decided 
Nixon should speak with Kennedy directly and so he did. In the little phone booth, on a 
pay phone at the Key Biscayne Inn, Nixon called Kennedy who was in Palm Beach at his 
family compound. Nixon offered to visit Kennedy but Kennedy replied, “No, I can get a 
helicopter. I’ll come to Key Biscayne.” The following Monday the two met in one of the 
Inn’s suites. Nixon told him then that he would not contest the election, though there had 
been pressure for him to do so.141 Kennedy offered Nixon a position in his Cabinet to 
which Nixon replied, “No, I should be the loyal opposition.” Klein felt that was one of 
the most important decisions of Nixon’s political career.142  
Nixon’s 1962 Run for Governor 
After the 1960s elections and his 1961 writing of Six Crises, Nixon decided to run 
for governor of California. The night before Nixon made his decision, he had dinner with 
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Klein and a few others at a seafood restaurant on a beach in Malibu to discuss what they 
already assumed he would - - to run.143 Nixon set up a new team, many of whom would 
follow him into the White House years later. Bob Haldeman served as campaign 
manager. Haldeman had worked with Nixon as his advance man in 1956 and as his aide 
in 1960. Klein hadn’t planned to join Nixon’s campaign but when it became apparent that 
Nixon was falling behind, Nixon called on Klein to join the team.144 Klein was forty-four 
at the time and served as Nixon’s press secretary and special assistant. Ronald Ziegler, 
then only twenty-two years old, served as Nixon’s press aide. Klein worked closely with 
Ziegler. Dwight Chapin, Bob Finch and John Ehrlichman also joined Nixon’s team. Of 
them, only Klein knew Nixon from the start of Nixon’s political career.145,146 Nixon’s 
team was young and eager but they provided little guidance for Nixon. Nixon seemingly 
managed his own campaign. His commands were carried out by aides, instead of his 
actions evaluated by advisors.147 This was a habit he would find difficult to shake. When 
plans were finalized with his team, Nixon saw fit to change them on a whim. This 
tendency would lead to one of the most infamous moments of his political career – one 
which many considered a career-ender, including Klein.  
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Nixon’s campaign was tumultuous. A contentious battle between Nixon and 
Edmund Gerald “Pat” Brown Sr. led to allegations of “outside money” and a host of 
smears between the two candidates.148 News coverage of the campaign was plentiful and 
Nixon felt he had been treated badly by the press. Nixon’s biographer, Stephen Ambrose, 
contended, “In the judgment of this author, the reporters and their publishers were highly 
professional. The major newspapers in the state assigned their top political reporters to 
the campaign, gave equal space to the candidates…and recorded accurately what they 
said…Reading their stories twenty-five years later, one would be hard pressed to find any 
favoritism.”149 In fact, Klein himself suggested there was little reason to blame the press 
for Nixon’s loss. Nixon’s own press secretary wrote, “…the election was not decided by 
press coverage. The press mainly reported what was said by the two candidates – and, 
with exception, little more.”150 Nixon’s perceptions of an unfair, accusatory and 
combative press were escalating. 
The former Vice President of the United States and presidential candidate lost a 
much smaller election by a large, and unexpected, margin. Klein knew it would be best to 
keep Nixon away from the press when it came time to concede. On November 7 the 
morning after election day and his loss, Nixon said to Klein, “I don’t want you to try to 
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talk me into going down to that goddamn press.”151 Klein told Nixon that having him 
speak to the press wasn’t part of the plan. Instead, Finch would write thank you notes to 
the campaign team and Klein would concede to the press. Things turned out differently. 
According to Klein, two of Nixon’s close friends spoke with Nixon prior to Klein’s 
speech and convinced him to confront the press. According to Nixon, he had seen on 
television as he was leaving the hotel a reporter ask, “Where’s Nixon” in an “insulting 
tone.” Nixon then said, “I’m going down there.”152 In either case, Klein was just as 
surprised as most when Nixon tapped him on his shoulder during his statement.153 During 
a 15-minute prepared monologue, Nixon criticized the press coverage during the 
campaign, eventually famously and indignantly saying, “You don’t have Nixon to kick 
around anymore.”154,155 
The backlash from Nixon’s speech was swift, but in retrospect, the ramifications 
held even more weight. The press was bitter, particularly the local press that had 
supported Nixon in many of his political campaigns. Nixon said to Klein following the 
press conference, “Damn it, I know you didn’t want me to do that. But I had to say it. I 
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had to say it.”156 The day following the press conference, Klein drafted an apology to the 
press on Nixon’s behalf: 
On the morning after the election, I made a concluding statement which has been 
interpreted by some as a general attack on the press. This was not my intent. My 
irritation has been with some specific reporting but certainly not with the press as 
a whole. Obviously, in the stress of the hour, I did not make this as clear as I 
intended to. Over the years I have built many friendships with members of the 
press, and I treasure these greatly. I also would like to reiterate my comment that 
many of the newspapers have done an outstanding job of reporting. In any event, I 
have concluded after reflection that these remarks were inappropriate and 
ungraceful, and I desire to withdraw them. At some future time I may perhaps set 
forth with deliberate care my observations on the role of the press corps in 
political campaigns.157 
 
Klein was never sure if Nixon had read the statement and the statement was never 
issued by Nixon. Klein noted his own frustration with Nixon at the time, having felt 
personally wounded by Nixon’s attack on reporters during that press conference. “I 
thought ironically that this worst outburst was a show of human, spontaneous anger 
which was contrary to the image of him as a mechanical political figure. But in many 
ways, the public statement illustrates clearly the continued feeling of Nixon toward a 
critical press,” wrote Klein.158 In his retrospective on his years in the Nixon White House, 
Klein brought back Nixon’s treatment of the press to that moment, “He could contain this 
feeling when he needed to, but later, after his first two years in the White House, he felt 
no great need to disguise his contempt for the working press, and thus he would issue a 
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variety of outlandish orders which further strained the relationship.”159,160 Klein and 
Nixon began to diverge at that moment. Ever a newsman, as loyal as Klein was to Nixon, 
his loyalty to the press was greater.  
Howard K. Smith’s TV segment, the “Obituary of Richard Nixon” followed 
Nixon’s loss and increasingly criticized his concession press conference.161 Klein 
assumed the moment marked the end of Nixon. He would later suggest that, “…it’s 
another one of these classic moments of Nixon on television having this very important 
effect on his career.”162 Nixon pursued a career as a lawyer between 1963 and 1967, but 
he by no means, was done with politics. 
Klein, Nixon, Television and the 1968 Presidential Election 
The election of 1968 occurred during one of the most tumultuous times in the 
history of the nation. Political riots shook cities and college campuses and the emergence 
of a counter culture clashed with the buttoned up middle class of the 1950s and early 
1960s. The United States was in the midst of a war that seemed to have no end; a war that 
was, for the first time, shown first hand to the American people through television. The 
nation was on the verge of economic decline.  
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While Nixon’s 1962 campaign seemed to many as the nail in the coffin of his 
political career, time at a law firm proved fruitful. He met his future campaign manager 
John Mitchell and Leonard Garment, a future presidential advisor.163 Due largely to the 
impact of the Vietnam War, the Republican Party was looking for a change. Nixon’s 
political stance as a Republican moderate, his support and careful work for Barry 
Goldwater and the success of the Republican Party in 1966 (Nixon earned a great deal of 
credit within his party for his campaign in 35 states and surpassing 100 candidates) 
placed him in the ideal position.164 A door was open for Nixon to remerge as a 
formidable candidate in the upcoming presidential election with renewed party ties and 
support. During that time, Ronald Reagan emerged as a conservative darling, but his 
limited experience in a public office separated him from the more experienced Nixon. 
The man who years earlier had professed to have had his “last press conference” was 
proudly situated as the Republican frontrunner for the 1968 Republican presidential 
ticket. Known to be a constant campaigner, Nixon wasted no time in rolling out his old 
tactics to bolster his position.  
By 1967, Nixon was ready for a comeback. On January 7 and 8 of that year, 
Nixon arranged a meeting at the Waldorf Astoria Towers in New York City.165 “The 
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purpose of this group is to begin planning now to win the nomination…It is not the 
purpose of this group to help me on the issues,” said Nixon.166 Nixon’s primary concern 
was not positioning himself firmly on political platforms as much as it was to effectively 
position himself as the opposite of sitting President Lyndon B. Johnson. Nixon was less 
concerned about his ability to beat his party opponents. He saw George Romney as his 
biggest rival. Then, Senator Charles Percy of Illinois and after him, Ronald Reagan. For 
Nixon, his biggest challenger was himself.  
At this point in his career, Nixon had not won an election on his own in seventeen 
years. He’d won against Jerry Voorhis in 1949 and then against Helen Douglas for a 
Senate seat in 1950. He famously lost to John F. Kennedy in 1960 and then to Pat Brown 
in 1962. Even for those who liked and supported Nixon, he didn’t seem able to win.  
“There was no denying that the odds against [winning the nomination] were formidable. 
After 1960 and 1962, I had what every politician dreads most, a loser image. In fact, after 
the ‘last press conference,’ I had a sore loser image,” wrote Nixon in his memoirs.167  
Nixon’s men knew this. “If we could convince delegates that Dick could win, 
then he’s in,” said Finch.168 Nixon would need to enter the primaries and prove he could 
win. The opportunity to face his opponents head-to-head was rapidly approaching. The 
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New Hampshire primary was just months away on March 12. Wisconsin (April 2), 
Nebraska (May 14) and Oregon (May 28) would follow. A sense of urgency filled the 
Waldorf suite. Nixon’s men urged him to immediately begin making speeches, 
appearances and taking interviews. That would be the way to forge ahead and position 
him as a winner. Nixon refused.  
Instead, Nixon opted to spend the next six months traveling abroad on “fact-
finding” missions. Foreign policy was a primary issue in 1968 politics and of personal 
interest to Nixon. He would use the time to advance his expertise on international 
relations from first-hand experience. Romney could spend his time in the public eye. 
Nixon would happily stay out of it, for the time being. His men however, were tasked 
were making certain that when he was ready to remerge on the campaign trail, every state 
would have an organization with advance-men, fundraisers and campaign managers 
waiting to push him toward the win. 
Nixon had his doubts about the campaign. Late on the night of December 22 in 
1967 he wrote them down on paper.  At the top of that list, on a fresh yellow pad, Nixon 
wrote “I have decided personally against becoming a candidate.” Nixon would not 
campaign like he had in any previous election. He was tired of the “charade” of political 
campaigns. He surprised even himself, when at the bottom of his list he wrote, “I don’t 
give a damn.”169 Richard Nixon wanted the presidency, but not as the Nixon of previous 
campaigns. His old tactics hadn’t worked. He recognized this, but he still wasn’t 
interested in playing the same campaign games as his opponents. This election, he’d do it 
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his way. He was a comeback kid with renewed patience and wisdom. He was a new 
Nixon.  
1968 brought forth more than a nation divided. It brought forth a nation changed. 
Vietnam protesters were no longer relegated to long-haired, bell-bottomed youth. They 
were part of the educated elite. The counter-culture was bleeding into the traditional, and 
the federal reaction to the emerging changes were at full force. On January 5, Dr. 
Benjamin Spock; William Sloan Coffin, the chaplain of Yale University; novelist 
Mitchell Goodman; Michael Ferber, a graduate student at Harvard; and peace activist 
Marcus Raskin were all indicted on conspiracy charges for encouraging draft-dodging. 
All were convicted, except Raskin who was acquitted of the charges. 
Just weeks later, the USS Pueblo, a Navy intelligence gathering ship, was 
captured at sea by North Korean patrol boats. All of its 83 crew members were charged 
with violating the country’s twelve-mile territorial limit. It would take 11 months before 
the crew was free. Only a week later, just past midnight on Wednesday, January 31, 
1968, North Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive at Nha Trang.170 In what is largely 
considered a turning point in the nation’s attitude toward the Vietnam War, 
approximately 70,000 North Vietnamese troops moved the battle from the country’s 
jungles to its cities. That morning, the U.S. embassy in Saigon was invaded.  
At home, Vietnam protestors and civil rights marches filled streets and campuses 
around the nation. While Americans fought and died on foreign soil, those at home faced 
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death and violence in their own cities, including two of the nation’s prolific leaders, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy.  A populous already on edge was quickly 
pushed over. The nation was searching for new leadership. 
Nixon’s campaign headquarters were situated at 521 Fifth Avenue in New York 
City. It was fitting that his headquarters was in the heart of an advertising mecca. 1968 
marked a nation still tending to the fresh wounds of losing a president while losing its 
sons and daughters in a foreign war. The emergence of the counter-culture and fighting 
overseas separated mother and daughter and father and son. The nation was unraveling at 
the seams. Nixon and his aides sought to mend it by whatever means necessary. 
With the Soviet Union now a nuclear equal to the United States and the Tet 
Offensive decisively changing the nation’s involvement in an increasingly complicated 
war, the people were clamoring for “new leadership.” This was no secret to Nixon and 
his campaign. They meticulously planned to sell him as the venerated leader the country 
so eagerly sought. Nixon had, to some extent, recreated himself. The Nixon of 1968 was 
calmer and more calculated than the one who faced Kennedy in 1960. As George 
Romney, Nixon’s Republican Party competitor, campaigned in gyms and appeared in 
malls across the nation, Nixon decided to maintain much less exposure. He was already 
known and had little to risk, other than overexposure.171 Overexposure meant the public 
might retain or worse, solidify the image they already had of Nixon - - as an unpleasant 
character with little appeal and even less political potential. In the past, television was 
bad to Nixon and his aides knew it. His campaign would need to be disciplined. Nixon’s 
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reemerging confidence in his chances helped ease the perceived unpleasantness of his 
character.  
“Gentlemen, this is not my last press conference.”172 Nixon stood before the press 
on February 2 as he began his 1968 campaign for the presidency at a press conference in 
a Holiday Inn in New Hampshire. Gallup polls showed him with a 40 percent lead over 
Romney, and 14 percent over Rockefeller. His confidence was tempered by an awareness 
of the those he felt were waiting for him to make a mistake. “I knew that the media would 
analyze and examine everything I did and said, and I would have to be extraordinarily 
careful of the image and tone my campaign projected.”173 
 After returning from a trip to Vietnam in mid-February of 1968, CBS anchor 
Walter Cronkite addressed the American people. He had traveled to the region to view 
the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. In a television special “Who, What, When, Where, 
Why?” Cronkite both criticized U.S. officials as well as contradicted official statements 
that were made regarding the war’s progress. Of the Offensive, as well as other military 
operations, Cronkite called for negotiation, "...not as victors, but as an honorable people 
who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could."174 This 
statement would resonate with the American people and create an even greater need for 
calculated rhetoric by Nixon’s men. A sense of deep national loss emerged from 
Cronkite’s broadcast. The next president of the United States would need to be able to 
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promise more than the end of a war. He would need to promise a rebuilding of a nation’s 
pride.  
   By mid-March, presidential campaigns were in full swing and Nixon felt safe as 
the preeminent choice for the party. Romney had dropped out of the race - - after a highly 
publicized comment he made regarding being “brainwashed” by American generals into 
supporting the Vietnam War - - much to the surprise and disappointment of Nixon. 
“Personally, I was disappointed by Romney’s withdrawal. Even though I had knocked 
him out of the ring, now I would win without having actually defeated an opponent in the 
election - - and the test of the election was, after all, the reason I had decided to enter the 
primaries in the first place,” wrote Nixon.175 Rockefeller withdrew on March 21. He 
announced that he had signed an affidavit removing his name from the Oregon primary. 
“Quite frankly,” he said, “I find it clear at this time that a considerable majority of the 
party’s leaders want the candidacy of former Vice President Richard Nixon, and it 
appears equally clear that they are keenly concerned and anxious to avoid any such 
divisive challenge within the party as marked the 1964 campaign.” 
 It was shock and awe at the March 12 New Hampshire primary for the 
Democratic Party. Eugene McCarthy, bolstered by two thousand student volunteers who 
were dedicating full-time hours, and an estimated five thousand who would dedicate their 
weekends, was a mere two hundred and thirty votes of defeating Lyndon Johnson. Robert 
F. Kennedy, then senator and former Attorney General entered the Presidential race on 
March 16. That same day, U.S. ground troops from the Charlie Company rampaged 
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through My Lai, killing about five hundred Vietnamese civilians, including infants and 
the elderly. Three American fliers intervened to end the massacre, positioning a 
helicopter between the troops and the Vietnamese, as well as removing the wounded to a 
safe location. The soldiers involved were charged with criminal offenses. None, other 
than the platoon leader were convicted.  
 At home, violence followed civil rights protests. On March 28, Martin Luther 
King, Jr. marched in Memphis, Tennessee on behalf of the Memphis African American 
sanitation workers. Nearly six thousand marched with him, some breaking storefront 
windows. King was convinced to leave what turned out to be his last ever civil rights 
march. Soon after he left, violence erupted on the streets. One young man was killed, 
sixty were injured and one hundred fifty arrested.  
 Days later, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed the nation on March 31 and 
announced his intent to limit the war in Vietnam. He then shared his decision to not seek 
reelection. The Wisconsin primary on April 2 proved no challenge for Nixon. He won 
79.4 percent of the Republican vote. McCarthy brought in 64 percent to now-withdrawn 
Johnson’s 34 percent. Just two days after the primary, King was assassinated while 
spending the day at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis. Robert F. Kennedy, having been told 
of the murder of King just before making a speech in Indiana, amended his notes and 
called for his audience to “tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of this 
world,” quoting Greek playwright Aeschylus.176  
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 A gentle world would have to wait. Riots erupted across the nation following 
King’s death. Forty-six deaths would result. In the midst of the pomp and circumstance of 
election season, the nation was wounded both at home and abroad. On Sunday, April 7, 
Nixon visited Mrs. King and the rest of the King family at their home in Atlanta. He 
attended Dr. King’s funeral two days later. He canceled all political activity in the two 
weeks following. For Nixon, Johnson’s decision against seeking reelection eased his 
journey to the White House, but the chaotic state of the nation perhaps posed his biggest 
opponent.  
 Affidavit aside, Rockefeller reentered the race on April 30th citing the events of 
the prior weeks as revelations as to the crises the American people faced. With 
Rockefeller back in, Ronald Reagan had an opening. A two-man contest against Nixon 
may have seemed insurmountable, but with the hope of Rockefeller denying votes to 
Nixon, Reagan placed his name on the ballot for the May 14 Nebraska primary. Nixon 
had little trouble surmounting the two. He garnered 70 percent of the votes. Reagan 
secured 22 percent and Rockefeller, five percent. The Oregon primary was on May 28, 
and for Nixon, it was his toughest battle yet. It was the last primary he would enter. He 
opted out of challenging Reagan in California, citing challenging Reagan’s “favorite son 
status” as a risk of dividing the party. He’d continue his own unique strategy to secure his 
nomination. Unlike his opponents, Nixon campaigned on the ground in Oregon for the 
May 28 primary. He won 73 percent of the vote. Reagan trailed with 23 percent and 
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Rockefeller collected four percent. “It was far from over,” wrote Nixon, “but things were 
falling into place.”177 
 Klein had been uncertain about joining the campaign but after Haldeman had 
asked him to meet for lunch at LAX in May of 1968, after the primaries were in full 
swing, he considered his options. Haldeman was worried about the direction press 
management and sought Klein’s help but Klein felt as though Haldeman would end up 
usurping the role anyway and that Nixon would certainly take a managerial role of his 
own, as he had done so many times in the past.178 After Haldeman had spoken with 
Klein, so too did Nixon. At this point, Klein had taken many leaves of absence from his 
job in the newspaper business. This time, he decided, if he was going to do it, he’d need 
to resign. Ultimately, Klein decided he’d join the team, see if he liked the structure of the 
press operations and then make a final decision as to whether he would leave his position 
at the paper. Klein joined the Nixon presidential campaign on June 1 of 1968. Klein and 
Haldeman agreed that Ronald Ziegler, who had worked for Haldeman in the intervening 
years, and had stayed in contact with Klein since they had worked together in 1962, 
should join the press team as Klein’s assistant. Klein continued to train him on the 
newspaper business.  
 Klein immediately noticed the nonchalant nature of Nixon’s top campaign 
advisers toward the press when meeting with them at Key Biscayne, where Nixon was at 
the time. “To my dismay as the new campaign press manager, I discovered that neither 
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[John] Mitchell nor Haldeman seemed worried about the fact that par to the press corps 
and staff had been marooned on an island offshore [in Key Biscayne], although I tried to 
explain the complications of separating the newsmen from the candidate,” he wrote.179 
Klein was acutely aware of the press’ apprehension with being separated from a 
candidate and understood the frustration they would be feeling. Despite his efforts to 
explain this to Mitchell and Haldeman, he noted that neither seemed particularly 
concerned, one sipping a beer and the other smoking a pipe discussing instead, the 
success of a meeting they had with Southern Republican leaders earlier in the week. 
 On June 4, primary election day in California, Klein agreed to provide 
commentary and engage in an interview on NBC. Klein was still new to the campaign. In 
fact, he’d only officially joined the team just three days prior to making his television 
appearance during the primary. Klein felt that both John Mitchell and Leonard Garment 
were unsure if Klein could handle television. Klein appeared on the show at midnight and 
then returned to his hotel. As he was watching television, he witnessed the assassination 
of Robert F. Kennedy. Robert Kennedy had taken the stage at a San Francisco Hotel. 
After addressing a large crowd, with a growing confidence that he would be able to bring 
calm to the nation, chaos erupted. At 12:13 A.M. on June 5, Kennedy was assassinated. 
 Instead of calling Nixon right away, Klein decided to call Haldeman first. 
Haldeman was asleep in the suite right below him. Haldeman and Klein watched the new 
coverage, trying to decide whether to wake Nixon and tell him the news or not. At that 
point, it was unclear if the shot was fatal. Ultimately, they decided to give Nixon a call, 
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but they weren’t the first to wake him. Nixon watched the California Primary on 
television from his New York apartment with his wife Pat, his daughters Tricia, Julie and 
his soon-to-be son-in-law David Eisenhower. 
 Nixon watched the June 4 California primary on television from his New York 
apartment with his wife Pat, his daughters Tricia and Julie and his future son-in-law 
David Eisenhower. Before he went to bed he said, “It sure looks like we’ll be going 
against Bobby.” Not long after, Eisenhower woke Nixon. “They shot Kennedy,” he 
said.180 The shooter, Sirhan Sirhan, was reportedly angered by Kennedy’s pro-Israel 
rhetoric during his campaign.181 Kennedy’s opponent for the Democratic party 
nomination, Hubert Humphrey would become the presumptive party candidate. The stage 
was set. Now, Nixon’s team had to figure out how to leverage it.  
 Nixon’s new strategy with the press had one significant difference over his last. 
He would simply avoid them. This wouldn’t be a repeat of 1960. The constant 
campaigning was ultimately useless and arguably led to Nixon’s exhaustion, illness and 
eventual loss. An individual campaigner had little reach in the grand scheme of things. 
Instead, the key was to utilize the reach of television as often as possible, while avoiding 
filtering his message via reporters and spending countless hours chasing opportunities to 
speak directly to voters. Minimal interaction with reporters to a minimum would be 
key.182 
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 Ray Price, a former editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune and speech 
writer for Nixon during his campaign, recommended a careful strategy in late November 
of 1967.183 He carefully and meticulously documented the ways in which Nixon and his 
team should create their image.  
I know the whole business of contrived image-mongering is repugnant to RN, 
with its implication of slick gimmicks and phony merchandising…but it’s simply 
not true that honesty is its own salesman; for example, it takes make-up to make a 
man look natural on TV. Similarly, it takes art to convey the truth from us to the 
viewer. And we have to bear constantly in mind that's not what we say that 
counts, but what the listener hears; not what we project, but how the viewer 
receives the impression.184  
 
 By all historical accounts, Nixon was weary of television.185 It was not something 
he knew or understood particularly well at the time. His experience with it had been poor 
and he viewed it as a gimmick. “He half suspected it was an Eastern liberal trick: one 
more way to make him look silly. It offended his sense of dignity, one of the truest senses 
he had,” wrote McGinnis.186 Although the decision to use television in his 1968 
campaign was a difficult one for Nixon, Price knew that it would be their key to 
controlling an image he felt was often distorted or incomplete. The first task was to learn 
to control the medium, so to express to the public, what he desired. 
 Nixon’s team would have to find a way to allow their candidate a degree of 
spontaneity while also protecting his image. Price wrote:  
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Our concentrated viewing of clips from the CBS library left a clear impression 
that RN comes across decidedly unevenly - sometimes rather badly, sometimes 
exceedingly well, and that the greater the element of informality and spontaneity 
the better he comes across. Spontaneity is difficult to convey in the formal setting 
of the standard press conference or a speech, when he’s concentrating on the 
arrangement of words to convey a particular thought in a particular way.187 
  
 Price suggested that the team orchestrate and then capture those moments of 
spontaneity, edit them and build a library of shots that would be available for various 
purposes. In essence, Nixon’s campaign team was developing the first vestiges of the 
orchestrated packaging of his television image. This manufactured content could rival the 
material available through major broadcast networks. Distortion was inevitable through 
broadcast media but the act of distorting was necessary for the Nixon campaign as well. 
They were simply leveling the playing field - one negative distortion, countered by a 
positive message.188 Nixon’s team knew that Nixon didn’t always come off favorably in 
front of the camera or in formal situations. That would have to be kept to a minimum. A 
new Nixon could come to life if taken out of the stodgy “two-dimensional, black-and-
white image” that “adversary proceeding” style shows put him in. More casual show 
settings allowed Nixon to shine. “…this kind of show,” wrote Price, “makes it possible to 
bring out a third dimension, and it’s in this third dimension that the keys to victory lie.”189 
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 Color too was vital. “I think that when watching black-and-white, we see a black-
and-white world,” wrote William Gavin, a thirty-one-year-old English teacher from 
suburban Philadelphia who had written to Nixon in 1967, urging him to run and base his 
campaign on the use of television.190 Gavin would later join Nixon in the White House as 
a speech writer. Gavin suggested that the use of color would encourage the audience to 
discover other details rather than fixate on one or two things within an image. Color 
would allow the public to see Nixon as he appeared in real life.  
 This notion was significant in the Nixon campaign. The aim was to move the 
public away from the preconceived Nixon narrative, which was generally unfavorable. 
Establishing a connection with Nixon as a person - - the capacity and potential to see 
Nixon as his aides saw him - - was far more critical.  
I still remember,” wrote Gavin, “how stunned I was the first time I saw Kennedy 
in person, after his election - when he came striding into the State Department 
auditorium, and I saw that his hair was sandy-colored. I knew it was black, 
because that is what I saw in all those black-and-white images that filled my 
mind. And somehow this discovery threw my whole conception of the guy out of 
whack; since this thing I’d known wasn’t true, how much else that I knew might 
not be true? In this case, the truth somehow added a new dimension - and the 
same can happen if we can replace the black-and-white image of RN with a color 
image.191  
 
Even the most basic aspects of the changing broadcast technology were analyzed 
for their role in creating a new Nixon, a new narrative that would supplant a tired and 
fatigued one. Nixon was vibrant and color television was going to accurately ensure that 
he was seen in true living color.  
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 It was increasingly clear that Nixon’s advisers felt that the way the television 
audience viewed Nixon was central to the success of the 1968 campaign. But it was also 
important that the audience was able to view themselves through Nixon’s eyes. This had 
been accomplished by LBJ during one of his press conferences when a camera swung 
around and showed the audience, exposing other cameras in the process. This “behind-
the-scenes” view allowed the television audience to see what LBJ was seeing, and 
essentially, to experience his point of view through his eyes.  
 It wasn’t just about appearing on television or simply knowing how to use it. The 
strategy of the Nixon campaign was rooted in the idea that television provided an 
interactive platform unavailable in the past. There was a certain urgency in keeping 
Nixon moving, in a figurative sense. All Nixon’s televised rhetoric was to be focused on 
the 1960s and 1970s rather than repeating the clichés of the 1950s.192 
 After studying old television news clips from years past, Nixon’s advisors showed 
him clips of both formal and informal settings and situations. According to Nixon: 
The insight led to the decision that I would use the question-and answer technique 
extensively, not only in press conferences and public question sessions with 
student audiences but also in my paid political programming. In the campaign this 
evolved into the ‘man in the arena’ concept, in which I stood alone, with no 
podium, in the center of a stage, surrounded by an audience in bleacher-like tiers. 
In this setting I was asked questions by a panel of private citizens, sometimes 
joined by local reporters.193  
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Klein had been advocating for this type of setting. It played to Nixon’s strengths allowing 
him to bypass the stiff formality that came with the debate format and took advantage of 
Nixon’s ability to connect with private citizens. Additionally, opting for the inclusion of 
local reporters was a more hospitable than settings open to ‘Establishment” media.  
 Despite discussion of focusing on the future, the creation of 1968 version of 
Nixon would hinge significantly on his past. Though frustrated by what he saw as his 
own personal shortcomings, Nixon’s team would leverage his time away from the 
political arena as a way to reconnect with the common man. It was a concept that Nixon 
had long attempted and would continue to use as a platform throughout his presidency. 
He was to be considered the epitome of the everyday man. He had emerged from humble 
surroundings and made his way to elite circles. He would be touted as a man of wisdom 
and experience. He was no stranger to the White House though he hadn’t yet captured the 
Oval Office. But just as familiar as he was with Washington politics, he was equally 
familiar with the plight of the everyday man. His attempts, and failures to win political 
seats were blips as far as his campaign team was concerned.194 The cultivation of Nixon’s 
image as an outsider, after serving eight years as Vice President of the United States, 
would be a significant one. It would be a strategy that would follow him into the White 
House.  
 In an effort to align himself with younger demographic, and shake off a little of 
his perceived intensity, Nixon appeared on a September 16 episode of “Laugh-In” with 
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the famous line “sock it to me.”195 “Laugh-In” was a somewhat risqué sketch-comedy 
program for its time and clashed with Nixon’s usual buttoned-up image. Later, producer 
George Schlatter told the Los Angeles Times: ‘All of Nixon's advisors were saying, 'You 
can't do this, it will ruin you.’ Nixon, understanding of the power of television, decided to 
appear on the show anyway. Through appearances like these, a “hidden” side of Nixon 
provided the public with a much less rigid stereotype.  
 The world was changing and Nixon’s campaign team knew this. What they would 
continue to learn is how drastically the media landscape was changing the world. Print 
media was seemingly easier for Nixon’s team to manage. Print was an ancient medium, 
which made it infinitely easier to navigate. Broadcast media however, was creating a 
world that was far less regimented and clear. Print converted the chaotic abstract into a 
clear order, divided into clear categories. Broadcast media was muddling this all up, 
mixing categories and creating abstract information.196 
 Someone needed to bring order to chaos. Harry Treleaven was tasked to do it. 
Treleavan, was hired as a creative director of advertising in 1967 and primarily focused 
on repairing negative perceptions of Nixon’s personality.197 As an advertising executive 
at the Fifth Avenue office of Fuller, Smith and Ross in New York City, he knew the 
power of image. A memo from his advertising agency, documented the plan for a July 1st 
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taped question-and-answer session for Nixon and an intimate group of Illinois and 
Michigan citizens. The tape was to air the following week by stations around Illinois.198 
Because Nixon was required to be in New York at the time of the taping, the citizens 
were flown to New York. Assistance in recruiting the group was needed, but very 
specific individuals were as to be selected: 
“Six people, residents of Illinois, from as many different parts of the state as 
possible. Three could be from the Chicago area, but no more. The group should 
have a young look. Try to stick close to these ages: three 25-35; three 35-50, 
preferably around 40. Four men and two women, or three and three. They should 
be reasonably attractive, white-representative of the average middle-class voter. 
Most important, they should be intelligent, articulate, well informed, and 
interested in current affairs. With a few questions you should be able to establish 
their awareness of today’s issues; crime, race problems, inflation, taxes, Vietnam, 
rioting, etc. They don’t have to experts - just have a reasonable knowledge of 
what’s going on and a concern about the situation. They do not necessarily have 
to be Nixon supporters. In fact, it’s desirable that some of the participants be 
uncommitted - or leaning in another direction - just so they’re not actually hostile. 
They should not be directly associated with the Nixon campaign, or in politics as 
an office-holder or candidate. Find business and professional people, housewives, 
etc. Look for extroverts who will not be intimidated by a television studio 
environment. There will be no studio audience, nevertheless, we want to be 
careful not to recruit anybody who’ll freeze in front of camera.”199 
 
The participants would be offered a first-class round-trip plane ticket and two 
nights in a hotel with all meals and other expenses covered during their time in New 
York. The men were to dress in suits or sports coats and wear a tie and the women, a 
daytime dress or suit. They would be responsible for drafting with their own questions 
before arriving at the studio for taping. It was highly recommended that they make 
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themselves aware of the news of the day by a thorough reading of the Sunday New York 
Times and the most recent issues of U.S. News and World Report, Time and Newsweek.  
 The intentionality behind each visual choice for Nixon’s campaign was apparent. 
Nothing was to be seen that wasn’t intended to be seen. Yet, this intentionality was not to 
appear, well, too intentional. That was part of the art. Nixon employed Madison Avenue. 
His team was stacked with advertising men who carefully navigated his campaign and 
this bled into every aspect of his campaign’s strategy. Treleaven wrote in his notes 
“Cuteness, obliqueness, way-outness, slickness - any gimmicks that proclaim ‘Madison 
Avenue at work here’ should be avoided. Imaginative approaches, contemporary 
techniques - yes. But beware of ‘over-creativity.’ The basic seriousness of our purpose, 
our candor, must show plainly in everything we do.”200 
 Reagan, who until this point had skirted around his official announcement as a 
candidate for president, announced his intentions just before the Republican Party 
convention in Miami Beach on August 5, 1968. Nixon landed in Miami the same day of 
Reagan’s announcement. Upon arriving at his Hilton Plaza Hotel, he called John 
Mitchell. He asked him the count. With a chuckle, Mitchell replied, “I told you that you 
didn’t need to worry, Dick. We’ve got everything under control.”  As the nominations 
began, Nixon asked a handful of individuals to join him and his family in their hotel 
suite. Among them were members of Nixon’s future White House team, including Bob 
Haldeman and Dwight Chapin. With a final count of 692 votes, 25 more than required, 
Nixon was officially nominated as the party’s presidential candidate, beating out Nelson 
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Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan. Nixon’s acceptance speech amplified his desire to 
reintroduce himself to the nation: 
I see another child tonight. 
He hears a train go by at night and he dreams of far away places where he’d like 
to go. 
It seems like an impossible dream. 
But he is helped on his journey through life.  
A father who had to go to work before he finished the sixth grade, sacrificed 
everything he had so that his sons could go to college. 
A gentle, Quaker mother, with a passionate concern for peace, quietly wept when 
he went to war but she understood why he had to go. 
A great teacher, a remarkable football coach, an inspirational minister encouraged 
him on his way.  
A courageous wife and loyal children stood by him in victory and also defeat. 
And in his chosen profession of politics, first there were scores, then hundreds, 
then thousands, and finally millions who worked for his success. 
And tonight he stands before you - nominated for President of the United States of 
America.201 
 
 Just one day later, he would appoint Spiro Agnew to be his running mate.202 
Nixon was committed to continue his campaign as the official presidential nominee with 
just as much control over his image. The first Gallup poll after the convention showed 
Nixon ahead of Democratic nominee Humphrey 45 to 29 percent. 
 Increasingly volatile moments for the Democratic Party only helped Nixon’s 
efforts. The Democratic National Convention in Chicago began somewhat peacefully as 
the police worked to enforce an 11 o’clock curfew. Demonstrations abounded in the days 
following the August 26 opening of the convention and took a violent turn. Most 
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accounts of the convention report that the police beat protestors and marchers, some until 
they were unconscious. At least 100 people were sent to the emergency room and nearly 
200 were arrested. Undeterred by the negative attention at the Convention, Humphrey 
launched his campaign as the Democratic nominee at the New York City Labor Day 
parade.  
 The advertising of Nixon between Labor Day and the election was broken down 
into two clear objectives. One was to present “Nixon the Man.” This was a direct effort to 
dispel the negative feelings about Nixon’s personality that plagued his campaign. The 
second was to show exactly where Nixon stood on the issues that plagued the nation. The 
first would be accomplished through a series of one-hour television rallies. Perfectly 
curated and orchestrated by Treleaven and his team, the rallies would include planned 
partisan cheering and a panel stacked with well-educated and well-appointed editors, 
professors, business executives and articulate and well-informed experts. These would 
then be carefully edited into five-minute segments for local stations to play in the weeks 
following the original telecast. A permanent team of producers, writers and editors would 
need to oversee the project and of course, a PR component would be necessary to ensure 
that the imaging was just right and to ensure that the pre-promotion and post-publicity 
activities surround the telecast were effectively utilized.  Nixon should also participate in 
a series of five-minute dialogues with nationally known leaders, suggested Treleaven. 
These would take place in an informal setting, an apartment or a carefully appointed set. 
Eight to ten of these in a day would do. 
 Nixon’s strategically automated and carefully navigated campaign hinged not on a 
traditional platform of issues, but on ensuring that he stayed in line with the reboot of his 
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image. At the time, Nixon was largely viewed as grumpy and aloof. He had privately 
expressed that he lost elections because he had treated an adolescent American voter as 
an adult. As Treleaven noted, “It’s is very difficult to get a man’s opinions considered or 
even listened to if he is not liked.”203 Throughout the 1968 campaign Nixon was careful 
to avoid any position that could be used to damage him later on. In fact, “…at the age of 
54, after twenty years in public life, Richard Nixon still needed time to work out his 
vision for the nation’s future. Without a clear vision of his own, and with an image that 
was in great need of reform, Nixon’s team focused not on his positions, but on his non-
positions. They knew the climate of the nation and the desire for a change. By carefully 
manipulating broadcast media, they used symbols, images and rhetoric to construct 
Nixon’s image in a way that would personify that desired change.”204 
 Nixon may have disliked television, but it offered him something print simply 
could not. “Television is particularly useful to the politician who can be charming but 
lack ideas. Print is for ideas,” wrote McGinnis on the marketing of Nixon during the 1968 
campaign. “Newspapermen write not about people but policies; the paragraphs can be 
slid around like blocks. Everyone is colored gray. Columnists - and commentators in the 
more polysyllabic magazines - concentrate on ideology. They do not care what a man 
sounds like; only what he thinks. For the candidate who does not, such exposure can be 
embarrassing. He needs another way to reach the people.”205 Television was focused on 
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personality, not on ideas. To be successful on television one simply had to be invited 
back. “The TV candidate, then, is measured not against his predecessors - not against a 
standard of performance established by two centuries of democracy…How well does he 
handle himself? Does he mumble, does he twitch, does he make me laugh? Do I feel 
warm inside? Style becomes substance. The medium is the massage and the masseur gets 
the votes,” wrote McGinnis. 
 George Wallace, a Democrat governor of Alabama, entered the presidential race 
in February under the American Independent Party, a group he had formed. His platform 
was largely based on his pro-segregation policies that were soundly rejected by the 
mainstream Democratic Party.206 At the time, however, his views were abhorrent among 
a large portion of voters. Wallace commanded the Deep South. Nixon knew he had little 
chance to beat Wallace in states like Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana, without changing his views on civil rights. Wallace also pitted the white, 
working class against intellectuals, establishment elites and bureaucrats. It was his way to 
chip at the possible support of Nixon and Humphrey. “Yes, they've looked down their 
nose at you and me a long time. They've called us rednecks, the Republicans and the 
Democrats,” he said at a rally, “Well, we're going to show Mr. Nixon and Mr. Humphrey 
that there sure are a lot of rednecks in this country.” Wallace tapped into a fear and anger 
and successfully convinced many Democrats to support a candidate outside the party. By 
late September, Wallace claimed 21 percent of the vote. He was by far, one of election 
                                                
206 Carter, Dan T. The politics of rage: George Wallace, the origins of the new conservatism, and the 
transformation of American politics. LSU Press, 2000. 
  91   
history’s most successful losers. His campaign had substantial funds and his sometimes 
outrageous rhetoric bought him a significant publicity.207 
 With Wallace’s success in the race, Nixon’s margin of victory was potentially 
very slim. Despite a 12 percent margin over Humphrey after the Democratic National 
Convention, Nixon was far from victory. In the weeks prior to the election, Nixon 
directed all of his energy on Humphrey. He attacked Humphrey on all fronts, from his 
alleged riot-inciting rhetoric to his exaggeration of poverty as a cause of crime. It may 
have seemed as though the “old Nixon” had returned for a final run as an aggressive 
campaigner. Aggressiveness would be required in the coming weeks, as President 
Johnson placed a call to all three candidates with news that could potentially put 
Humphrey over the top.  
 On October 26, after numerous White House calls, discussions with advisers and 
a reassessment of campaign strategy, Nixon released the following statement:  
In the last thirty-six hours, I have been advised of a flurry of meetings in the 
White House and elsewhere on Vietnam. I am told that top officials in the 
administration have been driving very hard for an agreement on a bombing halt, 
accompanied possibly by a cease-fire, in the immediate future. I have since 
learned these reports are true. I am…told that this spurt of activity is a cynical, 
last-minute attempt by President Johnson to salvage the candidacy of Mr. 
Humphrey. This I do not believe. At no time in the campaign have I found the 
President nothing but impartial and candid in his dealings with the major 
presidential contenders about Vietnam…In every conversation I have had with 
him he has made it clear that he will not play politics with this war.208 
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Although Nixon suggested publicly that he was in full support of Johnson’s 
choices, documents suggest that he used other channels to attempt to convince South 
Vietnamese allies to hold out for peace until after the election. He promised that he would 
get them a better deal than Johnson. While underhanded, Nixon believed that Johnson 
had initiated the bombing cessation to shift favor to Humphrey and give him the election 
win.  
 Johnson announced a complete halt of bombing in Vietnam the night before 
Nixon took the stage at his Madison Square Garden rally on October 31. The 
announcement resulted in a surge of support for Humphrey. It would seem as though the 
Democrats were able to put an end to the war after all. That outlook was short lived as 
South Vietnamese President Thieu announced that he would not participate in Johnson’s 
negotiations. Peace was not at hand as suggested, and Nixon and his team capitalized on 
making that known in the days just prior to the election.  
 “I scheduled a four-hour long telethon - two hours for the eastern United States 
and two for the West - the day before the election…some of my advisors had thought that 
such a costly and tiring effort was not needed, but I overruled them. I remembered 1960 
and felt I should do everything possible that might make the difference in a close 
election. It was my best campaign decision. Had we not had that last telethon, I believe 
Humphrey would have squeaked through with a close win on Election Day,” wrote 
Nixon.209 Election Day was a grueling back-and-forth between Humphrey and Nixon. It 
wasn’t until the next day, November 6th that the major networks would declare Nixon the 
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winner. As he stood before hundreds of supporters at the Waldorf-Astoria he said, 
“Having lost a close one eight years ago and having won a close one this year, I can say 
this - - winning’s a lot more fun.”210 
 Although Klein served as Manager of Communications in Nixon’s presidential 
campaign, his role was somewhat limited. By his own admission, he knew before taking 
on the role that Haldeman would likely retain a great deal of power of the direction of the 
communications strategy. His own telling of his years with Nixon reveal much more 
detail regarding Nixon’s previous campaigns than his 1968 presidential campaign. Of 
significance, however is what Klein considered to be a failing of the news media. “The 
basic principle, however, was that the former Vice President could come across on 
television far better than most newsmen realized. They remembered only the first debate 
with Kennedy and the 1962 ‘last press conference,’” he wrote. “They had forgotten that 
the 1952 ‘Checkers Speech’ drew more response than any political statement in 
history.”211 As a result of this oversight, Klein argued, that newsmen were surprised by 
Nixon’s ability to command a television appearance, and the surprise lead to more 
favorable coverage, aiding in Nixon’s win.  
 Throughout the campaign, Klein noticed the naivety of the young Nixon press 
team. Though enthusiastic and loyal, few had real experience dealing with the press. 
Klein would recall one instance where a young staffer felt the best way for the press team 
to appear sharp and astute was to deliver press releases to papers and wire services in 
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Cadillac-chauffeured limousines. Klein was relieved to have stopped him before he could 
carry out his plans.212 While that particular innovation for press strategy was quickly 
ended, Klein described a different innovation that remains a staple in modern campaigns. 
Klein and his team organized for Republican leaders, recruited by the campaign 
committee, to speak nationally on “party line” issues. He would select news themes that 
spoke to the citizens of each area the Republican leaders would be speaking and worked 
with speech writers to create a unified message. Klein understood the power of local 
media in responding to events like these. “Several regional stories in a day can have the 
impact of a national news story,” he wrote.213  
 Ultimately, Klein spent the 1968 campaign reconfiguring Nixon’s press team and 
training Ziegler in the process. Though he knowingly had to relinquish some of his 
control to Haldeman and Nixon himself, his independent tasks ultimately produced 
significant gains in that he had prepared and positioned others on his team for the path to 
the White House by keeping the press unencumbered and maintaining their confidence in 
a new Nixon.  
 The year 1968 may have been a combative year for the nation, but it was Richard 
Nixon’s most triumphant year as a politician. While the world witnessed a string of 
tragedies, on American soil and overseas, it also saw the beginning of a new America. 
Nixon had emerged victorious in a close election. His team had helped carry him through 
a repositioning of his “loser” image and elevate him to the highest office in the land. 
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Nixon would be the first President elected without party majority in either the House or 
the Senate since the 1800s. The legislative divisions in the already divisive climate of 
1968 America, would prove an insurmountable challenge in many regards. Nixon’s 
image-building strategy was certainly secure, but his political confidence would be 
increasingly tested throughout his presidency. 
Regardless of the nuances of how television was to be used during the 1968 
campaign, one thing was certain. Nixon’s team was making broadcast media a priority. It 
wasn’t about winning debates, it was about winning audiences. 1968 had ushered in a 
new Nixon, and with it, a new way to package a president. While the strategists who 
defined his campaign would largely remain with him, outsiders would emerge as key 
players throughout his presidency. If the 1968 election was the beginnings of a 
presidency focused on image-building, his tenure at the White House would trigger a 
quest to perfect it. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LAUNCHING THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 
 When Nixon began building his Administration, the first person he hired was his 
personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods. Woods had been part of Nixon’s political 
trajectory since 1951 and Nixon saw her commitment as an unwavering dedication and 
faith in him. He then asked H.R. Haldeman to serve as his Chief of Staff. Nixon 
envisioned Haldeman’s role, at the time, as mostly administrative. Nixon noted 
Haldeman’s ego and felt it was an asset. As a gatekeeper, he would have to turn people 
away from meetings with the President and Nixon felt Haldeman could handle the 
unpopularity a role like that might take.214  
 Nixon was extremely aware of the role that the media had played in his previous 
campaigns and the role it would inevitably play throughout his presidency.  
Since the advent of television as our primary means of communication and source 
of information, modern Presidents must have specialized talents at once more 
superficial and more complicated than those of their predecessors. They must try 
to master the art of manipulating the media not only to win in politics but in order 
to further the programs and causes they believe in; at the same time they must 
avoid at all costs the charges of trying to manipulate the media. In the modern 
presidency, concerns for image must rank with concern for substance…today it is 
a fact of life, and anyone who seeks a position of influence in politics must cope 
with it; anyone who seeks a position of leadership must master it.215   
 
Nixon’s relationship with the news media, particularly following the 1960 
campaign, was different. Now the President of the United States, Nixon did not 
overestimate his own power over the media. “The media are far more powerful than the 
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President in creating public awareness and shaping public opinion, for the simple reason 
that the media always have the last word,” he wrote. Nixon knew one man who firmly 
grasped this fact. He created the position of Director of Communication for Herbert 
Klein. 
 Klein had been with Nixon since his early forays into politics. He worked on 
Nixon’s campaign against Voorhis in 1946 and had cultivated a relationship with 
Haldeman, solidifying his place as a member of Nixon’s inner circle during the 1968 
campaign. Over the course of working on Nixon’s campaigns, he came to know Ron 
Ziegler in 1962.  Years later, with Nixon as President, the two met on a Saturday 
afternoon at the Pierre Hotel. “[We] decided that it would be good to follow the kind of 
thing which we had evolved as a novel thing in the campaign of having a two-part press 
structure. I felt that Ron would be a very good Press Secretary. The President also felt 
comfortable with Ron; it was kind of a mutual decision… I felt there ought to be an 
outside thing with the press across the country, and so we came up, mutually agreed on 
how this office would function in a very basic way and [on] its goals,” said Klein in a 
1973 interview:  
It gave me a lot more freedom and a chance to create this job. I didn't have to 
move each moment with the candidate which I had done [for] a lot of years. You 
know, it was sort of a mutually agreed-upon thing, but we couldn't figure out 
exactly how to work it out except that Ron would be the Press Secretary. We 
finally came up with the way that we could do the things that he [Nixon] wanted, 
which was to have a close liaison with the [Republican] National Committee and 
use my political things that way, as well as working with the Departments.216  
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The two ended their meeting for a very important event, according to Klein. Both 
die-hard sports fans, and Californians they broke to prepare for the SC-UCLA 
[University of Southern California vs. University of California at Los Angeles] football 
game that was on the same day. It was being televised and Klein had invited some of the 
to-be infamous Nixon aides. “My wife hosted a little party with Bob Haldeman and Bob 
Finch and myself and Ron Ziegler and two or three others, with some UCLA, maybe 
John Ehrlichman, and some SC [University of Southern California] people. And he 
[Nixon] went back to his apartment, and he would call us occasionally on a play or 
something. So, that was the day of my decision to come into the Administration.”217  
 Klein worked closely with Ziegler but had distinctly different tasks. He dealt with 
coordinating information and improving the Administration’s system of dealing with 
disseminated media. “I felt that there was a great need to relay what happened in the 
government to the editors and broadcasters across the country and so [I] set out to find a 
way do to do that best…” said Klein. Klein directed the Administration’s relationship 
with the broadcast media. While Ziegler played an important role as Press Secretary, his 
involvement in developing new television strategy was limited.  
Planting the Seeds of a Press Strategy 
 The Nixon White House saw the careful construction of a purposeful media 
strategy. In one of the most politically and culturally significant times in the nation’s 
history, President Nixon and his aides would begin the establishment of one of the most 
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lasting and influential contributions of the entire presidency.  While public memory 
seemingly assumes President Nixon as the culprit behind an inaccessible White House, 
investigation into the conversations between his closest aides establishes a much more 
substantial dialogue.    
 There is little question that Nixon had what might best be described as an 
obsession with his image, but that obsession was hardly unique. Johnson before him held 
a similar concern with the emergence of television and equipped the White House with an 
array of television sets and recording devices that would allow for tabs to be kept on the 
media milieu.218 Nixon White House created official channels through which to “handle” 
the press, the attempt to do so was calculated and organized. 
 Fresh off a campaign that effectively kept the press at arm’s length, the media 
relations team of the Nixon White House wasted little time ensuring that their strategy 
was implemented and improved upon, particularly in regard to network news. The nation 
witnessed numerous protests as the emergence of a counter-culture became more 
defined.219 So too was the nation searching for the stars and fulfilling JFK’s dream.220 
The media extensively covered Nixon’s long-distance call to the Apollo 11 astronauts on 
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the moon, his trip to Hawaii to visit them in quarantine upon their return and his 
subsequent visit with them after their quarantine was completed.221 A nation looking to 
the stars was also faced with disturbing images of an increasingly bloody war. As soldiers 
trudged through trenches, and men of science traversed worlds untouched, there emerged 
another significant legacy that was perhaps far less publicly pervasive but equally 
transcendent. The Nixon press strategy was planting its roots.  
The News Summary 
 Richard Nixon was sworn into office as the 37th President of the United States on 
January 20, 1969. From the first day of his presidency, Nixon required a daily “News 
Summary.” To create a more direct relationship with media beyond the three broadcast 
networks and the Washington Post and New York Times, Nixon’s staff produced and 
utilized a News Summary system which catalogued media content each day. These 
summaries included articles, editorials, columns and reports from fifty newspapers, thirty 
magazines and two major wire services. The Summary covered everything said about 
Nixon, the Administration and world events in the past 24 hours. They were sometimes 
as long as fifty pages and often no less than twenty. The News Summary staff would 
comb through dozens of dailies and study bylines, getting to know each reporter or 
                                                
221 “The primary objective of Apollo 11 was to complete a national goal set by President John F. Kennedy on 
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NASA. April 17, 2015. Accessed August 06, 2017. 
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columnist and analyzing their slant. The staff set up shop in the Old Executive Building 
just west of the White House in rooms 125,127 and 129.222  
 While the News Summary was a favorite for Nixon, it was separate from his 
communications department run by Klein. Klein seemed to have preferred it that way. He 
had made attempts to explain to Nixon that news media was not collectively conspiring 
against him, but the summaries tended to emphasize news critical of the President. While 
the Summaries were meant to aggregate and inform, they also served a role in reinforcing 
Nixon’s paranoia and tumultuous relationship with the press. The summaries often 
blurred the line between summarization and biased annotation. Because Nixon himself 
didn’t consume the news first-hand, he relied on these filtered reports. He used them to 
assess his progress and subsequently to create tasks for his aides, some of whom 
expressed concern over his reliance on them.  
Advertising Men Turned Advisors 
 Nixon was careful to utilize his advertising experts turned advisers when there 
was potential to establish a positive public image, but that practice sometimes straddled 
the line between piety and publicity.223 The first Sunday following the inauguration 
already set an unprecedented tone. Sunday worship, led by preacher Billy Graham was 
held in the East Room of the White House. This was uncommon, as services prior to this 
had been held at a local Washington Church. Nixon suggested the White House service 
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was an attempt to limit publicity and keep society reporters away. Often comparing them 
to the Kennedy’s, the Nixon’s fell short in their ability to host parties or demonstrate a 
particular degree of class and sophistication. Nixon was having none of it. “I would just 
as soon keep the society reporters away altogether (if we could get away with it).”224  
 Nixon’s working office was set up in the Old Executive Office building just west 
of the White House. “P [President] had decided he wanted to have a separate office in 
that building as a hideaway working office where he would not be interrupted by the 
constant activity in and around the West Wing and Oval Office…the one he picked was 
right at the top of the entry stairs and easily accessible,” wrote Haldeman in his daily 
diary entry.225  The Oval Office would be reserved for formal occasions. Haldeman 
would set up shop near there, in a small space next to the Oval Office. A short corridor 
connected the two. In the evenings Nixon would use the Lincoln Sitting Room on the 
second floor of the White House to continue his work. Mrs. Nixon had added the 
President’s favorite brown easy chair and footstool from their New York apartment. 
 “Disaster of the day,” wrote Haldeman in his diary on January 29, “…was a leak 
by the Communications Director Herb Klein about the European trip, made the headlines 
in the Star tonight.” Haldeman noted that surprisingly Nixon wasn’t too upset by the leak 
and that Klein, “of course,” denied it.226 Nixon embarked on his first presidential trip 
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225  Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1994.  
226 From the time Klein joined Nixon’s team for the 1968 campaign, he understood that Haldeman would 
function more-so as a gatekeeper than a team member. Often requiring that Klein report to him and cutting 
him off from the President, Klein’s relationship with Haldeman grew increasingly tense. Klein advocated for 
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abroad on February 23. Over the next eight days, he would visit various cities in Europe 
in hopes of establishing a principle. He wanted the people to know that he was a 
President who would first consult with allies before negotiating with adversaries.227 “The 
Alliance, held together in its first two decades by a common fear, needs now the sense of 
cohesiveness supplied by common purpose. I am eager for an early exchange of views on 
all the important issues that concern us. I favor intimate and frank consultations, and I am 
delighted that it has proved possible to make this journey so early in my administration. I 
am going to discuss, not to propose; for work, not for ceremony,” said Nixon in his 
February 6 announcement of the trip.228 He attended the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council and met with King Baudoin I in Brussels, delivered several public addresses in 
London, attended the Bundestag in West Berlin, met with the president and prime 
minister in Rome and then with French President Charles De Gaulle in Paris, ending it all 
with an audience with Pope Paul VI. 
  But even across the pond, he couldn’t escape from some of his press adversaries. 
While in London, Nixon attended a small dinner party on 10 Downing Street. Among the 
guests was John Freeman, the editor of the British magazine, New Statesman.229 Freeman 
was the newly appointed British ambassador in Washington. In 1962, the magazine 
                                                
an open relationship with the press whereas Haldeman supported the idea of a tight inner circle that shared 
little with outsiders in an attempt to prevent leaks. 
227 On February 23, 1968 Nixon departed on an eight day trip to capitol cities in Western Europe including 
Brussels, London, Bonn, Berlin, Rome, and Paris. 
228  Richard Nixon: "Statement on the Forthcoming Visit to Western Europe.," February 6, 1969.  
229 The New Statement, a cultural and political magazine based in the United Kingdom, was founded in 1913. It 
would become one of the most influential and respected magazines in the country. Notably, the magazine 
reviews politics and politicians. 
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described Pat Brown’s win over Nixon as a victory for decency in public life. “I decided 
to relieve the tension by addressing it directly. In my toast after dinner I said that 
American journalists had written far worse things about me than had appeared in 
Freeman’s magazine. It was now a part of the past and best forgotten,” Nixon recalled. 
“After all,” he said, “he is the new diplomat and I am the new statesman.”230 The trip was 
an important one for the Administration. Not only was it Nixon’s first foreign trip as 
President of the United States, it was also the first time the press teams would have to 
handle a large-scale press event.  
 The Nixon Administration’s handling of the media was both meticulous and 
mangled. While the Administration seemed to have a significant grip on strategies 
surrounding the written press, they were much less capable when it came to the still-new 
technology of broadcast news. Early on, the President himself was starting to feel the 
necessity to get ahead of TV. Haldeman wrote to Alexander Butterfield, deputy assistant 
to Nixon, on March 20, 1969, “In developing the weekly game plan for the President, it is 
extremely important that major emphasis be given to TV coverage as well as general 
news releases. In other words, the game plan should look specifically at satires that are 
slanted to TV and that will be given major television play.”231 The Administration 
quickly recognized that despite its handle on the written press, the seeming dominance of 
broadcast television, friend or foe, was of primary concern. Where the press was 
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concerned, newspapers and presidents had an already long and vibrant history. TV 
broadcasters were still relatively new in the Nixon era, and the Administration saw the 
budding relationship as both an opportunity to infiltrate and to instigate. The potential 
power of broadcast media was not lost on Klein. He understood quickly that the President 
would not only benefit from utilizing broadcasting techniques as he had done in his 
campaigns, but in nurturing an emerging industry in hopes of placing the Administration 
in the right position with its leaders, a position that would prove to be both lucrative and 
sometimes ludicrous in the coming years.  
 Attempts to create relationships came in many forms. The President himself 
delivered speeches at broadcasters’ events. Following one such gathering, Klein wrote to 
Haldeman on March 25, “Please tell the President that I believe his remarks for the 
Broadcasters could not have been more appropriate. They were well received and I will 
have a more detailed report on this later. The comments were such that the Broadcasters 
felt he had taken them into his confidence, and I believe this will be most helpful in the 
days ahead. I noticed in the audience most of the power structure of the broadcasting 
industry.”232 Klein’s attention to the power core was significant in that it showed the 
beginnings of more tactful and deliberate analysis not only of news coverage but of the 
composition of the industry itself.  
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The American People vs. The American Audience 
 The difference between the news-consuming American public and the American 
public in general would prove significant for the Administration. To television 
broadcasters they may have been one-in-the-same, but to the Nixon Administration, 
powerful distinctions would emerge. The President’s rhetoric toward the broadcast news 
industry was no accident. To Nixon, there were those who knew him through his policies 
and those who knew him through their television set. Haldeman and Klein often 
exchanged notes carefully documenting the desire of the President to be completely 
aware, not only of the media response in regard to his image, but in analyzing that 
response to determine whether his efforts and those of the Administration were fruitful.233 
In some cases, the mere coverage of a statement, event or initiative was a determination 
of its worthwhileness. How the President appeared to be doing was just as important, if 
not more important, than what he was actually doing.234 
 The week following Klein’s compliments of the President’s interaction with 
broadcasters, Haldeman described the emergence of what would become one of the most 
formidable media strategies established up to that time. The President, he told Klein, 
would like a process that tracked all stories. In addition, the careful planning of White 
House events would encourage daily news coverage. The audit process of television and 
print coverage on the President and the Administration on a daily basis and the 
                                                
233 Klein, Herb. Interview by John R. Nesbitt and Terry W. Good. Exit Interview. Room 160 of the Old 
Executive Office Building, July 13, 1973.  
234 Here, the Nixon Administration was beginning to focus on the concept of “perception versus reality.” 
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appearance over fact shaped what would become their public relations apparatus.  
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documentation of reactions by White House aides. The results would could suggest the 
encouragement or strategic discouragement of those in the industry.235 In a memo to 
Klein Haldeman wrote, “The point here is that, as you well know, he is always pushing to 
be sure that we are adequately registering our reactions, both positive and negative, to the 
commentators and newscasters and networks when they do a particularly good or 
particularly unfair job of reporting and coverage. He wants to be sure, first of all, that we 
are auditing the television news and, secondly, that we are getting our word in when we 
should.”236  
Klein adhered to the request with a distinct two-point plan and responded just days later:  
 
1. We will push additionally the daily TV aspect with the Cabinet members. We 
have been doing this considerably, particularly in connection with special trips or 
speeches by the members, but we will see to it that it increases. Incidentally, what 
we monitor is the network news programs at 6:30 p.m., and that is what is 
contained in the news report. One other feature which is not generally considered: 
Each network sends and this is used heavily on the local shows at 6:30 p.m. and 
11 p.m.; and frequently is a larger audience than the Cronkite’s, etc. Much of the 
President’s and Cabinets* TV material is being carried on this. It is difficult to 
monitor this because it is different in each market, but we do well on it.237  
 
 Klein’s assessment of local television and its potential to grow larger audiences 
would see a great deal of traction later in the Nixon Administration. As Nixon’s aides 
continued to develop and refine their media strategy for television news, they would 
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begin to see the value of local markets and create additional methods to explore how to 
capitalize on them. For now, the major three networks would remain of primary 
importance and the political shows they carried would be carefully leveraged. Klein 
continued to push his own ideas forward but was often weighed down by the tasks placed 
on him by Haldeman. While serving as director of his own office, it was becoming 
evident that his role may be more reactive, than proactive.  
Vietnam, Eisenhower and Foreign Affairs 
 Tensions surrounding the war in Vietnam were intensifying. Nixon’s trip to 
Europe provided ample opportunity to discuss the situation with other world leaders. 
However, Nixon had little interest in delaying action. Even prior to his inauguration, 
Nixon had asked Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, to prepare a report on 
enemy activity in Cambodia. He had plans for an offensive on the Ho Chi Minh trail in 
that region that would cut supply lines and cripple enemy forces in South and North 
Vietnam. Not only did he hope this would make it possible to withdraw American troops, 
he also sought to prove that he was someone who would do anything. On February 18, 
Kissinger informed Nixon that Communist forces were utilizing the Ho Chi Minh trail 
and that they were headquartered there. On February 22, the day before Nixon left for his 
European tour, the Communists launched an offensive. It was an action that seemingly 
violated Johnson’s agreement with Hanoi when he had canceled the bombings. Four 
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hundred fifty-three American casualties were reported the first week of the offensive; 336 
the second week.238  
 Nixon took immediate action. While en route to Europe, he ordered the bombing 
of Cambodian sanctuaries. But before the order could be carried out, Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird reached out to Nixon, concerned that the press and Congress 
would lash out if not consulted. In response, an angry Nixon canceled the order. Nixon 
had wanted to flex his power but resolved to tout the recension as an act of patience 
rather than a sign of weakness. Nixon held two press conferences, on March 4 and on 
March 14, to discuss his decisions and the continued enemy offensive. “It will be my 
policy as President to issue a warning only once, and I will not repeat it now. Anything in 
the future that is done will be done. There will be no additional warning,” said Nixon.239 
The next day, Nixon ordered a non-appealable immediate B-52 attack on Cambodian 
sanctuaries. The bombing was executed on March 17 in what was named Operation 
Breakfast. Not only was Operation Breakfast kept a secret from the enemy, but the 
American people and the United States Congress as well. 
 Anti-war demonstrations were a major concern for the Administration. College 
campuses were breeding grounds for widespread movements and the White House was 
growing concerned over the number and of massive rallies that were rapidly disrupting 
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universities.240 Nixon noted that the trend was not unique to the United States. Similar 
student and youth protests were occurring across the globe, even in places largely 
unaffected by the Vietnam War. The January 24 News Summary that came across his 
desk documented ABC-TVs reports on student uprisings from Pakistan to Paris. Just 
prior to this, Nixon had ordered a study on worldwide student revolt.241 The news 
intensified his interest on the matter - - particularly as to how communist factors might be 
influencing youth disturbance. Ultimately, Nixon judged that the anti-war movement was 
largely propelled by males who desired to avoid the draft. The key to ending the anti-war 
movement may not be ending the war, but rather ending the draft. Nixon would take steps 
to do just that. On May 19, Nixon sent a message to Congress on changes in the Selective 
Service System.242  
 Amid an already defining time for Nixon, on Friday, March 28, former President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower died. He had been in the hospital since April of the previous year. 
Nixon, who served as Eisenhower’s Vice President, was personally very close to 
Eisenhower and had sought his counsel throughout his campaign for the presidency. For 
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Nixon, Eisenhower’s death early in his first term, cast a long shadow. Nixon retreated to 
Camp David to write Eisenhower’s eulogy.243  
 April 1969 proved a trying month for Nixon’s patience with foreign forces. On 
April 15, North Korea shot down a U.S Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft on a routine 
mission. Nixon’s inclination was to return force with force but ultimately refrained from 
military action after the American ambassador to South Korea warned that excessive 
American reaction might encourage South Korea to stage an invasion of North Korea.244 
Nixon turned his sights back to Cambodia, ordering a second secret bombing mission.245  
 At the end of June, Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thieu met at Midway 
Island to discuss Nixon’s plans for “Vietnamization,” a program that would slowly 
withdraw Americans from Vietnam. It would occur in stages resulting in a continued war 
and an increasingly agitated American public. While it would potentially become one of 
Nixon’s greatest political failures, at the time he considered it one of his biggest 
triumphs.246  
An Administration in the Shadows 
 While the President was interested in the opinions of his aides when it came to 
their assessment of the position of the press and its major players, he was far less 
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interested in putting others in the spotlight. For Nixon, image was primary and the 
strength of that image rested on his ability to appear, completely independently, as the 
voice of the Administration. This would change as individuals within the Nixon White 
House gained notoriety for their own ventures and would evolve later as the 
Administration hit obstacles that fostered a need to establish the image of an 
administration that operated as a full-functioning and supportive team. The President was 
strongly against the perception of any White House staff member as a spokesman for the 
Administration. 
Haldeman alerted Klein to Nixon’s order only after Klein suggested that 
Kissinger appear on shows like “Meet the Press.” “The President does not want Kissinger 
to make public television appearances of this sort. He is perfectly willing to have Henry 
meet with commentators, editors, etc. on a background basis in private sessions but does 
not want him - or any other White House Staff members - to appear as Administration 
spokesmen in public.”247 Nixon’s concern was also partly due to leaks to the press that 
had been occurring in the previous months. This drove his limiting of aides to speak 
about what was happening in the White House. The policy would extend the notion that 
the Administration was closed off and intimidated by Nixon’s distrust of the media.248  
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Reassigning the Triumph of Space Travel, Internal Affairs 
and Embracing New Tech 
 Apollo 10 was the dress rehearsal for the most famous space mission to date, the 
moon landing. Every test was run on that May 18 mission to ensure that the astronauts on 
board Apollo 11 could land on the moon. The success of Apollo 10 made it possible for 
Apollo 11 to take flight. In light of the importance of the Apollo 10 mission, news 
coverage was extensive. The space program brought something unique to the country at a 
time that was often violent. Space missions brought Americans together even if only for a 
moment. There was a sense of boundless potential that accompanied each launch. 
Astronauts became heroes. The young dreamed of following in their footsteps when 
many young dreams and young dreamers were often lost on the battlefield.  
 Coverage of the space program was a welcome relief from the coverage the Nixon 
White House often documented in their news summaries. It was no surprise then that 
Nixon and his team eyed capitalizing on it. On May 20, 1969, Haldeman wrote Klein, 
“The President would like a report immediately on the question of how former Vice 
President Humphrey happened to be interviewed on the television coverage of the 
APOLLO 10 Sunday and how Vice President Agnew happened to have been ignored.”249 
 Paul W. Costello, who served as the deputy director of communication, explained 
to Haldeman, “In response to your query on how former Vice President Humphrey 
happened to be interviewed on television Sunday during coverage of Apollo 10, the 
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following explanation is provided by NASA officials: “Humphrey accompanied by his 
press representative Norman Sherman, asked to be taken to the NBC studios immediately 
on arrival at the launch area. His request was granted. Ordinarily, NASA authorities say, 
the networks are too busy to engage in this type of an interview at launch time.” 
Haldeman scribbled on the same memo a note to Klein in blue ink, “Maybe we have to be 
faster on our feet + get our VP to the studios too.”250 He signed it, “H.” Nixon would 
often compare his Administration to others, using the comparisons as “evidence” that he 
was unfairly treated by the media. His aides however, were beginning to realize that 
Nixon’s concern, though sometimes valid, was often due to inaction by the 
Administration, not an overtly malicious press culture. If something was going to be 
done, they would need to be ahead of it - no one would reach out to them. Klein knew 
more attention had to be paid to the creation of a proactive plan where television was 
concerned. 
 Incidents like this were occurring too often in Nixon’s opinion. He delivered a 
significant speech on Vietnam on May 14, and was concerned that the coverage was 
insufficient. “He’d been doing a lot of thinking about feeling we don’t do an adequate job 
of selling our story,” wrote Haldeman.251 Sometimes though, Nixon’s aides knew, he’d 
just have to deal with the fact that he was going to be treated differently than previous 
presidents. This would be a hard pill to swallow for Nixon, and an even harder task to 
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manage for his aides. “Feels Ziegler is a superb mechanic, but not a designer. He had 
read all the Sunday papers pretty thoroughly and found just what he had expected and 
had predicted to K[issinger], all comments about his speech were either neutral, or 
negative. Not one line about the fact that 98 percent of the foreign press had claimed the 
speech, or the strong positive reaction in Congress. Makes point that if JFK had made the 
speech they would have all been ecstatic. (Afraid a good part of this is a fact of life, but 
I’m sure we could do a lot better.)” wrote Haldeman in a May 18 diary entry.252 
 The Apollo 10 incident was a crucial moment in the team’s strategy development. 
It would only take a matter of days before Haldeman wrote to Klein about the need to 
create an official unit within the White House to handle TV news, “At our recent meeting 
to discuss Bud Wilkinson’s memorandum concerning the exploitation of the potential of 
TV, it was decided that there should be a Special TV News section within your office. 
Would you please submit your recommendations on those individuals who you feel are 
qualified to head this section.”253 Klein’s office would begin to primarily focus on 
television news, further diverging his role from Press Secretary Ziegler and solidifying 
the two-part press structure of the Nixon White House. Klein was still in the process of 
determining just what his office would be doing and thus far it was to help to outline the 
needs of the Administration. 
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 As the Administration worked to find ways to take advantage of television news, 
Klein found himself immersed in an effort to temper the increasingly tense protests that 
were occurring outside the White House walls.254 He had hoped that part of his job would 
be to take advantage of other avenues that would draw positive media attention to the 
President, particularly when those opportunities would play well on television.255 The 
prioritization of building up Nixon’s image was no secret and those within the 
government who were looking to advance their clout, or help push forward their 
departments agenda. 
 One such memorandum from Carol V. Harford, Assistant of Cultural Affairs, was 
addressed to “The Honorable” Herbert Klein. Harford was making her case for the 
benefit of the Administration to focus on the arts. Just months earlier, she sent Klein a 
memo that alluded to the serious nature of the issues the Administration faced. Klein’s 
TV news initiatives could benefit from a little creativity to ensure the creation of a 
Presidential image cleared of the smoke of gunpowder and heard over increasingly 
deafening protests. Harford wrote:  
There are indeed major matters demanding Administration attention, many of 
which were inherited so are probably additionally complex. They are so major it 
sounds gratuitous to even make such a statement. Because of the scope and 
dimension involved it is understandable that cultural concerns may be low on the 
totem pole of decision making. I recognize and respect these conditions. 
However, the arts do offer an opportunity to take a quiet, sure step in a significant 
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area. If done soon, this could ensure productive preventative maintenance, thereby 
forestalling additional undesirable incidents, and assuring the cultural community 
that there is also national leadership in this facet of communication and ideas. 
Individually, the incidents are not major crises, but they show no signs of 
decreasing and the culminating effect could result in unwanted publicity — 
written and verbal — and create serious problems for the Nixon 
Administration.256  
 
On June 4, Nixon gave the commencement speech at the Air Force Academy. In 
it, he defended the military. Following the address, the State Department published a 
four-page analysis of the press reaction. The summary, for internal government use only, 
outlined the “Fundamental Truths,” “Blasts at Critics Ignored Issues,” “Result: Hardening 
of Positions,” and “Congressional Reaction.” Each topic was followed by the quotes and 
commentary from large circulation newspapers and national broadcast stations. The 
introduction to the document said, “Few quarreled with his basic premise that this 
country should remain strong and committed. But a number of editors and commentators 
held that he failed to indicate how strong and to what degree we will remain committed 
throughout the world; also, that he tended to dismiss responsible critics of America’s 
foreign and defense policies along with a relatively small group of extremists,”257  
 Haldeman was not pleased. The summary read far too negative in his opinion. He 
reached out to Klein. “Confidential,” was scrawled across the top of the memo. He 
attached the summary with his own assessment: 
 …I think in reading it you will share some serious reservations that I have in 
looking at it. The analysis includes a brief one-page summary of favorable press 
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reactions and then three pages of criticism…It is equally disturbing that the State 
selected this topic for their weekly Opinion Summary, especially if they felt 
obliged to concentrate on derogatory opinions,” he wrote. “It is hard to believe 
this comes from our Administration’s State Department rather than the 
Democratic National Committee. I think this is the kind of department disloyalty 
that we can readily do without and that we should take some steps in discreet 
fashion to see that this kind of thing does not continue. As a matter of fact, 
perhaps the steps should be taken in not such a discreet fashion since this is a 
pretty blatant incident.258  
 
Klein followed Haldeman’s request. He reached out to Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Richard Phillips. “Looking at the three pages, I find an 
overwhelming amount of criticism and no noticeable balance. I recognize the need for 
objectivity but this does not achieve this, and I fail to see how a summary like this serves 
any national purpose,” he wrote.259 Phillips replied, “We do strive for objectivity in these 
reports. This has been discussed with the people concerned; and, in view of this lapse, our 
future reports will be carefully reviewed to maintain both balance and objectivity.” The 
significance of this interaction wasn’t merely in the strong reaction by Haldeman to 
“discreetly” handle what was construed as disloyalty. Klein establishes that he is not only 
dealing with the press’s influence on public opinion, but how the press is influencing 
other departments in the creation of their perspectives and opinions. Nixon’s aides are 
troubled by the potential of the press as a threat not only to public opinion, but to internal 
government support of Nixon.260 
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 Later on, the day of the Air Force Academy address, Nixon contacted Haldeman. 
“By evening [Nixon] was really mad,” Haldeman wrote. There had been a leak to the 
newspapers about troop withdrawal. The Administration had been dealing with plugging 
similar leaks but this one was particularly troubling for Nixon. The Washington Star 
reported that Nixon had decided to begin troop withdrawal even though Nixon promised 
Thieu that the decision would be announced jointly. “[He] kept calling me from San 
Clemente house with new orders to investigate. K (Klein) advised me not to go too far. 
Would be counterproductive, so I ignored some of the orders,” wrote Haldeman.261 This 
was not uncommon. Nixon sometimes angrily ordered his aides to act against those he 
felt wronged him, often journalists. Haldeman remarked about this in an annotation of his 
diaries. “A couple of examples in this day illustrate a challenge I faced frequently - which 
was to decide whether or not to follow a specific Presidential order. I sometimes decided 
not to, on the basis that it was not an order that was really intended to be carried out, but 
rather a letting out of steam, or that it was clearly not in the P’s interest that it be carried 
out. Usually I later informed P that the order had not been followed, and usually he 
agreed that was the right decision. There were times, however, when he intentionally 
would end-run me with an order to someone else who he felt would do his bidding when 
I wouldn’t.”262 
 The world was changing, that much was clear. Just nine days before man would 
journey to walk on the moon, Klein was trying to update the White House with cutting-
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edge technology. The Administration, grappling with new broadcast tools was 
considering the integration of new technology in the White House. A memo to 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Moynihan, Wilkonson, Keogh, Ziegler, Chapin, Butterfield, and 
Cole from Klein, read: 
Tomorrow, Friday, July 11, from 9.00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., the telephone 
company will demonstrate its PICTUREPHONE in Room 91 of the 
EOB…PICTUREPHONE is designed to be an integral part of future telephone 
service. It consists of a very small “Sony-size” television set connected to a 
regular desk phone. The video signal travels through ordinary telephone wires. 
The telephone company has proposed that PICTUREPHONES be installed in the 
offices of the Cabinet Secretaries and key White House staff. Approximately 20 
sets could be made available for this purpose. If you or anyone on your staff 
would like to see a demonstration of PICTUREPHONE tomorrow, please notify 
Rob Odle of my staff a time which would be convenient for you.263  
 
New technology was rapidly emerging in the years that marked the Nixon White 
House, in efforts to stay in touch with the world evolving outside its walls. Juxtaposed to 
the common perception that the Administration was stuck in another time and bitter to the 
changes befalling them, Nixon’s aides were often at the forefront of utilize emerging 
media tools. 
 There was perhaps no greater feat of technology at the time than that which put 
man on the moon. On July 20, 1969, astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” 
Aldrin became the first people to walk on the moon. The historic moment lent an optimal 
opportunity to divert attention from the Vietnam narrative and place Nixon squarely in 
the middle of one of the most celebrated moments in history. The Nixon Administration 
had a tremendous amount to gain from the positive publicity a successful moon landing 
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would provide. Nixon's team would need to orchestrate it flawlessly and meticulously to 
ensure that his involvement sparked no accusations that he was politicizing the event. 
What Nixon would say to the astronauts, guaranteed global coverage. Nixon’s aides 
began work scripting possible statements. 
 “Neil and Buzz, I am talking to you by telephone from the Oval Room at the 
White House. This certainly has to be the most historic telephone call ever made from the 
White House,” said the President. He continued:  
I just can’t tell you how proud we all are of what you have done. For every 
American this has to be the proudest day of our lives. For people all over the 
world I am sure that they, too, join with Americans in recognizing what an 
immense feat this is. Because of what you have done the heavens have become a 
part of man’s world. As you talk to us from the Sea of Tranquility, it inspires us to 
redouble our efforts to bring peace and tranquility to earth. For one priceless 
moment in the whole history of man all of the people on this Earth are truly one 
— one in their pride in what you have done and one in our prayers that you will 
return safely to earth. 
 
Armstrong responded, “Thank you, Mr. President. It is a great honor and privilege 
for us to be here representing not only the United States, but men of peaceable nations 
with an interest and curiosity and a vision for the future. It is an honor for us to be able to 
participate here today.”264 To which the President replied, “Thank you very much and I 
look forward, all of us look forward to seeing you on the HORNET on Thursday.”265  
 Initial drafts of Nixon’s statement to the astronauts revealed a more overstated, 
and at times, overtly political or religious tone. Speechwriter Ray Price suggested 
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wording like, “But already, we see that man’s destiny is defined not by the bounds of 
Earth, but by the sweep of God’s creation,” and “As one people, we ask the blessing of 
the Almighty on your mission…”266 Another speechwriter, Bill Safire, took a more 
stringently political approach, “The flag you have implanted is the symbol of men who 
brought the spirit of freedom to a New World; let it symbolize now the spirt of humanity 
bringing peace and wonderment to new worlds beyond our own. Let those stars and 
stripes stand for a turning of the tied in the affairs of men — away from the dark side of 
our nature, and toward a bright new dawn of understanding and peace.” In a note at the 
bottom of Safire’s version he wrote: “Eclipse,” “turning tide” and “dark side” offer 
consistent moon metaphor for use here or elsewhere.”267  
 The President’s final statement would merge ideas found in both Price and 
Safire’s drafts, but decidedly without the more overt religious or political tonality. The 
President’s statement, one to be heard, quite literally, throughout the universe would be 
more politically vague out of an abundance of caution that his gesture might be regarded 
as politicizing one of history’s most groundbreaking moments. Still, the potential for the 
President to use the historic opportunity as a platform to bolster his Administration’s 
aims was not lost on the press, and the Administration was quick to respond. 
 Dear Scotty” Klein wrote to James “Scotty” Reston of the New York Times: 
 “…I must say that in the midst of the tremendous Times coverage of the moon 
shot, there was one major dismaying note. I refer to the Johnny Oakes editorial of 
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July 19 which implied that the President has schemed for a piece of the glory by 
speaking to our men on the moon. This editorial simply ignored the facts and, I 
feel, was in bad taste. The facts are that the proposal for this call came from the 
astronauts and NASA, not the President. Colonel Frank Borman, who delivered 
the plan personally, convinced the President to accept the idea as one which 
would be helpful and encouraging. The television coverage came from network 
requests. Phone calls of Presidents to astronauts have regularly been filmed and 
heard. My observation during the entire moon program was that the President 
made every effort to encourage the astronauts and that he shied away from 
anything to be construed as stealing the limelight. As to the point of disturbing the 
work of the astronauts on the moon, that was clearly debunked before the millions 
who saw them pause briefly on television to hear from the Commander-in-Chief. 
It is hard for me to believe that it is a sin for the “boss” to say “well done” at such 
moment. I think the public would agree that the call to the moon and the visit to 
the splashdown were expected and in good taste…I know and appreciate the 
separation of the editorial page from your news department but, because of our 
long friendship and candidness, I wanted to convey to you these feelings.”268 On 
August 1st, he would receive this response, “I’m not going to defend that 
editorial. I thought it was unfair and in bad taste. As a matter of fact, the day 
before your letter arrived Frank Borman, who was in to lunch at the Times, told us 
the story of his part in the President’s phone call, and was quite sharply critical of 
the editorial. Please drop in next time you are up this way. Best regards, Scotty.269 
 If the Nixon Administration was to take advantage of the magnitude of the moon 
landing, it would not be through the phone call. Instead, it would be through the 
promotion of the astronauts and the firm positioning of the President as a champion of 
leadership that put the nation on the moon. “As you know, the space effort has covered 
four administrations with each having a major part. In the post-Sputnik era of 1957, it 
was then Vice President Nixon who first spoke out for an increased American effort. 
General Eisenhower launched the effort, John Kennedy had the vision of the moon shot, 
Lyndon Johnson carried through, and Richard Nixon helped bring this to a culmination 
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and will continue to do so. As to sharing whatever glory, if this can be done, President 
Johnson was invited personally by the President to attend the moon launch and his 
personal arrangements were made by the White House,” wrote Klein to Reston.270 
 On July 23, the astronauts splashed down in the South Pacific. Nixon was on the 
flight deck of the Hornet, the carrier that retrieved the astronauts. A five-member press 
pool joined Nixon, Haldeman, Ziegler, Secretary of State Bill Rogers, Herb Klein, 
Hughes and Apollo 8 astronaut Frank Borman.  Haldeman recalled Nixon’s jubilation as 
the capsule broke through the atmosphere. “P was exuberant, really cranked up, like a 
little kid. Watched everything, soaked it all up. Showed everyone his fancy 
binoculars.”271 The President ordered that the band play “Columbia the Gem of the 
Ocean.” It was necessary for the astronauts to be quarantined upon arrival. “Neil, Buzz, 
and Mike. I’d like you to know that I think I’m the luckiest man in the world,” he said, 
kneeling forward slightly to see the three men now encased in a converted Airstream 
trailer that served as their quarantine chamber. He continued: 
I can tell you about all the messages we have received in Washington. Over 100 
foreign governments, emperors, presidents, prime ministers, and kings, have sent 
the most warm messages that we have ever received. They represent over 2 billion 
people on this earth, all of them who have had the opportunity, through television, 
to see what you have done…I am going to find on this trip around the world, and 
as Secretary Rogers will find as he covers the other countries in Asia, as a result 
of what you have done, the world has never been closer together before. We just 
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thank you for that. I only hope that all of us in Government, all of us in America, 
that as a result of what you have done, can do our job a little better. 272  
 
Nixon knew the nation, and the world, would be watching. The moment was a perfect 
opportunity to redirect the nation toward a moment that was triumphantly unifying.   
 Nixon’s conversation with the astronauts was somewhat candid and off script. 
While he had been given suggested notes, he spent much of the time speaking informally, 
asking if the astronauts had been able to keep up with sporting events while in space. His 
notes, scribbled on the helicopter on July 23, hit on several points he felt were of 
particular importance. In shaky cursive script, he wrote:  
1) This has to be greatest homecoming. 2) Bring you greetings from Washington, 
from heads of [illegible] the world, messages poured in - 3) Bring you greetings 
from 3 great ladies - Jan - Armstrong,  Pat - Collins, Joan- Aldrin 4) The nation 
will welcome you when you come out of quarantine August 13.” Under a long 
line that separated the page he continued, “All the superlatives - You had the 
biggest rooting section in history of world - You have inspired us all to reach for 
the stars - what we can do if we put our mind - hearts to it.273 
 
Nixon’s handwritten notes and the subsequent typed full statement suggestion by 
Price, presented the following day on the Hornet, made no mention of Nixon’s upcoming 
foreign travels.274 Instead, both focused entirely on the moon landing and the uplifting 
nature of its success for the nation and the world. Nixon had decided, at that historic and 
                                                
272 Richard Nixon: "Remarks to Apollo 11 Astronauts Aboard the U.S.S. Hornet Following Completion of 
Their Lunar Mission.," July 24, 1969.  
273 Textual Records by Richard Nixon, 23 July 1969, Folder Remarks to Astronauts Aboard the Hornet, July 23-
24,1969, President’s Personal File: President’s Speech File, 1969-74; Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
274 Textual Records by Richard Nixon, 23 July 1969, Folder Remarks to Astronauts Aboard the Hornet, July 23-
24,1969, President’s Personal File: President’s Speech File, 1969-74; Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
  126   
highly publicized moment not to politicize the event and promote his upcoming 
presidential agenda.  
 Discussion surrounding the Apollo mission and the President’s handling of the 
astronauts within the White House exemplified a distinct awareness of the potential for 
the media and the public to see the President’s actions as pandering. In fact, discussions 
in the White House prior to the phone call suggested that there was a need to avoid what 
could be seen as a “gimmick.” However, following the return of the astronauts, the 
Administration would too carefully strategize the use of media to firmly situate the 
legacy of the President. The President initially planned for a low-key reception at the 
White House for the Astronauts, one limited to the space-men and their wives, “This will 
be a Black Tie dinner, with wives and as of now will be a small dinner,” wrote Haldeman 
to Chapin.275 However, on the U.S.S. Hornet, Nixon would announce to the nation a 
much larger affair.   
 The Administration took each opportunity to connect the Nixon White House 
with the success of the space program, however indirectly, to engage the public in 
positive perceptions of American life in a time when American values were greatly in 
question and contested among generations of Americans. “The President’s News 
Summary of October 8 reported on the reception received by the astronauts during their 
visit to Spain. It was reported as the biggest reception accorded a foreigner in that country 
since former President Eisenhower visited there in 1959. The President wants you to take 
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the necessary steps to get this story the widest distribution possible,” wrote Ken Cole to 
Klein.276 Just the day before, Klein wrote: 
I’ve discussed with the astronauts’ traveling party what additional things we can 
do to gain more attention for their trip. They have widely hailed and even outdrew 
the Pope in one place in Latin America. Each of the networks have been called. 
CBS has been running something every night, NBC — much of the time. With the 
trip to Europe, coverage will increase. I also have newspapers asking for wrap-up 
stories, which will point out glowing receptions; for example yesterday in Madrid 
and today in Paris.277 
 
Klein Defines His Role 
 As the astronauts found their footing back on Earth to increased fame and 
notoriety, Klein was at work outlining his role and goals in the new position he had 
created for himself. It wasn’t until October 9 that he sent a formal memo to the President 
detailing his office’s goals and objectives.278 In the nine months in took Klein to present 
his outline, he had been working on situating himself in his new position. After all, 
Director of Communication and the Office of Communications were entirely new and no 
one fully understood where that situated Klein in relation to the Office of the Press 
Secretary. For much of the start of the Nixon Administration, Klein navigated the careful 
distinction between his position and Ziegler, worked on individual tasks assigned to him 
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by Haldeman, and spent much of his time meeting with reporters in an effort to keep his 
promise of an open White House. The nine months prior to Klein’s outline was utilized to 
understand the needs of the new Administration. Tactics were tested and analytics were 
collected to identify what worked and what didn’t. Klein used this information to 
establish the various goals of his office. He would use his experience to separate his goals 
into various areas and meticulously describe gaps that his Office could fill. If Klein was 
to gain autonomy in the new Administration, he would have to make himself 
indispensable.    
Of primary importance to Klein was creating a system that allowed him to 
maintain open communication with the press. Klein described the general goal of the 
office as a promoter of public understanding and public confidence in the Administration 
and those who worked within it. The means to do so would be through broadcast media. 
“We are pioneering in a technical-idea age,” he wrote. “…during the next six months, it 
will be important to develop the means of depicting pictorially, in a better way, the 
programs of the Administration as seen on television. We are working on film 
technique.”279 
 There was little question that the Administration was orienting itself toward an 
image-centric objective. “…it will be important to develop the means of depicting 
pictorially, in a better way, the programs of the Administration as seen on television,” 
wrote Klein. “In television our goals are to get fair representation on the major news 
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shows and gain wider coverage for the Administration. Beyond the obvious news show, 
we have the variety shows, ranging from MEET THE PRESS to JOHNNY CARSON, to 
TODAY. We have had, however, someone on a Sunday show virtually every Sunday for 
nine months.”280 
 While television strategy was a key component of Klein’s plan for his office, so 
too was the need to manage “prejudiced” reporters. To do so, he would need to build a 
more effective briefing system within the Administration. “We intend to improve the 
quality of the briefing done by those in the Administration because this is a technique of 
getting at even the more prejudiced reporters. We need help here in foreign areas, but are 
gradually getting it,” Klein continued. The Administration however, would not simply 
rely on those within its ranks to ensure that the plan was followed, but would continue to 
establish relationships with movers and shakers within the broadcast industry. Klein 
wrote to the President, “We have a strong working program with the top people in the 
radio and television industry. And I think we can increase pressure here when necessary 
through Dean Burch (chairman of the Federal Communications Commission), based on 
management assent.”281  
 The coming years would establish a clear effort by Klein and Haldeman to keep 
up with the up-and-comers within the broadcast industry and pay close attention to 
leadership changes that would either work in the favor of the Administration or against it. 
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In some cases, troublesome reporters would be “dealt with.” Others would be courted to 
work for the Administration, some after leaving their respective careers and others, more 
unsettlingly, without. However, those within the broadcast industry were sometimes 
equally as eager to enter the Administration without provocation from its aides.  
 A letter from the American Broadcasting Company arrived at the White House a 
month earlier, on September 10, 1969, addressed to Bryce H. Harlow, Assistant to the 
President. Robert B. Amdur an employee of ABC, expressed his disappointment that 
Alvin Snyder (CBS Executive News Producer) was appointed Broadcast Deputy to Herb 
Klein. “It was particularly disturbing since on 9 June I had written a note to Herb Klein 
requesting the opportunity to discuss just such a position as Mr. Snyder has apparently 
secured. Also, I had suggested my self for such a position to Paul Costello and Ginger 
Savell several times. However, they stated that it was impossible to increase the staff due 
to budget restrictions.”282 
 Harlow wrote to Klein on September 20, referencing the letter, “On musings over 
the enclosure, I can’t help wishing mightily that we could find a suitable spot for Bob 
Amdur. After all, he is among the faithful — he did give us his “all” in the campaign — 
he did do a good job at the Convention — and I think he is professionally competent in 
the broadcasting business. Is it hopeless? If it is, I suppose we ought to tell Bob so, so the 
poor guy will stop believing that there is some chance.”283 Klein was confident they had 
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their man in Snyder. Haldeman and Klein had exchanged memos on potentially bringing 
in reporters to join the team. Haldeman would request background checks, without the 
knowledge of the reporter, and that a careful assessment of their political leanings be 
performed. Like the Nixon campaign relied on advertising men to package the President 
as a commodity for the public to buy, Klein was carefully adding newsmen to his team.  
 Pressure was on Klein. The President, by way of Haldeman, complained often 
where broadcast media was concerned. On September 24 of 1969, Klein would receive a 
note from Haldeman requesting he handle what appeared to be an issue the two had 
discussed more than once before. “Here are two prime examples of what we discussed 
this morning. You can see the degree of concern that has developed here - and I think it is 
essential to get this going + to make sure he honors it,” wrote Haldeman.284 His note 
referenced a memo Haldeman had received the previous day from Ken Cole, who served 
as Deputy to the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, John Ehrlichman. Cole 
wrote, “The President’s television report on Saturday, September 20, mentions NBC’s 
TV coverage as being clearly unbalanced of the President’s draft decision. They were 
played in great disproportion to the support for the President which exists in the country, 
even among youth. The President feels, as the report points out, that he deserved more 
than 1/15 of the time devoted to the subject. The President addressed the following 
comment to you, “See that NBC gets a hard kick from Klein on this. And, again, when 
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are we going to have a system where this is automatically done and reported to me?”285 
The emergence of a defined strategy to handle the broadcast media within the Nixon 
White House was exiting its wide-eyed wonderment of infancy and entering its moody 
adolescence.  
 The “hard kick” wasn’t always directly from Klein. He had devised a system that 
could be implemented any time a network said or did something that was perceived as 
unfair or biased toward the Administration. Across the country, in major cities, Klein had 
situated groups that would “automatically function in such a way as to ensure that editors 
and broadcasters will hear complaints from readers and viewers across the country.”286 
Klein knew this pressure had the potential to influence executives to change their tune. 
The news, particularly the broadcast media, operated on ratings and revenue and a 
dissatisfied public could eat into both.  
 The captivity of the Hanoi pilots had long kindled the fires of unrest over the war 
in Vietnam. While the Nixon White House continued to ride the waves of the moon 
landing with the public, they struggled with the continuing upheaval that accompanied 
the increasingly tumultuous war in Vietnam. The prisoners of war would fuel Klein’s 
meticulous study of the complexity of the broadcast media’s potential to elicit and 
electrify emotional response from the American public, and the complications that might 
bring for the government in regard to sensitive topics. On September 26, regarding the 
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capture of the Hanoi pilots, he wrote to Haldeman, “The trip of the four wives of captive 
pilots was organized by Murphy Martin of Dallas, Texas (of the Murphy Martin TV 
show), after a plea from the wives in Dallas. He called me to gain our feelings regarding 
this. I approved it and then checked with the White House for verification and found a 
lukewarm feeling. I went to Defense and found it in agreement with the program and 
suggested the steps which were taken. It is not possible to order a plan of action with 
things of this nature, which involve individual human emotions.”287 If Klein could devise 
a plan for how to do this, the potential to shift attention from the negative reportage on 
Vietnam to a unifying hero narrative would be immense. Meanwhile, the public 
sentiment toward progress in ending the war needed attention.  
 By mid-September, Nixon was holding top secret meetings to discuss the next 
troop withdrawal from Vietnam, slated for December 15. There had also been a 36-hour 
halt to B-52 raids in South Vietnam. Tensions continued to rise as those against the war 
felt Nixon’s slow withdrawal was doing little in making progress toward its end.  With 
college campuses filling up with students for the new academic year, unrest was rising to 
all-out disruption. There were talks of a nationwide day of protest on October 15. This 
moratorium was of great concern to Nixon. It would potentially disrupt his November 1st 
deadline for a “solution” with the Vietnamese, fearing that if Vietnam saw the nation as 
one so greatly divided, its leverage in negotiation would be irrevocably damaged. With 
protests continuing to erupt across the nation, the President’s message on Vietnam 
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required clarity. The team turned to television to ensure the it was their message that was 
getting through. 
 Dwight Chapin, who had served as the President’s personal aide in 1967-1968 
joined the Administration as Special Assistant to the President. He had known Haldeman 
for years before the campaign. After Nixon’s 1962 campaign for governor, Haldeman 
hired Chapin to work at the J. Walter Thompson Company advertising agency in 
California. Now, sitting in his office as part of the Nixon White House, he was sifting 
through memos. Chapin too was receiving advice from many regarding the President’s 
public reach over the small screen. In mid-September, a memo from Gregg Petersmeyer, 
an intern, crossed his desk. In it, Petersmeyer made his case for a series of informal 
televised presidential addresses “for the purpose of meeting the country’s crisis of spirit.” 
He wrote to Chapin, “I would suggest that the President hold several televised informal 
“talks” with the American people spaced over the next twelve months. He would tell the 
American people what is right with America, her people, her principles and her 
institutions. The talks would not be “polyannish” for they would include a candid 
evaluation of America’s weaknesses as well. But the expressed purpose would be to 
allow the American people to regain a balanced perspective of this country.”  
 Petersmeyer suggested that there were four categories of individuals who had the 
opportunity to speak to the masses, including political figures, clergyman, academics and 
the broadcast and printed press. The press he said, “in both words and pictures portrays 
the negative aspects of American life and seemingly endless series of violent 
confrontations between individuals, groups, institutions, and the nations.” But, they 
weren’t the only of the four that were failing the American public in talking about what 
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was “right” with the nation. “Actually no one from these groups is talking about what is 
“right” with America. If the President of the United States does not, who will?” Unlike 
some of the other memos Chapin had received, this one featured, on page three, one 
section that held particular significance.   
The Silent Majority 
 On October 15, an estimated two million people joined the Vietnam Moratorium, 
making it the largest demonstration in U.S. history. While centralized in Washington, 
D.C with  250,000 protestors in force, across the United States, students, workers, women 
and children were taking part in church services, rallies and meetings. Black armbands 
were worn by supporters as a tribute to those who had died in the War thus far - the 
number was nearing 45,000. The protests remained largely peaceful. Nixon stayed at the 
White House during the protests and decided no action was the best course. He had held a 
press conference earlier stating that his decisions would not be swayed by the 
demonstrations. “On the night of October 15 I thought about the irony of this protest for 
peace. It had, I believed, destroyed whatever small possibility may still have existed of 
ending the war in 1969. But there was nothing I could do about that now. I would have to 
adjust my plans accordingly and carry on as best I could. At the top of the page of 
preliminary notes I was making for my November 3 speech, I wrote: ‘Don’t get rattled - 
don’t waver - don’t react.”288 
 Two days prior to the moratorium, Nixon asked his staff to pick one letter from 
the many he had received from those who were critical of his press conference stance. 
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They selected a letter from a Georgetown University college student. The student had 
asked the President to “reconsider his pre-judgement,” and that he felt it was not unwise 
for the President to take note of the will of the people. Nixon responded, “Whatever the 
issue, to allow government policy to be made in the streets would destroy the democratic 
process. It would give the decision, not to the majority, and not to those with the 
strongest arguments, but to those with the loudest voices…It would allow every group to 
rest its strength not at the ballot box but through confrontation in streets,” responded 
Nixon.289 
 On page three of the memo Petersmeyer wrote to Chapin just two months earlier, 
under the all caps section heading, THE SILENT MAJORITY: 
The vast majority of Americans have deep-rooted and sound moral values. They 
need reassuring that they are not alone and want leaders who also share such 
values. Of late the emphasis has been so repeatedly placed on other areas that 
people are questioning the present strength, if not the very existence, of this 
majority.” The President’s famous “silent majority” speech, delivered in an 
informal televised address was one of the most remembered moments of the 
Nixon Administration. In concluding his recommendations to Chapin, 
Petersmeyer called on the example of President Franklin Roosevelt. “My 
understanding is that much President Franklin Roosevelt’s political success was 
derived from his ability and willingness to talk directly to his ‘fellow Americans.’ 
In my opinion, Americans today, no less than Americans in the 30’s, will respond 
affirmatively to a series of informal addresses by the President. The people in 
today’s ‘spiritual depression’ should be reminded of the greatness of this country. 
It would seem appropriate for the President to be the one to remind them of it.”290 
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On November 3, the President stood before the pubic and delivered his “Silent Majority” 
speech.291  
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our 
allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose 
confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief 
that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had 
done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a 
people,” said Nixon. “Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any 
American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. 
But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I 
allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that 
point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations 
in the street…If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason 
and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.”292  
 
The response to the speech was overwhelming. The White House received over 
50,000 telegrams and 30,000 letters in response. A Gallup poll conducted immediately 
following the speech showed Nixon at a 77 percent approval rating. However, the Nixon 
White House felt the press did a poor job in providing an unbiased view of his speech. 
Instant news analysis, commentators and pundits filled network news stations with their 
take on the address. Nixon and his aides decided something would need to be done. For 
Nixon, the decision to go after the networks was an “unexpected success” of his 
speech.293 Between 10:15 PM and 1:15 AM that night, Nixon called Haldeman, by his 
account, between 15 and 20 times, wanting to know what the plans were for 
counterattacking the press on their response to the speech. “Then pressure about what is 
Klein doing to get reaction. Reports on editors around the country…then hit network 
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management for biased reports,” wrote Haldeman in his diary entry that day. Nixon was 
pushing every angle - those only a few of many. However, there was one ultimate plea. If 
only one thing were to be done by his aides, “get 100 vicious dirty calls to New York 
Times and Washington Post about their editorials (even though no idea what they’ll 
be).”294 Haldeman described the process of immediately following up after major TV 
addresses as what would become an established routine. The President needed to know 
the impact of a speech on the public and in the media. “The pleas for ‘vicious dirty calls’ 
to the papers was to keep pressure on them from the public in the hope that they would 
consider the other viewpoint occasionally,” noted Haldeman on his diary entry.295 
Working with Broadcasters 
 By November, the Nixon Administration had worked to open the doors for 
broadcasters. “The President wants to get some local TV commentators that have big 
followings invited to White House functions from time to time. He has in mind 
specifically such people as George Putnam in Los Angeles, and some of the good ones in 
Chicago and other cities. Klein should give you a list of these,” Haldeman wrote to 
Nixon’s secretary Rose Mary Woods.296 The new Administration was still working to 
develop relationships with broadcast media. While there was a clear aggression toward 
negative reporting, 1969 still saw a distinct effort from an Administration that 
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understood, or at least accepted, the potential power of broadcasters in the emerging 
decade.   
 Following Nixon’s “Silent Majority” speech, the Administration kept even closer 
tabs on the press. Each major publication was checked and their response was reported. 
Klein lead the efforts and discussed coverage with the biggest men in broadcasting. A 
November 14, 1969 memo to Haldeman outlined his conversation with Julian Goodman, 
then President of NBC, that had occurred that same morning. Klein reported, “I told him 
that if he looked at the spontaneous reaction we have received from the great silent 
majority after the November 3 speech, he would see that a majority percentage of these 
people added critical comments of the networks for their handling of the commentary 
following the speech…I suggested that the point is well taken that it would be a very 
good time for the networks to re-examine their policies of interpretation since obviously 
interpretation is becoming a growing part of news coverage.”297  
 This was an argument that Klein had made before in the weeks prior during 
interviews with both CBS and ABC. Broadcast news was becoming far more interpretive 
than it had been in previous years. This was something with which the Administration 
would find themselves continuing to struggle. A shift in news culture created a parallel 
shift in the television press dealings within the Administration. Klein recognized that a 
new strategy must emerge.  News commentary was becoming more powerful than the 
news itself. Process and procedure were no longer primary concerns. The “gimmicks” of 
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television were becoming secondary to the newsmen who were now licensed to offer 
their opinion.298  News commentary would become an increasing obstacle for Nixon’s 
aides. 
 Days later, Haldeman would receive a memo from Chapin regarding the 
upcoming Gallup poll and its questions on network news. The Nixon Administration was 
no stranger to the importance of Gallup poll results, not only on what that meant in terms 
of analyzing public perception but the power of those results to influence public opinion 
itself. “Will you look over the following questions which I am going to submit to 
Gallup?” said Chapin. Haldeman marked up the list of questions he had received from 
Chapin, eliminating some he disliked and editing others for word choice. Number eight 
read, “There has been considerable discussion surrounding President Nixon’s speech on 
Vietnam Monday night. Criticisms have been made by some commentators who disagree 
with the President in his views. How about yourself - do you agree with the President in 
his views on Vietnam or do you agree with the commentators?” Chapin underlined “you 
agree with the President in his views on Vietnam” and “agree with the commentators,” in 
red pen. Next to it he scribbled, “H-I don’t think we should even ask Gallup to use this. 
We will lose points if we ask them - they aren’t that stupid.”299 
 The relationship between Nixon’s aides and John Davis, the Editor of Gallup 
Polls, was unique, one that would evolve in the coming years and one that was 
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particularly intriguing in 1969. Just one month prior to Chapin and Haldeman’s 
discussion on potential questions to send to Gallup, Chapin wrote to Haldeman about an 
unexpected call. “John Davis, Editor of Gallup Polls, called this afternoon. This is 
unusual since I am usually calling him,” Chapin wrote. “According to Mr. Davis, they 
have some summary data on a Vietnam questionnaire which has been in the field. He said 
he did not want to expand on this over the telephone but that it looks like there might be 
some important information here which will help the Administration ‘get off the hook’ in 
regard to Vietnam. He said that in a meeting with George Gallup, Sr., yesterday that Mr. 
Gallup said this poll could do a great service to the Government. He asked Mr. Davis to 
contact me to arrange an appointment.” Chapin went on to say that Gallup was willing to 
give the poll to the Administration for its use, and not publish it. If they decided not to 
use it, the poll would be published. Haldeman scribbled in black pen, a line leading from 
“publish it” to a note on the bottom of the page, “might [sic] be we should take it just to 
keep it from publishing.” Chapin noted that Harry Dent (special counsel and political 
strategist) and himself were planning to meet with the Gallup people that Friday and 
suggested that perhaps someone from Kissinger’s office might attend. On the upper left 
Haldeman wrote “C - 1) Have your mtg-without K or anyone from his office + do not 
discuss with him. 2) Take the poll 3) Report to me. H.”300 This would not be the last time 
Nixon’s aides rubbed elbows with Gallup. The polls would play a major role in their 
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evaluation of their broadcast press strategy and the relationship between the 
Administration and the Gallup organization would prove to be a significant one.  
Klein’s Growing Concerns 
As the year wore on, Klein became increasingly aware that appearance of over 
aggression toward the press could prove to be disastrous. In a November 21, 1969 memo, 
Haldeman made that point clear. After a particularly disturbing event and perhaps one of 
the most overlooked cover-up attempts by the Nixon Administration, the “Army 
massacre,” now better known as the My Lai massacre. There were 504 unarmed 
Vietnamese civilians killed by U.S. soldiers in March 1968. Klein wrote: 
I presume you or the appropriate people are looking carefully at the handling of 
the Army massacre case which seems to be gaining speed. I mention this only so 
that we are coordinated. Pictures of this are being sold by the former Sergeant 
who took them and may be appearing in the London Daily Mail, Der Stern and 
Life. Some already have appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and were shown 
on the air by Walter Cronkite, who held up a copy of the paper. This case could 
develop into a major trial almost of the Nuremberg scope and could have a major 
effect on public opinion. I have talked to Dan Henkin (chief spokesman for the 
Defense Department) about it, both in regard to the merit of having the Army 
release pictures and getting it over with, and in keeping me informed…I called 
John Mitchell this morning and suggested that special care be taken that the 
Justice Department does not move in any actions which might be regarded as 
intimidation of the media during this particular period of time. He assured me he 
was aware of the problem and on top of it.301  
 
Strategy, Klein recognized, meant knowing when to lay low just as much as it 
meant knowing when to fight back. Response to the My Lai massacre would draw far 
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more attention to it than the Administration wanted, and in any case, there was far more 
benefit in deflecting attention than defending actions.  
 Instead, Klein drew attention to another aspect of his office, a mailing system put 
in place to share news with individuals in the press, outside of the usual press conference 
or press release. Just weeks earlier, Klein made it clear to Haldeman that he had handled 
the coverage of the Nixon’s speech on Latin America and the general activities that 
followed it with extreme care.302 Providing an overview of the major newspapers and 
their coverage and headlines about the speech, he noted that, “Our mailing, which went 
out Air Mail Special Delivery last night to 1500 television news directors and editors and 
commentators, included the text, background fact sheets and background summary 
sheets.”303 It would seem the Administration was developing a secure handle on a method 
by which to ensure that their information was reaching a wide range of television 
newsmen.  
 Equally important to getting their story out was letting the public and those in the 
media know that the Nixon White House was not stuck in a bygone era, as often 
suggested. Positioning Nixon in the role of embracer of technology added to the narrative 
that he was friendly toward new media and happily engaged it. “I have planted a story in 
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Broadcasting Magazine about the President’s idea of using the Satellite to get the 
message directly to Latin American as evidence of use of modern tools,”304 he ended. 
 The year of 1969 was a formative time for the nation and for the Administration. 
Americans saw a man walk on the moon and voters positioned Nixon in the White 
House. Klein and Ziegler had agreed upon a two-pronged system for dealing with the 
press and diverged on their own independent paths. Klein began to outline and identify 
how his new position would operate in a new technologically driven age. Haldeman, 
pressured by the President, applied equal, if not greater pressure on Klein to quickly and 
effectively put his goals and objectives into practice. Along the way, he added newsmen 
like Snyder and utilized men other aides, including Chapin to manage the system. With 
major events like the moon landing and the President’s televised addresses on Vietnam, 
Klein sought not only to perfect the Administration’s development of Nixon’s image, but 
the response to the creation of that image by the press. The end of the first year of the 
Nixon Administration would see a well-formulated broadcast news strategy but one that 
retained its blunt edges. Over the years, a sharper, more cutting-edge strategy would 
emerge. Nixon’s team of advertisers and newsmen would begin to formulate a public 
relations apparatus absent of public relations experts. 1970 would bring new challenges 
for the Administration as tensions over the war in Vietnam continued to grow and the 
Administration’s relationship with broadcast media evolved into a war of its very own.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MEDIA AND THE VIETNAM QUAGMIRE 
 While the Vietnam War protests galvanized Nixon's antagonism toward the press, 
1970 was filled with speeches, televised addresses on issues from wage and price 
restraint to Nixon’s approval of a plan for the Interagency Committee on Intelligence 
allowing for the conducting of operations against domestic targets. In October of that 
year, Nixon proposed a five-point plan for peace in Indochina during a televised address. 
The plan included the negotiated withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Soon after, 
during a campaign rally in California, demonstrators attempted to pelt him with objects 
while shouting taunts. The tumultuous atmosphere of the previous year had spilled into 
1970 manifested in the Kent State deaths and the rampant violence on college campuses 
across the country resulting in large scale closures of academic institutions. 
 Off the success of the Silent Majority Speech, Nixon approached 1970 with a 
particular goal in mind. Television had served him well and he was eager to make it work 
for him on a regular basis. A December 1969 memo to Haldeman, Nixon floated the idea 
of a part-time or full-time television professional on staff who could coordinate all his 
television appearances. “When I think of the millions of dollars that go into one lousy 30-
second television spot advertising a deodorant, it seems to me unbelievable that we don’t 
do a better job in seeing that Presidential appearances always have the very best 
professional advice whenever they are to be covered by TV.”  While this wouldn’t 
formally materialize until 1971, Nixon and his aides would spend 1970 leading up to its 
eventual creation.  
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 While the events of 1970 were politically and publicly corrosive, inside the Nixon 
White House, calm reigned. Prevailing narratives suggest that the Nixon White House 
was quickly becoming closed off, however discussions between Nixon’s aides suggest 
otherwise. A distinct attitude of disdain was emerging, but more significantly, a well-
articulated and power media strategy was in its formative stages. The Administration’s 
evolving contentious relationship with the press was only part of a much larger narrative 
– one that included everything from biting internal squabbles about missed media 
opportunities to the investigation of how the Administration might purchase the 
American Broadcasting Corporation.   
 The early days of 1969 saw far more open press relations, at least where Klein was 
concerned, and this was becoming a point of stress. Klein, a former newsman, enjoyed 
the company of journalists and saw value in keeping channels open.305 Nixon and 
Haldeman were less enthused by the idea. In fact, Nixon’s antagonism toward the media 
was becoming a central focus in 1970. Nixon speechwriter, William Safire, wrote of 
Nixon’s positioning the press as the enemy, “He was saying exactly what he meant: ‘The 
press is the enemy,’ to be hated and beaten, and in that vein of vengeance that ran 
through his relationship with another power center, in his indulgence of his most 
combative and abrasive instincts against what he saw to be unelected and 
unrepresentative elite, lay Nixon’s greatest personal and political weakness.”306  
 While Klein’s interaction with the press was largely successful and applauded by 
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those in the media for its success in allowing more unfettered access to the Nixon White 
House. However, the White House was becoming weary of the “hostile” media and 
Haldeman was gearing up to exert more authority over Klein’s evolving Office of 
Communication. The President, often through Haldeman, would lay out specific 
directions regarding how to respond to the press. Even in matters outside of traditional 
political discourse, Nixon was increasingly sensitive to the reaction of the press. No 
squabble was too small to engage in. The year of 1970 started out with one such event.  
 At the end of January, White House police officers publically debuted a new 
uniformed designed by Nixon and Ehrlichman. The uniforms were influenced by the 
uniforms worn by guards at Buckingham Palace – overstated and ceremonial. The media 
had a field day and ridiculed their design. Nixon was outraged. “H – I want our staff to 
take RN’s position on this regardless of their own views…a W.H. staffer does not have 
independent views on W.H. matter. Have Klein take the offensive on the slovenly W.H. 
police we found,” he wrote on the News Summary that contained media criticisms on the 
matter.307  The new uniforms lasted for two weeks. 
 Nixon clearly demonstrated his disdain for criticism. He required the unwavering 
support of those around him. His attempts to silence his own staff had worked where 
opinions where involved, but his efforts to silence members of the press met with failure. 
While his powers were limited in that regard, he did his best, through Haldeman and 
Klein to ensure that those who crossed him were punished in some way. When John 
Gardener criticized Nixon’s budget, Nixon lashed out, “H&E – He is to be completely cut 
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off from now on. This is an order.”308 When news anchor Walter Cronkite’s name 
appeared in a News Summary one morning in early 1970, Nixon circled it and wrote next 
to it, “A Nothing!” David Brinkley faced Nixon’s wrath as well. Nixon went as far as to 
have his friend Don Kendall of Pepsi complain to NBC about Brinkley. Nixon’s anger 
wasn’t only a result of criticisms toward his policies or his actions as president. When 
Hugh Sidey wrote a column that mentioned Nixon’s luxurious private homes and his 
wealthy friends, Nixon wrote, “Freeze him completely for 60 days.”309   
 The image of the President was of primary importance – perhaps more so to him 
than anyone else in the Administration - - but the staff was made aware that any push 
against the idealized Nixon image generated a response of utmost force and immediacy. 
Numerous meetings between Haldeman and the President resulted in pressure on the staff 
to focus on ways to ensure the President was portrayed a very particular way. This, of 
course, wasn’t a new concept in 1970. However, what was significant was the 
Administration’s recognition that it. As Haldeman put it, “actually gets down to what is 
the best television.”310  
 Nixon had been successfully using television to reach the American public directly. 
It was his preferred method since the early days of his campaign for the presidency. 
However, just as Nixon’s team began to take advantage of the behaviors of the television 
press, the rules would change. A proactive attempt at television strategy became reactive 
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and changes to the system were often perceived as personal attacks by Nixon, motivated 
by an inherent bias. At first, when the President delivered speeches from the Oval Office, 
all three major networks would cover the speech in primetime. When the networks 
decided to take turns broadcasting Nixon’s speeches, leaving the other two free to air 
regular programming, Nixon reduced his use of television.  
 This by no means suggests that Nixon was turning his back on the medium. On the 
contrary, he began 1970 with a historic use of television on January 26. Nixon explained 
to the nation why he objected to a $19.7 billion appropriation bill. After detailed 
explanation, in front of the cameras, he signed his veto. This was a first on television. His 
appearance was a success. It provided Nixon with just the platform and opportunity he 
needed to present his policies. According to Nixon’s team, the Democrats insisted that 
the networks give them equal time to reply.311 When the networks provided the time, 
Nixon immediately asked for an inquiry into how many times the Fairness Doctrine had 
been applied while Kennedy and Johnson were in office. “My recollection is that we got 
‘equal time’ only 3 times in 8 years,” he wrote.312 Nixon always wanted to know if the 
networks were treating him differently from his predecessors.  
 As Nixon’s aides tightened the reins on press relations, the White House itself was 
more open than ever. Musical performances livened up the Pennsylvania Avenue 
residence. Mrs. Nixon gave special tours and hosted large parties. On March 2, she 
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launched a weeklong tour of colleges visiting their volunteer programs. She traveled to 
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, Colorado and Missouri. The press criticized her avoidance of 
major universities where anti-war protests were taking place. This however, was 
dismissed more as a matter of safety than an avoidance of a political posture.  
  The President started the year in San Clemente. On January 7, Nixon and Charles 
“Bebe” Rebozo, his friend and confidant, spent part of the day taking a drive and walking 
along the California beaches. The day ended with an angry phone call to Haldeman. 
Nixon read a story by LA Times Stuart Loory who questioned the cost of the “Western 
White House,” Nixon’s home base in California.313 Nixon was greatly offended by 
implications that he was wasting time or money. He ordered Haldeman to respond to the 
allegations. Haldeman, who had been with the President in San Clemente, returned to 
Washington D.C. the next day and began working to find year-round use for the Western 
White House, to stave off criticism of its cost.  
 College campuses in the early 1970s were in a state of crisis. Student protests often 
escalated to much larger events and violent riots than had been seen before. Even though 
anti-war rallies were less frequent since Nixon’s Silent Majority speech the previous 
year, civil rights protests and political movements against “the capitalist system” were 
regular features of life on college campuses. One example of this was on the University 
of Colorado campus in Denver. In the four days prior to the arrival of Mrs. Nixon at the 
University, five bombings had taken place on the campus. The University had collected 
$5 fee from each student in 1969, intended for the establishment of a scholarship for 
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African American students. The Administration then refused to distribute the money on 
the grounds that it was illegal because disadvantaged white students were not eligible. In 
response, students began blowing up buildings.314 From one social battle to the next, 
America’s youth were rising up and Nixon, a man of stark formality with a demeanor of a 
time past, was to answer their call.  
 Nixon had yet to see a year in office where the country, and the world for that 
matter, was not embattled in seemingly unwinnable conflict. It was clear 1970 wouldn’t 
be that year. The President felt as though 1970 was going to be the worst year for him 
and his Administration. Concerns about inflation, the recession, crime and election 
attacks at the top of the agenda. The focus of 1970 wasn’t on 1970. It was a way to 
improve 1971 and build up to 1972.315 In the midst of a country in peril, Klein prepared 
for a perilous journey of his own. Each decision made in an effort to open the White 
House to the press would close Klein out of Nixon’s inner circle.  
The Build Up 
 On January 1, 1970, Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act, which 
would later include significant environmental initiatives including the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act, Mammal Marine Protection Act, as well as the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  Vietnam was, as it had been, a central focus for the 
Administration, and an increasingly sensitive pressure point for the nation. This 
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manifested itself in continued campus unrest. Student protests would gain greater 
attention in 1970 than perhaps every before. The killing of student protestors at Kent 
State University by the National Guard deepened an already cavernous wound.  
 The African American community continued to fight for the full realization of 
their civil rights through the desegregation of public schools. In 1968, around 68 percent 
of African American students in the South were still attending all-black schools. That 
number was down to eight percent by 1974. Counsel to the President, Daniel Moynihan 
suggested that, “There has been more change in the structure of American public school 
education in the last year than in the past 100 years.”316 While Nixon is not 
conventionally known as a fighter for civil rights, he was, perhaps not without coercion, a 
significant part of the process.  
 Concerns over the impact of interviews with other government officials on Nixon’s 
image were significant. After Ralph Bunche, who served as Under Secretary General for 
Special Political Affairs since 1957, conducted a press conference that was reported by 
the The New York Times, as suggesting that his critical comments were censored by the 
Nixon Administration, presidential counsel Leonard Garment was instructed by 
Haldeman to handle the situation.  
As you suggested, I talked to Ralph Bunche- - in fact I went to see him when I 
was in New York the other day – and told him our reaction to his press conference 
statements. He insisted that the NEW YORK TIMES misquoted him and that he 
made no reference to the President or the Administration as such, confining his 
critical comments to the Attorney General and Vice President. He indicated that 
he was sorry he even got into this passage, saying that he was caught off guard by 
a question that came right after a commercial break. I told him how difficult it 
was to make sustained progress in this area without some active support from 
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leaders like himself. He is sending me a transcript of his press conference and the 
follow-up comments in the NEW YORK TIMES, which he said are in the very 
back of the paper.317  
 
 Scribbled on the top right corner of the memo was a note to Klein, who had 
received a copy of the message. “Klein – Another case of our “friends” at the NY Times 
– H.”318 Every potential misstep was considered a slight at the least or an outright attack 
at the most, never a simple mistake. 
 Nixon was making efforts to appear a little more relatable through the press but this 
was a tall task. On January 9, the staff presented the President with a card for his 
birthday. Grudgingly he agreed to a press photo with the card being presented to him. 
“Worked fine, but P his usual awkwardness, just can’t cope with personal-type situations. 
Explained the whole card (Washington Star front page) in minute detail. But the 
photographers couldn’t have cared less,” wrote Haldeman.319 Nixon did well with 
personal interactions with the people, but the press were not ordinary people and Nixon 
struggled. Still, Nixon’s awkwardness didn’t do any serious damage to the efforts of 
Haldeman, Klein, Ziegler and Chapin. Perhaps he wasn’t relatable, but at the moment, he 
was reachable – and that was more than most had expected.  
 In a January 11 Washington Post Parade magazine, stated:  
PRESS RELATIONS – President Nixon has never felt comfortable with the press. 
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Even during the honeymoon period, he held few press conferences. He has been 
sensitive, however to press criticism, as indicated by Vice President Agnew’s attack 
on the media. Nevertheless, the President has instructed his subordinates to run an 
open Administration, and they have been generally candid in talking to reporters. 
Result: The credibility gap of the Johnson years has largely disappeared. Rating: B 
minus.320 
 
 This analysis was favorable, but it wouldn’t change the closing of a somewhat 
previously open Administration.  
 The first few weeks of January were primarily dedicated to the construction of 
Nixon’s State of the Union address. Speechwriter Ray Price had produced a draft but 
Nixon found it lacking in substance and organization and decided to write on his own. 
Haldeman wasn’t convinced that the President was truly working on it. “Another day 
supposedly cleared for work on the State of the Union, but no work done…I think this is 
a classic example of forced procrastination. The draft he has is totally unsatisfactory, and 
he dreads getting started to work on it, so he keeps inventing excuses,” wrote 
Haldeman.321  
 As Nixon attempted to get his speech written, eventually passing the task to Safire, 
Buchanan and Price, he was also pushing Haldeman to find a solution to Kissinger’s 
hobnobbing with the press. Haldeman noted that Nixon, “Wants me to take over K’s 
schedule guidance for public and PR things, get him to see the right press people and not 
waste time with the unwinnables.”322 Nixon had been concerned about Kissinger’s 
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growing popularity in the press. He felt his accent was a bit too “war-like” and at one 
point, had asked Klein to keep him off television for that reason.323 
 Television appearances were routinely utilized across the government by late 1969 
and they took a much more significant hold in 1970. The State Department had 
implemented a program that sent senior officers to their home states to deliver speeches 
and for radio and television interviews and appearances. Between November 3, 1969 and 
January 1970, nine senior State Department officers and ambassadors appeared on 102 
television stations and 15 radio stations. The appearances were spread across 35 cities in 
20 different states. Between January 19, 1970 and March 11, 14 speakers were scheduled 
to appear on 269 TV stations and 35 radio stations across 40 cities in 24 different states. 
Due to the success and size of the program, it was given permanent program status and 
assigned a staff officer to ensure its success. The program was anticipated to grow in the 
early months of 1970, especially where broadcast time was concerned. The result of the 
strategy thus far had been staggering. There had been a 70 percent increase in media 
appearances during the last three months of 1969.324  
 An increased use of television by government officials laid the foundation for the 
Administration’s future television press strategy. It put pressure on those on Nixon’s 
team, like Klein, to organize a way to gather analytics on those appearances. Nixon 
wasn’t only concerned with what his appointees said on screen, but what any government 
official said. For Nixon’s inner circle, what politicians said outside government walls 
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were indicative of their loyalty to office of the presidency. Klein was tasked with 
handling the television press and by extension, those who behaved badly when on it.  
A Growing Preoccupation with Image 
 Of primary concern to Nixon, as demonstrated throughout his political career, was a 
focus on building image. This did not change in 1970. To Nixon, it wasn’t simply about 
what he had accomplished. In fact, he felt as though his accomplishments while in the 
White House would pale in comparison to how he was perceived by the public as a result 
of press coverage. This was made evident by Haldeman on February 2, when he wrote of 
a conversation he had with Nixon that day, “A lot more on need for better press on P’s 
image and leadership. Says trouble with all our backgrounders was that they were all on 
what we accomplished, nothing about personality of the man. Point of JFK did nothing 
but appeared great; LBJ did everything and appeared terrible. Taft infinitely more 
effective than Teddy Roosevelt. Teddy Roosevelt had personality. Taft just did well.”325  
 According to Haldeman, the task of making the President look good just wasn’t 
getting done, and the increasing hostility of the press accelerated the situation. On 
February 4, he wrote to Klein. “The story we were to get out and run somewhere about 
how the President has overcome the great handicaps under which he came into office – 
specifically, the hostile press epitomized by NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON 
POST, TIME, NEWSWEEK, etc.; the hostile network commentators, the generally 
hostile White House press corps, the hostile Congress, etc. This is the whole pitch that we 
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talked about some time ago. The story has not been gotten through.”  
 Haldeman suggested that if the task could not be accomplished, perhaps it was time 
to exert pressure on media insiders with influence. To be exact, Ralph deToledano, a 
friend of Nixon’s and editor at Newsweek. deToledano had reportedly been jockeying for 
a White House position, making him the perfect candidate of which to take advantage. “If 
we can’t get someone to take this and write the story along the lines we’ve been talking 
about, let’s at least get Ralph deToledano in, put the thing squarely to him, and get him to 
write it. Do it on the basis that it’s a test case, or something, so that there’s some heat on 
it; but some way or other, let’s get it out. Everybody’s failed so far,” Haldeman wrote to 
Klein. In a handwritten addition, he tacked on, “the heat is building.”326  
 Indeed. The strategy for 1970 was becoming increasingly clear. Nixon may not 
have been able to solve the volatile foreign and domestic issues, but his team would make 
every effort to appear as though he had. Nixon’s team knew that television had not 
simply changed the way in which the press operated; it changed the way in which the 
President did. To maintain control of the Presidency, the team would wrestle control 
away from the television press.  
 Internal television strategy in the White House was carefully monitored and 
analyzed. What couldn’t be controlled on the outside would be mitigated by what could 
be controlled on the inside. Every opportunity was taken to dissect and learn from a 
television event. Nixon’s aides had been tasked with creating viable, internally produced 
                                                
326 H.R. Haldeman to Herbert Klein, 4 February 1970; folder Memoranda, February, 1970: Box 2; White House 
Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Herbert Klein; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California 
  158   
television events and guiding the coverage of externally produced events through careful 
staging. While productions done inside the White House were managed independently of 
those by the press, the integration of the strategies and understanding of how both 
systems operated was important. The way the Administration produced material would 
need to be done so in a very particular fashion, with the understanding that that 
production would be contorted to fit within the broadcast template. For example, 
television commercial breaks required stations to both prioritize and compartmentalize 
news coverage. Klein and his team understood that presidential events would need to be 
evaluated in terms of television news clips. Not unlike truncated quotes in newspapers, 
events covered by the television press would appear in “bites” and training Nixon to 
present himself in a way that fit within that format became a priority.  
 After a five-minute film on the environment by the President, the team and the 
President weighed the benefits. Nixon’s aide James Keogh, former editor of Time 
magazine, wrote to Haldeman, “We probably should not have done a full five-minute 
filming since none of the networks use more than about one and one-half minutes…the 
President should have simply referred to the fact that he had sent the Bill or the Message 
up and then go into the inspiration part and the reason why, very briefly, running for one 
to two minutes.” Keogh understood that the substantive content would have to be 
included in the report of the newscaster so, the President’s time need not be spent on 
doing so. “We gain more from his general statement than we do from his simply listing 
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the contents,” he continued.327 From here on out, the President expected that this be used 
as an example of how to construct future promotions of messages and bills. Klein and 
Nixon’s inner circle were carefully navigating both the internal production of broadcast 
content and the continuously emerging methods of news reporters and broadcast 
schedules. There was a sustained and deliberate method of trial, error and analysis.  
Tensions Rise on World Stage 
Official peace talks in Paris remained in a deadlock by early 1970 but behind-the-
scenes, Henry Kissinger was holding secret talks with Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam. On 
February 2, there was a strike on the Ho Chi Minh trail by 52 bombers in retaliation for 
Viet Cong raids. Just over a month later, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia aligned himself 
with Cambodian Communists, the Khmer Rouge, after being deposed by General Lon 
Nol. The Khmer Rouge were attempting to overthrow Lon Nol’s regime.  
 Prince Sihanouk brought a great deal of attention to the efforts of the Khmer 
Rouge, and the Rouge’s leader, Pol Pot, tried to capitalize on that notoriety. Later, Pol 
Pot would oust Lon Nol and his leadership would result in the death of nearly 25 percent 
of the population due to starvation, exhaustion and execution. In March, General Lon Nol 
led Cambodian troops in an attack on the Khmer Rouge as well as the North Vietnamese 
troops inside of Cambodia.  
 In the United States, Nixon and his team discussed ways in which they might assist 
Lon Nol, who was pro-America. Two weeks later, on March 31, Captain Ernest L. 
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Medina was charged by the U.S. Army for the massacre of Vietnamese civilians in My 
Lai that had occurred two years earlier. Less than a month later, Nixon announced the 
withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within a year. The stunning 
turnaround was a precursor to Nixon’s announcement on April 30.  
 The situation in Vietnam required continuous monitoring of coverage by the 
Administration – this had been done in the previous years as well. However, the approach 
in 1970 was different. What was being reported itself was dissected less than were the 
reporters covering the war. It wasn’t unusual for Nixon’s aides denigrate reporters for 
even the most minor criticism of the President, but reporters in Vietnam drew particular 
scrutiny. A February 21 memo exemplifies the interest in those with journalistic 
influence on public opinion. “You asked for a run-down on Richard Threlkeld,” wrote 
Klein to Haldeman.  
He has been in Vietnam for CBS for about a year. He went there as a ‘reporter’ 
and recently was promoted to the rank of ‘correspondent.’ He is one of about half 
a dozen CBS men who have been up-graded to that rank while serving in 
Vietnam. Prior to going there, he was in the network’s southern bureau in New 
Orleans, and before that, he was in the CBS pool as a junior correspondent. He 
has worked at WCCO in Minneapolis and is a graduate of the Medill School of 
Journalism at Northwestern. He is about 30 and is not considered to be among the 
heavyweights of the CBS correspondents. He is one who is likely to 
sensationalize.328  
 
 The Administration kept careful notes on each major reporter, and some local 
reporters. Throughout 1970 the list would continue to grow, culminating into a master list 
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by the end of the year.329 
 The President himself was watching carefully. Though it’s often suggested that 
Nixon fervently avoided watching the news, those who worked with him suggest 
otherwise. While he disliked it, he indulged in it from time to time.330 His frustration 
mounted whenever he felt that his Administration was criticized more than previous 
administrations. Having had held the office of Vice President, he had a unique 
perspective in this regard – and he took it personally. In a Friday evening report, an ABC 
reporter, about happenings in Laos, suggested that the Nixon Administration felt as 
though keeping the public uninformed was in the public interest. Under the orders of the 
President, Haldeman encouraged Klein and Magruder, the Deputy Director of White 
House Communications, to follow up on instances like this by reaching out to the 
reporter and driving home prepared points, oftentimes pushing the idea that previous 
administrations were not criticized similarly. In this case, the reporter was to be quizzed 
about what newsmen said when Kennedy began the war and continued it for the three 
years he was in office.331 The point of the questioning wasn’t necessarily to address 
“incorrect” coverage, but to begin a case against the news media as a whole. They were 
biased, and the Administration was going to make sure they knew they couldn’t get away 
with it.  
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 Not only was it important to the Administration that the public was aware, but the 
media held accountable for perceived bias. It was equally important that Nixon’s staff 
believed it as well. When articles would align with Nixon’s perception of a hostile media, 
the priority was to ensure that everyone was aware. Lawrence Higby, Haldeman’s 
assistant, disseminated such information on March 4, 1970. “The President has requested 
that the article that appeared in TV Guide by Howard K. Smith on the bias of networks be 
sent with a covering memorandum by Herb Klein to all PIOS,” Higby wrote to Magruder. 
“For your information, John Brown is making sure that article is circulated to all staff 
members.”332 It is not unlikely that the President wanted to ensure that Klein saw this 
type of commentary. After all, Klein was the most likely to protect the press. It was a 
practice Nixon had become less inclined to let continue.  
The Most Completely Informed Individual 
 No matter concerning the image of the President was too small for the 
Administration to take seriously. One particular concern was the perception that Nixon 
was unaware or uninformed about the daily happenings in the country. This was often 
rebutted; noting that the President had a substantial News Summary provided to him each 
day. In fact, his aides suggested that Nixon was perhaps one of the best-informed 
presidents to date.333 Nevertheless, regardless of the continued tensions surrounding the 
war and civil unrest that followed the Administration into 1970, Nixon’s aides never 
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relented in their pursuit to topple that perception.  
 Pat Buchanan, adviser to Nixon, had given television interview where he talked 
about the daily News Summary provided to Nixon. “As a result of Buchanan’s interview, 
he exploded the myth that the President has isolated himself from the daily facts of life in 
the country. To the contrary, he had the point that the News Summary project which the 
President initiated, brings to his desk every morning, the most comprehensive report ever 
assembled anywhere on what the American people are reading, hearing, and talking 
about,” wrote Higby to Klein and Ziegler. One of Klein’s tasks was to ensure that anyone 
who appeared on TV was prepared and trained to do so and this point was to be made 
clear in all future opportunities: “…Richard Nixon has been, for more than a year, not 
only the most fully informed President in our history, but the most completely informed 
individual.334  
 An uninformed Nixon wasn’t the only myth the White House staff was combatting 
on a regular basis. Reports regarding Nixon’s sleeping schedule were circulating in the 
early months of 1970 and Nixon, a man who regarded his hardworking image as the 
epitome of his legacy, saw it as an attack on his very character. He made this clear to 
Haldeman, who turned to Klein to ensure that the press would be made aware. “In some 
article that Vermont Royster wrote recently, he said that we run the show on the basis of 
early to bed and early in the office. Somehow we need to kill the early to bed idea,” wrote 
Haldeman. “As a matter of fact, the President almost never is in bed before 11:30 P.M. or 
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midnight and he very frequently works well past midnight, either in his office or in the 
Lincoln sitting room.” Haldeman noted that the President also wakes up multiple times 
during the night - sometimes at 2 or 3 a.m. - and works for an hour or two. Nixon was 
also known to call staff member in the middle of the night when he had specific things to 
discuss. “All of these points ought to be got across so that we don’t let any early to bed 
myth set in as a result of Royster’s article.”335 
 Nixon’s interest in the polls mirrored his interest in following his press coverage. It 
was a way to successfully gauge his efforts to cultivate his image and his legacy. He also 
looked to them to boost his confidence and to justify his distrust of the media. If the 
people felt he was doing well, and the media didn’t reflect that, Nixon had the “proof” he 
needed to suggest media bias. On April 7, H.R. Haldeman turned his attention to the 
polls. In a highly confidential project, Haldeman requested that Klein put Earl Mazo on 
assignment. After the 1960 election, Mazo, a journalist for the Herald Tribune, felt the 
election had been stolen and started writing an investigative series. "There was a 
cemetery where the names on the tombstones were registered and voted…I remember a 
house. It was completely gutted. There was nobody there. But there were 56 votes for 
Kennedy in that house."336 Mazo envisioned winning a Pulitzer for his work, but was 
pulled off the story without being told why. As it turned out, Nixon had reached out to his 
Mazo’s superiors. Nixon had asked Mazo himself to stop writing the piece because he 
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felt the country couldn’t handle a constitutional crisis during the Cold War.  
 Mazo was just the man Haldeman and Klein needed for this job. What we need is a 
thorough analysis of the Gallup and Harris staffs - particularly Gallup. We should try to 
find out who their people are - the principal people in the organization - what their 
backgrounds are - their leanings and orientation, etc.,” wrote Haldeman to Klein. 
Haldeman also expressed the need to find out who influenced both the organizations and 
the individuals. “The whole poll business has become even more suspect than it has been 
in the past as you will see by looking at the pattern of Gallup, for example, and for that 
matter the lack of Harris releases. We need to know what it is that we’re dealing with 
especially as we come into an election period.337 
 As it turned out, Mazo’s report theorized a relationship between Lou Harris of the 
Harris Polls and pollster Oliver Quayle.  
Harris and his firm have no direct or visible association with the Oliver Quayle 
organization, which, as you know, is the leading confidential pollster apparatus 
for Democratic candidates and the Democratic party and its adjuncts. However, 
Harris and Quayle are intimate, professionally. [Privately they] regularly swap 
information, experiences, interpretations, findings and so forth. [Naturally, 
therefore, the published Harris Poll and the confidential Quayle Polls invariably 
confirm each other, quite unlike the situation between Harris and Gallup.  
 
Not only had Harris conducted nine major surveys for Time and Life, during a non-
election year, but the Harris organization was also in the process of finalizing a deal with 
a major network to produce television “specials” in preparation for 1972.  
 The agreement between the Quayle and Harris polls was a significant finding. A 
New York Times article backed Mazo’s report saying, “Quayle’s current unpublished 
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nationwide poll agreeing substantially with public surveys by Louis Harris, shows Mr. 
Nixon running markedly better today than he did against Humphrey…” From the Ashoka 
Hotel in New Dehli, he wrote to Klein, “This thing of Quayle ‘agreeing substantially’ 
with Lou Harris is really hot stuff — and as newsworthy as Ron Zeigler agreeing with 
Herb Klein!!!” poking fun at the at times-tense relationship between the two aides. 338  
 Focus on the polls was an important part of the Administration’s strategy. The year 
was a dry run for 1971 and 1972. There was no misconception that 1970 would be an 
easy year or even a routine one. The country was in too much turmoil to expect it would 
be. As such, it was immensely important to stay on top of the polls and know exactly 
where Nixon would land in public opinion. This first term was just a prolonged campaign 
for Nixon’s second.  
A Growing Credibility Gap 
 Talk of the Vietnam War was forbidden among the White House staff. The 
President was clear that no one could talk about the war publicly. He was determined to 
stay in control of the information. The strategy didn’t always work. In regard to the 
number of soldiers killed over the years, Kissinger had provided the press more 
information than he should have, and as it turned out, the information was wrong. The 
fact that the information was incorrect wasn’t necessarily the problem. It was that now 
the press could promote the notion of a “credibility gap” in the Nixon White House. On 
March 9, while Kissinger was away, Ziegler had the responsibility of explaining the 
misstatement to the President over two long briefings. According to Haldeman, the 
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outcome of the briefings was positive, but the entire event “shows more clearly than 
anything yet how the White House press is totally dedicated to screwing us rather than 
getting the facts and reporting them. They bent every effort to tangle it up and prove a 
credibility gap instead of trying to get it straight,” he wrote.339 For now it seemed as 
though the war discussion would take the backburner. Things were heating up at home 
and Nixon was busy addressing them. Segregation and race were everyday conversations 
in the White House, as was the handling of emerging labor disputes.  
 On March 17, 1970 United States postal workers in New York City went on strike 
due to poor working conditions and low pay. With no legal rights to bargaining, the 
postal workers went on strike. Postal offices in New York City, where the first strike 
originated, were described as “dungeons,” citing a lack of appropriate heating and 
cooling and unsafe working conditions.340 In large part, the postal system was made up of 
African American workers. The civil rights movement, and the growing tensions 
surrounding the full desegregation of schools bolstered the strike efforts.341 It also 
amplified the cause of New York City postal workers. Eventually, more than 210,000 
Postal Department workers took up the cause across the United States and began strikes 
of their own.  
 Nixon was prepared to take a firm stand. The simple fact that Federal employees 
were on strike was unacceptable. If he could fire them, he would fire them. At the very 
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least, those involved would be suspended. For Nixon, the concern wasn’t about the 
responsibility of the postal system to deliver the mail, it was a matter of principle. The 
postal strike, for Nixon, was a reflection of his lack of control and the subsequent 
appearance of a lack of leadership. He demanded that the workers return to work but his 
announcement merely solidified the strike resolve and even motivated other government 
agency workers to threaten a strike if Nixon were to pursue legal action against the postal 
workers.342  
 Nixon’s legacy was at stake, but more importantly, so too was his image. His 
decisions here would greatly impact how the public viewed him. Nixon was dedicated to 
his image as a “man of the people” and a push against postal workers placed that image 
in a precarious position.  He was at an impasse. Action against the postal workers might 
create sympathy and support for the postal workers, but the strike was having a 
debilitating impact on the postal system, even causing the stock market to fall. The stock 
market relied, in part, on the postal system for trading. A long strike raised fears that the 
stock market might have to close entirely.343  
 On March 23, in a historic move, President Nixon called for the National Guard in 
New York to take over mailing services. He made his announcement on television that 
day. In a seven-minute statement he declared a national emergency, called for workers to 
return to their jobs and announced the deployment of the National Guard. Eight days after 
the strike began, it was over and no postal worker had been fired. On April 2, a settlement 
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was reached.  One of Nixon’s most significant contributions during his presidency was 
born out of the postal strike. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 was made effective 
on July 1 of 1971. 
 In defiance of the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of 
Education, seven states – Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Mississippi, Georgia and Louisiana – continued to enforce segregated school systems in 
1970. In 1969 another court decision had ordered an end to delaying the integration of 
schools. Tension regarding desegregation continued to mount and it became increasingly 
clear to Nixon and his Administration that steps were needed to calm another domestic 
crisis. In March, a cabinet committee was created to transition segregated systems. 
Biracial committees were formed in each of the states with still segregated school 
systems. The committee members themselves had reservations. There were concerns by 
individuals of both races that involvement in the committee would either reflect badly on 
them or that the committee itself was merely a publicity stunt.  
 Tension in southern schools was a regular conversation in the White House and 
Nixon’s position wasn’t always popular. Nixon felt that the “liberal establishment” was 
pushing too hard for total integration rather than desegregation. In his opinion, the 
process needed to be a slow one and moving too quickly could result in more 
confrontation and violence. While Nixon’s March 24 statement on the full desegregation 
of schools affirmed his resolve in upholding the law as it stood, he still promoted his own 
preference in moving forward.  
I am dedicated to continued progress toward a truly desegregated public school 
system. But, considering the always heavy demands for more school operating 
funds, I believe it is preferable, when we have to make the choice, to use limited 
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financial resources for the improvement of education--for better teaching 
facilities, better methods, and advanced educational materials--and for the 
upgrading of the disadvantaged areas in the community rather than buying buses, 
tires, and gasoline to transport young children miles away from their 
neighborhood schools.344  
The push for desegregation by Nixon was seemingly more for the appearance of 
control and leadership than it was for any moral reason. The law dictated something, and 
it was to be upheld. He had, after all, much to lose from this push. He wasn’t courting the 
African American vote and he was risking those votes he sought - the “Silent Majority.” 
The Nixon Administration wasn’t attempting to cultivate the “ethnic block” vote but 
rather those who were “resentful in the inner cities.”345  
Houston, We’ve Got a Problem; Washington, We Have a Distraction 
April 13, 1970 began quietly. Haldeman was concerned about the broadcast 
networks’ agenda. “It’s obvious that the networks are running about twice a week a five-
minute series of interviews of unemployed people – the purpose apparently being to try 
and establish a recession psychology,” he wrote to Klein. “Is there anything we can do to 
combat this effort?”346 The strategy of Nixon’s aides was evolving and the complexity of 
their investigation into the media was beyond the basics of media influence, approaching 
the potential psychology behind it all. Nixon’s aides were beginning to focus not only on 
content and rhetoric, but also on potential, deeper impacts of sustained reporting. It was 
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one thing to go after one report, or one reporter, but the aides felt that a series of reports 
over time could establish a more pervasive mindset among the American people. 
However, that examination would to have to wait. An emergency of epic proportions was 
about to captivate the country.  
“Houston, we’ve got a problem here,” astronaut James R. Lovell reported to 
NASA Command, while nearly 200,000 miles from Earth. At about midnight on April 
13th, Kissinger called Haldeman. There had been a problem aboard Apollo 13. The 
spacecraft, launched on April 11th with the mission to land in the Fra Mauro area of 
Moon. An explosion on board the craft prevented landing. The damage from the 
explosion resulted in power failure, shortage of potable water, loss of cabin heat and 
malfunctioning of the carbon dioxide removal system on the Command Module. At the 
time, the chances of a safe return for the astronauts seemed slim.  
The following day was dedicated to conversation about the Apollo module. The 
President had scheduled a speech regarding Vietnam but decided to postpone it 
considering the circumstances. While Ehrlicman urged a trip to Houston, a trip to the 
Goddard Space Center in Maryland for a briefing was made instead. Meanwhile, Nixon’s 
aides were planning their own response.347   
After a dramatic feat of engineering, on Friday, April 17th the astronauts made 
their safe return to Earth in the south Pacific Ocean. Nixon was elated. In celebration, he 
“Ordered cigars for all on success when learned that was (NASA Engineer) Chris Kraft’s 
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tradition at NASA.” The President called the astronauts and the press and then ended the 
day with the “Evening at the White House” event with special guest Johnny Cash. “Lots 
of people, enthusiasm. It was a great day,” wrote Haldeman.348 The next day Nixon and 
his aides flew to Houston to thank the ground teams that brought the astronauts home 
safely, and award them the Medal of Freedom.  
Apollo 13 had gripped the nation. It captivated the country’s attention and with 
Nixon’s aides, it had truly become a television event of its own. With the astronauts 
returned home, Nixon and his team prepared to bring Vietnam back into the picture. They 
had delayed their initial address regarding troop withdraw when the Apollo module was 
in danger. Now that the astronauts were safe, the medals presented and the pomp and 
circumstance were over, Nixon prepared for his TV appearance on April 20. Nixon gave 
his address at 6:15 from San Clemente. Strategically, Nixon asked for the information 
leak to the press. The press was to be informed that the President was to announce a 
40,000 troop withdrawal during his address. Instead, he would actually announce the 
withdrawal of 150,000 troops.  
The tactic would accomplish two things. One, it would discredit the media. 
Something that Nixon and his aides often sought. Harming the credibility of the press, 
and revealing their use of leaked material that was unsubstantiated would build the 
perception that the press was neither responsible nor fair. This, ultimately would work in 
Nixon’s favor. Criticism from the press regarding him and his Administration would 
potentially seem less believable. Second, the expectation of a smaller number of troops 
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withdrawal and then the revelation of a much larger troop withdrawal would increase the 
likelihood of a positive response from the public. If the people thought fewer troops were 
going to be coming home and then were told by the President that he would bring home 
100,000 more, would again place him in a positive light. Both of these outcomes would 
enhance Nixon’s image. One was a long game and the other, a short. This is how the 
Administration would play ball – chip at the credibility of the press by leaking inaccurate 
information and then use television to speak to the nation directly, with the accurate 
information. Nixon would appear honest and the press would appear sloppy – at least that 
was the plan.  
By late April, Communists had gained control of one-fourth of what was 
considered “neutral” Cambodia. In response, plans were considered to have South 
Vietnamese move in on one side and a joint American/South Vietnamese push in another 
territory. The escalation moved Nixon back where he liked to be, absorbed in foreign 
affairs and away from domestic issues. This, of course, had its consequences. 
Polls were becoming a central focus. They had always been, but with the new 
Administration, new relationships were forged and the impact and position of those polls 
was increasingly important to the Nixon White House and its mission to maintain a 
certain image of their President. Klein had been instructed by Haldeman to gather 
additional information on the Gallup and Harris polls as part of their continuing project. 
In doing so, he spoke with Earl Mazo, supporter of Nixon and the editor of Readers 
Digest, who was willing to do a little digging and provide his own insight to Nixon’s 
aides. “Mazo believes no major purpose will be served researching the Gallup staff or 
clients. He says the situation is basically unchanged over the years, and his studies show 
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no indication of a sellout. The only change is one I noticed during the campaign and that 
is that George Gallup, Jr., is weaker and less perceptive than his father,” wrote Klein.  
The Harris poll presented a more complex picture. In fact, ties to the Department 
of Transportation were of particular interest to Klein. “…the poll has been sold to a Wall 
Street firm called Donaldson Lufkin. I am getting a rundown of the firm. Harris was in 
Newsweek but was bounced out and now is in Time. The poll stories are written by 
Harris personally. You know Harris’ background and ties which are certainly anti-
Nixon…I have just found out that a major new client of Harris is DOT. I have been trying 
to reach Volpe on this… Earl Mazo has been delayed in further investigation because of a 
story he is writing for Reader’s Digest on the President. He promises to get more 
information immediately.349  
Concerns of a Cheapened Image 
The morning staff meeting of Friday April 24 elicited more concerns about the 
public’s perception of the President. The continued national unrest and what seemed to be 
endless and increasing conflicts in Vietnam and Cambodia had spurred a sense a loss of 
momentum and leadership. Nixon’s aides were lobbying for the President to be more 
available to the press and the people, but Nixon was even less receptive to the idea as 
1970 wore on. If nothing else, the team simply needed the President to make an 
appearance. Haldeman wrote: 
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E and Harlow and Zeigler and Klein all feel there is a substantial problem and that 
P’s theories of isolation and remoteness are badly aggravating it. Hard to get them 
to come up with positive ideas to counterbalance this, but they do feel strongly. 
They argue for more public Presidential presentations, press conferences, 
speeches, review trips, etc. Not so much to sell programs, but to demonstrate P 
cares and is interested and will try to do something. Whole thrust is on need for 
appearance, not substance.350  
 
A dichotomy emerged. As the year progressed, so did concern regarding the 
accessibility of the White House to the press. In the same regard, some on Nixon’s team 
were concerned that increased openness would lessen the effectiveness of the President’s 
appearances. The general consensus had become this: The success of manufacturing a 
positive image of President Nixon was reliant on the continued control over his 
appearances. Absolute control over his appearances was only possible if they were few, 
and heavily prepared. Too many appearances and Nixon’s impact diminished. Openness 
potentially cheapened the value of the President, his aides and his family. There was to be 
some degree of privilege that accompanied the ability to reach the Nixon Administration, 
a formality that many of Nixon’s aides felt should stay intact.351 
On April 30, Haldeman wrote to Klein, Ziegler, and Constance Stuart, staff director 
and press secretary for the First Lady, “We’ve got to establish a very clear policy of not 
selling the White House too cheaply. When we make arrangements for the President’s 
family or for that matter, key staff people, to do feature stories or feature filming for 
television, we should not just jump at the first offer, but rather be hard to get and play for 
the best kinds of things we can possibly get.” A previous tour of the White House with 
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Nixon’s daughter, Tricia, brought this concern to light. A 20-minute segment was agreed 
upon but the team thought it potentially possible to have pushed for a full-hour special. 
Haldeman expressed that had the team bargained more strongly, the Administration may 
have had the opportunity for more television time. “Sometimes we’d be better off not to 
give anything than to give too much for too low a price,” Haldeman wrote. 
Cambodia and the Leadership Crisis 
That same day, Nixon addressed the nation through a televised speech from the 
Oval Office. Nixon asked the American people to support his decision to send troops into 
Cambodia in response to North Vietnam’s incursion into the country. The use of the word 
“incursion” was deliberate and calculated, and like many other items of discussion in the 
Nixon White House, hotly debated. In fact, before the speech, the President called a few 
of his aides into the Roosevelt Room to discuss how to get the word out about the speech 
and bolster support. A discussion about the difference between the use of the word 
“incursion” instead of “invasion” emerged. “Incursion” was temporary and this plan was 
not. This lead to Donald Rumsfeld questioning how the plan flew “in the face of the 
Nixon Doctrine.” To that, Kissinger replied, “We wrote the goddamned doctrine, we can 
change it.” That instantly ended the discussion. Nixon used the term “incursion.”352  
“I realize that in this war there are honest and deep differences in this country about 
whether we should have become involved, that there are differences as to how the war 
should have been conducted. But the decision I announce tonight transcends those 
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differences. For the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for Americans 
to come home in the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18 million people in South 
Vietnam and 7 million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just 
peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake,” he said to the nation. This was the first 
time a President used a map in the way Nixon did, during a televised address. If openness 
was a concern for the press, Nixon’s team orchestrated this televised appearance to 
obliterate that notion. Not only was Nixon speaking candidly, straight to the American 
people about a very contested issue, he was essentially providing a full visual lesson. He 
had been accused of intentionally keeping the public uniformed and this appearance was 
designed to counter that. Perhaps, it would suggest, that the press was at fault for a lack 
of information, not the Administration.353  
Tactics like this one served Klein and his team well. They allowed for a more 
intelligent conversation with the media and gave Klein the leverage he needed to suggest 
that the Administration was making some attempt at being open, regardless of how that 
information may have been skewed by those in the White House. At least information 
was available, and for appearance sake, it was being presented in a clear and television-
friendly way. To the Administration, there would be little need for a station to create its 
own graphics if the White House had already done and to show the public something 
other than what the President had shown the people would almost certainly open the 
networks up to criticism from Nixon’s team. 
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Nixon ended his address; “It is customary to conclude a speech from the White 
House by asking support for the President of the United States. Tonight, I depart from 
that precedent. What I ask is far more important. I ask for your support for our brave men 
fighting tonight halfway around the world--not for territory--not for glory--but so that 
their younger brothers and their sons and your sons can have a chance to grow up in a 
world of peace and freedom and justice. Thank you and good night.”354 Following the 
speech, Nixon took a walk around the Rose Garden on his way back to the White House. 
As after each televised address, Nixon’s aides prepared for a night of careful management 
of phone calls and reactions regarding the President’s address.  
Just days after his televised address, on May 4, and as Nixon and his aides gauged 
national reaction, tragedy struck on the campus of Kent State University. Haldemen went 
to the Executive Office Building, where the President was spending part of his day, to tell 
him that four students had been killed. Disturbed by the prospect of an unwarranted and 
overzealous attack on students by the National Guard, the President hoped that perhaps 
the rioters had provoked the shooting, but little evidence suggested that. Other than 
throwing rocks at the National Guard, the students hadn’t instigated any violent action. 
Nixon felt, to some degree, that he might be responsible – that his speech may have 
motivated unrest.  
Haldeman and Nixon talked about how the Administration could get through to 
students. The disconnect seemed no closer to being resolved than when Nixon entered 
office. Rumors abound of protests, marches and strikes. While this had been discussed as 
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a possibility following Nixon’s address on Cambodia, the news held a unique weight. 
Nixon’s foreign decisions were seemingly having an almost instant impact on domestic 
affairs and his much-desired image as a peacemaker was tangled in the trappings of a 
prolonged war and a country divided. There seemed little to do other than wait and see 
how Cambodia turned out. “If it can be proclaimed a success and we can get out in six 
weeks, it will set him up pretty well for a while. If not, we’re in for a bundle of trouble,” 
wrote Haldeman.355 
A “bundle of trouble” was, a serious understatement. The Kent State deaths and the 
subsequent violence on college campuses amplified the fragility of the nation’s condition. 
Media attention was non-stop. Schools had closed and threats of violence were at a high. 
Nixon tightened reins on Vice President Spiro Agnew in light of his forceful rhetoric that 
was credited as trigger in an already volatile situation. On May 8, Nixon held a press 
conference addressing the student demonstrators, as well as Cambodia and Vietnam. 
Herbert Kaplow of NBC News asked Nixon what he thought the students were trying to 
say through their demonstrations. Nixon replied:  
They are trying to say that they want peace. They are trying to say that they want 
to stop the killing. They are trying to say they want to end the draft. They are 
trying to say that we ought to get out of Vietnam. I agree with everything that 
they are trying to accomplish. I believe, however, that the decisions that I have 
made, and particularly this last terribly difficult decision of going into Cambodia 
sanctuaries which are completely occupied by the enemy – I believe that that 
decision will serve that purpose, because you can be sure that everything that I 
stand for is what they want.356  
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Nixon was trying to align himself more closely to the plight of the America’s youth. 1970 
wasn’t about trying to explain or defend his actions. In many cases, it was a departure 
from the maligning of the “others.” Instead, 1970 was grasping at opportunities that 
allowed Nixon to appear in alliance with the ideological underpinnings of a nation at a 
tipping point. Nixon was, in many ways, still campaigning.  
 The press conference was considered a success but the year was taking its toll on 
Nixon. The next day, Haldeman expressed his growing concern. “I am concerned about 
this condition,” he wrote.  
The decision, the speech, the aftermath killings, riots, press, etc.; the press 
conference, the student confrontation have all taken their toll, and he has had very 
little sleep for a long time and his judgment, temper, and mood suffer badly as a 
result. On the other hand he has gone into a monumental crisis, fully recognized 
as such by the outside, and so far has come through extremely well. But there’s a 
long way to go and he’s in no condition to weather it. He’s still riding on the crisis 
wave, but the letdown is near at hand and will be huge.357  
 
Nixon had many tests ahead and his staff was starting to worry that in a time where 
appearance of strong leadership was most needed, Nixon might stumble under fatigue. “If 
we make it, it will be a great proof of leadership at a time that was badly needed. If we 
don’t, we’ll have a rough couple years of rebuilding,” Haldeman wrote, finishing his 
diary entry for the night.358 This, perhaps, was another stunning understatement by 
another Nixon man.  
 The Cambodia situation was precarious. A Senate strategy had emerged that would 
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require the President remove all American troops from Cambodia by July 1, 1970. This 
worried Nixon. A move like that might be interpreted as defeat, and there seemed to be 
enough votes to carry it. Still, Nixon’s aides were hopeful. An amendment on the basis of 
troop safety would likely be possible. While the Senate was a concern for the 
Administration, press coverage of Cambodia was a major concern for the presidential 
aides. Compounded by the student unrest, press strategy in the White House was all-
hands-on-deck and Haldeman turned to Klein to do the heavy lifting. Politics aside, the 
answer, as it so often was in the Nixon White House, was television. 
 “The work load in your office should be shifted so that all odds and ends and busy 
work is handled by one person and the rest of your staff can concentrate on the Cambodia 
situation, as well as the student situation,” Haldeman wrote Klein in a memo:  
Herb, it is felt you should get on television as much as possible. There have been 
several positive comments about your appearance on the Cavett show. In addition, 
it is vital we get the Cabinet Members who are good on television should be 
programmed accordingly. The orchestration of the Cambodian public information 
effort between now and June 20, and then the follow-up to the withdrawal of 
American troops as primary in the President’s mind. We must continue to plug 
away on this effort.359 
  
 The situation in Cambodia had the potential of creating even more evidence for 
growing accusations of a “leadership crisis.” Wherever the perception arose that Nixon 
was losing control of his country, Nixon’s aides were ready to respond.  This wasn’t 
simply an unspoken code of honor. Their response was methodical. James Keogh, special 
assistant to Nixon in 1969 and then head speechwriter, had earlier made note of an 
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“attack” by the media in their suggestion that there was a “leadership crisis.” Haldeman 
ordered him, Klein, Safire, Buchanan and Lyn Nofziger, a deputy assistant to the 
President, into action. “Of course, the opposite is true,” he wrote of there being a concern 
over the President’s leadership abilities. “It is felt that some very positive speeches 
tackling these problem should be developed for use by others, such as the Vice President, 
Chairman Morton, Senator Scott, Congressman Ford, and others. In addition to the 
speeches, it would be well to have a fact sheet. It could list “what some say” – (this 
would be the negative comments) and “the truth” – (our side of the story.) Will you 
please put your team to work on this matter?”360 Orders like this were not new to Klein 
and the others. Klein and his staff mailed out fact sheets and background material to news 
directors, writers and editors. 
 These formal strategies were juxtaposed by the more underhanded approaches that 
were becoming commonplace in the Nixon White House. It seemed, for every action “by 
the book” there was another “underneath the table.” While speeches and a list of talking 
points were commonplace and open for general discussion amongst the team, Klein 
himself was to take a different focus. The Nixon White House was no stranger to putting 
political pressure on the press but the tactic of financial pressure was emerging as a 
formative strategy. The President’s image was at stake and in such cases, traditional 
methods weren’t always enough. Haldeman, in a private memo to Klein suggested the 
following the next day, “P.S. Perhaps another gateway to get this out would be to have 
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some very important person – maybe a major advertiser – write a letter to the news 
media, the Times, the Post, and Time and Newsweek, simply laying it on the line like this 
and asking them some searching questions. The letter should be written, in each instance, 
to the publisher.”361 Nixon’s aides weren’t simply going after reporters, or demanding 
corrections from editors anymore, they were strategically going after the institution itself. 
Pressmen were small pickings. The establishment was the real problem and Nixon’s 
aides, men from media and marketing, knew that money was a very powerful influencer. 
 There was a clear sense in the Nixon White House that between the situation in 
Cambodia and the unrest across the nation’s college campuses, the “establishment press” 
was latching on and using the opportunity to inflict the greatest damage possible on the 
Administration and the image of Richard Nixon. Efforts to make it into columns in 
national newspapers was failing and Nixon’s aides were becoming more diligent in their 
efforts to hold the media responsible for their words and actions.  
 That same day, Haldeman, in what some suggest was a memo written by Nixon 
himself362, laid out the groundwork: 
…to the extent the President has any support whatever on Cambodia this is a 
devastating indication of the lack of credibility of the national media, particularly 
the two news magazines, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and three 
networks. You should point out that all of them have opposed the President 
violently on this issue. Also we should point that this is nothing new. Richard Nixon 
is the first president this century who came to the Presidency with the opposition 
of all these major communication powers and, since he has been in the Presidency, 
he has been heavily opposed with only a few exceptions. He has been opposed not 
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just editorially but primarily by the slant of the news coverage due to the attitudes 
of reporters. The fact that he now survives all of this with even 57% approval by 
the people indicates not so much something about Richard Nixon as it does 
something about the news media. Point out that this 57% figure incidentally is a 
rather remarkably one in view of the fact that it is the period of economic slowdown, 
and that Eisenhower in the whole year of 1958, when he had Lebanon and other 
foreign policy successes had a Gallup rating which dropped into the 50s. You might 
say that this is really a time for soul-searching on the part of the press as to whether 
it is they who are out of tune with the people rather than the President. The point 
could also be made that the President has taken all of this with good grace. He has 
never during this period of office called a publisher, commentator, editor, etc for 
purposes of criticizing him and that the real meaning of it is that the President, 
himself, has finally reached the conclusion which would be one that should cause 
the media some concern. He realizes that he does not have to have their support.363 
 
A line had been officially drawn and the veiled threat toward the media was worthy of 
note.  
Tightening Reins 
 In late May Klein was preparing for an air inspection trip of Vietnam and 
Cambodia. The plan was to invite the press but Klein had his reservations and was 
hesitant to move forward, instead offering an alternative plan. “I talked to Felix 
McKnight [of the Times Herald] several times during the weekend and he was willing to 
send a wire suggesting such a trip. He said that to be credible, we would have to be 
certain to include some people who are known opponents, such as Punch Sulzburger and 
a representative from the Washington Post,” he wrote to Haldeman.  
My alternative suggestion would be that we arrange for perhaps two or three 
groups of editors and broadcasters to come in the invitation of the President for a 
briefing of the situation. This could include lunch and discussion with either Laird 
or Rogers and an afternoon briefing by one of the two. Defense and State would 
then be followed by a meeting with the President or perhaps cocktails with him at 
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5:00 pm or 6:00 pm for an hour.364  
 
 Reins on the press were tightening, but these reservations weren’t entirely based on 
a perception of negative coverage. Previously, Johnson had planned a similar trip when 
he checked on the election in South Vietnam. Apparently, the trip started well, but the 
reporters were unable to see all they had wanted to see. Klein expressed concern that 
dwindling supplies and resources, and the prediction of an increase in fighting could put 
them in the same position. Chapin seemed to agree. At the bottom of the memo Klein 
scribbled, “H- C recommends (1) drop trip idea (2) try and set Klein out there with some 
group (3) drop idea of bringing editors or broadcasters for briefing – all the arguments 
against the plans.”365 The idea was dropped but perhaps of greater significance was that 
the concept was discussed at all. Klein had always been more open to engaging the press, 
even as Nixon’s other aides pushed for a more closed environment. Contrary to the 
suggestion that Nixon was dedicated to keeping information from the public, his aides 
had fully planned though eventually abandoned, a trip to do the opposite. The logistics 
rather than the politics, at least in this instance, seemed to tip the balance.  
 When Klein returned from Vietnam he was appraised of a conversation that had 
occurred between the President and Buchanan. Buchanan had sent the President a memo 
informing him of the following: “In two weeks’ time CBS-TV has shown only three short 
film segments on troops uncovering enemy caches of arms and food. That is, CBS is not 
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screening much footage that would tend to demonstrate the truth in the President’s stated 
reasons for moving into the sanctuaries.”366 Haldeman wanted Klein to waste no time 
complaining to CBS about their coverage. “I wonder if now isn’t the time for you to 
personally move firmly in talking with top-level management at CBS and asking them 
what is happening here. As you know, we keep all the news broadcasts so that you can 
have a case built sky-high before you go in to see them. The only way this thing is going 
to change is if we get some top-level action and you now are in the unique position to do 
so,” he wrote.367  
 Klein routinely spoke to the movers and shakers in the press. There was some 
kindred spirt between those in the news business and Klein. Haldeman understood the 
value of Klein’s relationships but seemed to lack an understanding that certain tactics 
could bring irreparable damage to those valuable relationships. Still, Klein made an effort 
to bridge the gap between White House and press managers but often attempted to shift 
attention to other ways that the President could establish a positive relationships of his 
own. 
 While Nixon’s aides were looking to aggressively hit the top executives at major 
networks, Klein was focused on taking apart the smaller appearances of the President, 
making note of even the slightest missteps by correspondents and reporters. If something 
was said, even in passing, that the Nixon White House didn’t agree with or felt reflected 
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badly on the President, network executives would know about it. On June 17, Klein sent a 
memo to Haldeman about Nixon’s address in Knoxville.368 ABC had, even by the 
Administration’s standards, done a good job in their coverage. That is, until a 
correspondent in a final comment noted his surprise about the number of dissidents who 
had shown up. Klein immediately called Jim Hagerty, press secretary under Eisenhower 
and now Vice President of ABC and John Lynch. Hagerty brought the complaint up and 
what followed was a letter written to Klein from Lynch himself. It read, “Dear Herb: I 
have checked the script of our report from Knoxville on the President’s appearance there. 
I would agree with you that the correspondent stretched the point in this particular case. It 
is very uncharacteristic of him. Best, John.”369  
 The daily News Summary that was implemented when Nixon first took office were 
getting continued use. On July 10, Larry Higby, assistant to Haldeman, wrote to Klein 
about the need to get comparisons of the total amounts of time Kennedy, Johnson, 
Eisenhower and the President had on television over the course of their terms in office. 
This was information that the Nixon Administration had wanted for some time, but didn’t 
think was possible to acquire without going to the networks. The July 10 News Summary 
included something that suggested otherwise. “After reviewing Frank Stanton’s 
(President of CBS) response that played on CBS last evening, and which appears on page 
9 of this morning’s Television Report in the News Summary, it is obvious that Mr. 
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Stanton had this information. Bob has now requested that you phone Mr. Stanton and ask 
him for this information and that you have available for Mr. Haldeman by noon today the 
information supplied by Mr. Stanton. Thank you,” wrote Higby.370 
 Nixon’s aides were eager to find or create opportunities to get the President in front 
of the camera. They knew that a good appearance on television, with the President talking 
directly to the American people, had more of an impact than speeches and press 
conferences. In the vein of Franklin Roosevelt, Haldeman pushed for Fireside Chats for 
television.  The President would need some convincing and Haldeman knew this. He 
reached out to Chapin:  
We’ve done a lot of talking about the idea of the President doing a series of 
Fireside Chats from the Lincoln Sitting room for national television on Sunday 
evenings. We need to work up a specific plan on this and the way to sell it to the 
President would be to develop the complete plan on one subject, right down to 
having a basic text written, staging worked out and everything else. We would 
also have a plan for how this works into a series of broadcasts, but we should start 
it by selling one specific program to the President.371 
 
 Television strategy to this point had been somewhat reactionary. Major events, 
national tragedies, war and presidential events necessitated a need for quick response. 
Nixon’s aides were pioneering new ways of utilizing a new medium and despite the 
challenges of doing so, they were relatively successful in their endeavors. They forged 
relationships with press executives and investigated reporters. They documented each 
individual in the media they suspected to be “against Nixon” and watched them carefully 
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while striking alliances with those who exhibited more moderate or favorable leanings. 
But one thing was emerging in the 1970s that was unique. Nixon’s aides were engaging 
in deep research. Perhaps a product of paranoia, Nixon was constantly comparing the 
behavior of the press with him to how the press behaved with his predecessors.372 The 
infancy of television made this a new area of research. Likewise, Nixon’s aides were 
looking to previous presidential successes with emerging media technology, such as 
radio, and investigating ways to modify those successes for television. Television 
strategy in the Nixon White House wasn’t just emerging, it was pioneering. 
Building a Case Against the Press 
 Nixon spent a generous amount of time at his Western White House in San 
Clemente, and as a result, garnered jeers from the press. The potential damage to the 
President’s image if the press continued to perpetuate a narrative that Nixon was 
vacationing often was not lost on Nixon’s aides, and certainly not on Nixon himself. 
Chapin, in response, was asked to do a spot analysis of the coverage of the activities that 
occurred at the Western White House in the LA Times in comparison to the coverage in 
the New York Times and the Washington Post. Coverage had been better in the Eastern 
papers the previous year, and if the LA Times was going to risk less favorable coverage 
this summer, the Administration was going to be prepared to confront them about it. 
Coverage analysis on topics like this was important for the Administration. This was just 
further evidence that Nixon’s Administration wasn’t simply blacklisting press and 
chastising them for perceived transgressions, they were simultaneously meticulously 
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researching major press players. In 1969, the focus would have been the origination of 
suggestions like that of the President “vacationing.” In 1970 the focus was more 
sophisticated. It was becoming clearer. The Nixon Administration wasn’t gearing up for 
press avoidance, it was mounting its case against the press through careful research and 
press manipulation. 
 The way the press interpreted Nixon’s travel had been a particular point of analysis 
for Nixon’s aides. Ever vigilant in the formation and verification of Nixon as a constant 
worker, no stone would go unturned when it came to the Nixon’s time spent outside 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Nixon would regularly visit Walker Cay, the northernmost island 
in the Bahamas. At the time, the land was leased by American businessman Robert 
Abplanalp. Abplanalp built a small Presidential office in a building there complete with 
Presidential flags and other accoutrements fit for the Commander in Chief.  “It would be 
a good idea for you to make this known the next time we are in Florida and the President 
goes to Walker’s so that there will be no question in the minds of the press as to whether 
the President is able to work and communicate while he is out there. You should make it 
clear that he does both,” Haldeman informed Ziegler and Chapin.  “Along the same line, 
the next trip to Los Angeles should not be announced as a working vacation. The 
President doesn’t want to see that term used anymore. These trips are not working 
vacations, they are a move of the White House from Washington to San Clemente.”373 
 To construct this idea more clearly for the press, the President requested that a 
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working schedule be established and announced each day that he spent at the Western 
White House. Two briefings would be held each day – one at 10 a.m. and the other at 2 
p.m.  In addition to informing the press, they were also to be specifically informed that 
the President works the full day, contrary to some reports that suggested he rested in the 
afternoon. “It will be essential for you to develop something to cover at each of these 
briefings each day. He wants to be sure we keep the press working, not give them a day 
off.”374  
 Of course, the relentless pursuit to protect Nixon’s legacy continued. It had been 
made clear among the aides that there was little sense for Nixon to bother to do certain 
things if there was no resulting news coverage that came out of it. Appearance was 
paramount. Haldeman made this clear once again to Chapin, "As you may recognize, it’s 
important that we do some evaluation of the coverage of the things we do for the purpose 
of getting coverage, instead of just blissfully wandering along doing all the things and 
getting no mileage out of them.”375 
Increasing Tension Among Aides 
 There was always a bit of tension between Haldeman and other aides in the Nixon 
White House, but nothing unusual in a high stress, high stakes Administration.376 Chapin 
was on the receiving end of Haldeman’s frustration when it came to matters directly 
concerning the President, and particularly those that involved his schedule with the 
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internal television team and broadcast press. “As mentioned frequently before – it would 
be helpful to me to have the same daily schedule as the P. has. Maybe (and apparently) 
that’s asking too much,”377 Haldeman scribbled on a note to Chapin. Notes like this, 
between the two where common. Contrary to prevailing narratives, Nixon’s aides seemed 
to get along well for the most part and weren’t stifled under the oppressive thumb of 
Nixon himself. According to Chapin, when the aides would meet, and Nixon would 
happen to wander in, he would joke with the group casually before walking out. It was 
Haldeman’s presence that would quickly turn a relaxed gathering into a tense situation.378 
 July 1970 is filled with discussion of a solid “scientific” plan for how the President 
spent time with key members of the press and television people. Despite the fact that this 
had become an important aspect of the Nixon Administration, Nixon’s aides were still 
learning when and where to embrace the press and when to shun them entirely in terms of 
television. A balance had yet to be achieved and Haldeman had it high on his agenda to 
find it.379  
 Interestingly enough, just two days after Haldeman wrote a memo to Chapin 
regarding that very balance and the importance of creating a scientific plan, he made 
clear that no one was to give the impression that the President would be attending any 
events with the press. “Will you please be absolutely sure that it is completely clear to all 
possible concerned parties – inside and outside the staff – that the President will not do 
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the Gridiron, the Radio-TV Correspondents – the White House Correspondents – the 
Women’s Press Club – The White House Photographers – or any similar group who is 
having a dinner next year or at any time in the future,” he wrote.380  
 There was little advantage, according to Haldeman, for the President attending 
events as these. Instead, particular members of the press friendly to the Administration 
would be selected, invited and entertained at the White House. Maintaining control over 
the environment, and the press that the President approved were critical. Much to his 
dismay, Ziegler had recently failed to inform the President that an event in which he 
attended was hosted by The New York Times. Had he known, Haldeman wrote, the 
President would have never attended. 
 Haldeman was becoming frustrated by these missteps from fellow aides when it 
came to press management. An event for General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had been committed, set up, staged and executed without the approval of 
Haldeman. He had approved setting a date, but had been unaware of all the other details, 
and that they had been finalized. The fact that the event included press coverage, and 
subsequently, the President was slated to appear on television, made this an issue of 
significance. The handling of the event left Nixon with no prior notice of his television 
appearance. To Haldeman’s relief, the President had ended the breakfast 30 minutes 
early, giving them time to prep him. Of course, it was of the utmost importance for the 
President to be prepared and the oversight put additional pressure on the internal 
                                                
380 H.R. Haldeman to Dwight Chapin, 9 July 1970; folder Memoranda, July, 1970: Box 2; White House Special 
Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Dwight Chapin; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 
Yorba Linda, California  
  194   
television team to work in conjunction with Klein and Ziegler to formulate a distinct 
plan.  
To do this we need to get back to the key list that Buchanan is developing of the 
good press people and then work out a program for maintaining contact with 
them. Another facet of this plan would be a program for continuous contact with 
the key network guys assigned to the White House and the key network anchor 
men so that each of them gets a communication by phone or in person with 
several of our key people listed above each week. Please get to work on this 
quickly and let me have a plan within the next few days of this overall thing.381  
 
 Klein and Ziegler were at work creating a rating of editors, publishers, reporters 
and other potential influencers within the media. Nixon wanted this done. Not only was it 
important to be aware of the coverage and the non-coverage, it was equally, if not more 
important to be aware of where each editor, publisher and reporter stood when it came to 
their potential leanings and the flavor of their overall reporting. The list gave the 
Administration the opportunity to easily distinguish the “good guys” from the “bad guys” 
and more importantly, who to watch and who to pressure when necessary. On July 15, the 
beginnings of the list were given to Chapin from Higby. At the time, it still wasn’t known 
exactly what the list would accomplish and when it would be used, but it was prioritized 
nonetheless. “Here are the Ziegler and Klein ratings of editors, publishers, reporters, etc. 
It is my understanding that Buchanan’s office will now put together a master list to use as 
appropriate – what – ever that means,” wrote Higby.382  
 There are few other moments during the presidency of Richard Nixon that truly 
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exemplify how meticulous his aides were in protecting his image than the reaction to 
coverage of Nixon’s attendance at a baseball game. Richard Nixon was a lover of sports. 
On July 14, he attended the All-Star game in Louisville, Kentucky and threw out the first 
pitch. Nixon had been received in Louisville to a largely enthusiastic and supportive 
crowd. However, a delay at the start of the game was interpreted by The Washington Post 
to have been caused by the President. It was a lesson, according to Haldeman. It 
exemplified the type of work that was not being done by Nixon’s aides in managing the 
press, and he meticulously documented it:  
The sports page of the Washington Post, both page D-1 and page D-2, give us 
some lessons to be learned from yesterday’s activity. The President has already 
talked with you about the problem of the staff writer story datelined Cincinnati, 
claiming that the President delayed the game seven minutes and that he arrived 
thirteen minutes late. The point here is first of all we should have moved instantly 
to correct the story after we saw it, which of course no one did until the President 
raised cain about it.  
Secondly, you and I should have perceived when we were standing down there 
worrying about the delay in getting things under way that the crowd was going to 
interpret this as a delay caused by the President and we should have demanded 
that the stadium announcer explain that the game would be starting according to a 
schedule that was determined by the television coverage, so that we make it clear 
that there was no delay caused by the President. The assumption of the crowd 
was, of course, that everybody was being held up waiting for the President to 
come in, and that was the assumption of that writer.  
Now Ron has got to follow up on this and get the story corrected. But your 
problem is to avoid letting a story like that get started to begin with.  
I have discussed with Ron several ways of getting it corrected. I think it is 
imperative that first he work on finding out who that staff writer was and getting 
him to run a correction and insisting that be on the front page of the sports 
section. Secondly, I think he has got to get to Bob Addie and get a good, human-
interest story run in his column correcting it. Third, he has got to get Bowie Kuhn 
and get him to put out a thing from his office, saying that not only was the 
President not late but he was early and that he and the President both had to wait 
in a hot room under the stands for a considerable length of time before the 
President was brought out in the field and taken to his seat, and that the delay was 
due to the television schedule, not anything involving the President.  
The next problem is the Bob Addie column itself. I hope you will read it carefully 
and see what happens in the way of things getting out.  
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The information about the Secret Service, however, is not only not inevitable, but 
is unforgivable. How in the world did we end up with 75 agents at the game, plus 
50 in the President’s official party, plus newsmen and photographers? This is the 
kind of stuff that does us grave disservice to get out and we’ve got to figure out a 
way to keep that from happening.  
Then we get to the incorrect information regarding the elevator, and I think Bob 
Addie ought to be asked to correct that – make the point that the elevator was not 
reserved for the President and his party, but that the President walked in from 
under the stands along the track and into his box and that the elevator was fully 
available to the press. Unfortunately it broke down, which is certainly not the 
President’s fault.  
I don’t know what the facts are on the problem of meeting the Cincinnati 
ballplayer, but it doesn’t do much harm or good.  
Then we get to the picture on D-2 where your ever-present advance man, plus 
Hughes’ ever-present Military Aide managed to do a great job getting on camera. 
There is probably not much way that Brennan could have avoided it, but your guy 
could sure as hell have been out of the way. It is absolutely unforgivable that an 
advanceman has to be told six times to move out of the place he insists upon 
putting himself. You told him over and over and he kept moving back in. Now 
that guy has got to be called in and chewed out, or else dumped, one or the other, 
and it has got to be done fast, firmly and clearly.383  
 
 The entirety of this memo is perhaps one of the best examples of how specific 
Nixon’s aides were in their preparation and response to press that may diminish the image 
of the President. While much literature on the Nixon White House media strategy is 
entrenched in the more highly publicized moments of political history, an event Nixon was 
happy to attend provides understanding of the depth of analysis with which the aides 
engaged moment by moment.  
 Chapin took Haldeman’s specifics in stride. It was well known amongst aides that 
Haldeman’s personality did not allow much room for discussion. It was easier to chat with 
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the President himself than it was with Haldeman.384 Nixon’s aides, when one-on-one with 
the President, felt a sense of kinship.385 A year into the presidency, the formality was 
warring down. That didn’t mean that Chapin didn’t have his own quirks. “H. Please 
indicate sources on this type of thing,” wrote Haldeman on a small yellow notepaper. 
Haldeman, however, was not easily persuaded to follow Chapin’s direction. In blue pen, 
he wrote “Why? Facts don’t require sources – only opinions do.”386 It was just the type of 
response Chapin and his team had come to expect from Haldeman.387 
 There was no shortage of banter between Nixon’s aides. What may have been 
construed as tension and animosity was often muted sarcasm wrapped in a dry wit – 
something those in the Nixon White House took a little smug pride in.388 Still, in true 
Nixon style, there was an expectation of formality in the White House that denoted a sort 
of rigged environment. On December 17, a peculiar memo crossed Chapin’s desk. 
Stamped “High Priority” four times, and “Confidential” twice, its contents suggested 
something of significance. It was from Haldeman.  
Those who are privileged to work on the First Floor of the West Wing of the 
White House, in the immediate vicinity of the Office of the President of the 
United States, will be expected from here on to respond to that privilege by 
wearing jackets or coats at all times. They are not to move through the West Wing 
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of the White House in shirt sleeves, vests, etc.389  
 
Chapin responded:  
I consider it a privilege to work on the first floor of the West Wing of the White 
House, in the immediate vicinity of the office of the President of the United 
States, and will abide by your orders that we respond to this privilege by wearing 
jackets or coats at all times.  
Unless otherwise instructed by you, I will assume that spats, top hats, carnations 
and other such items are not the order of the day. 
By the way, whatever happened to the hard-working shirt-sleeve days of the early 
sixties? Somehow I seem to recall some fascinating pictures not only a President 
but an Attorney General at their White House Staff coatless, with shirt sleeves 
rolled up tackling the problems that lay ahead of them. You will add, I am sure, 
that they probably did not waste time writing memos like this. But, I bet they did, 
for they were also known for their wit.  
Food for thought only.390  
 
Relationships with Local Press 
 Building a relationship with the local press was increasingly important as well. In 
response to the continued unrest across the nation, the President was making his rounds. 
The national press had their angles, and the aides were well acquainted with them, at this 
point in Nixon’s term there was already a deepening sense of a complete disconnect with 
national media. Increasingly clear was the power of the local press. The sentiment toward 
local news people was far different than it was toward the national press. The President 
had always been less suspicious of the local media.391 Nixon requested that receptions 
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and meetings take place between him and local newsmen when the opportunity arose – 
upset when opportunities were missed.392  
 By the end of August, opportunities to take advantage of local press opportunities 
were still missed – and there were many. “Once again we’ve blown the opportunity for 
the President to meet and shake hands with the local press,” Haldeman wrote to Ziegler. 
Regarding an event at the Music Center, Haldeman berated Ziegler for an important 
opportunity missed. Intermission presented the perfect moment. The President had 
wandered out of the venue’s Founders Room and into the hall so that he could greet the 
public. He happened to meet a drama critic from the Herald Examiner, one from the 
Citizen News and an AP reporter who had covered the death of his father. The President 
expressed that he would have preferred those individuals to have been brought up to meet 
him, instead of having met them by happenstance. Haldeman told Ziegler that these were 
opportunities he should have been looking for and taking advantage of. “Apparently you 
were nowhere to be seen when all of this took place, which very much distressed him,” 
wrote Haldeman. “The point here is that when we are in the field on a trip like this, the 
President wants you to take the responsibility for making sure that little opportunities are 
created for him to meet the local press people. He wants you to do this at your initiative 
and to be looking for it as a higher priority item than that of taking care of the national 
press.”393 This was one of the moments that exemplified the difference between Ziegler’s 
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handling of the press and Klein’s relationship with them as a former newsman. Ziegler 
was less comfortable in dealings with the press outside of his traditional role, whereas 
Klein often spent his free time sharing meals with members of the press, and forging 
relationships.394  
 Events such as this one spurred the movement toward a more defined relationship 
with local press. Klein and Ziegler worked on connecting with both the print media and 
broadcast media in local departments. In 1969 there had been a clear discussion regarding 
the power of local newsmen to influence their respective publics and the greater ability to 
connect with them than there was when dealing with Eastern establishment media.  
Shifting Strategy Begins Press Alienation 
 The unrelenting pressure of the continued campus unrest consumed much of the 
Administration’s focus in 1970. Nixon’s team recognized it as a principle campaign 
issue. As such, plans to handle demonstrators had to be made any time the President 
traveled around country. In the past, discussions revolved around diffusing situations 
involving demonstrators. Now, more experienced and calm than in 1969, the team 
devised a way to physically position Nixon between the demonstrators and the press so 
that the visuals told a powerful story of their own. Words weren’t necessary. With the 
television team at the White House carefully studying, analyzing and pioneering strategy, 
a greater understanding of broadcast media’s powerful visual storytelling served as an 
important tool in manipulating television news media.  
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 Talking to the press wasn’t a priority. Now, the team would focus on staging the 
visuals, the photos, and the TV images themselves. This hadn’t been a major concern for 
previous administrations – it certainly hadn’t been a priority. Haldeman provided the 
directive: 
…we should attempt to have the demonstrators concentrated in one area where 
they are highly visible and it may be that the President will move in front of that 
area in order to let the cameras get a picture of the ratty looking people that are 
out demonstrating and/or the profane and obscene signs they carry. In other 
words, let’s contain them where we can control them but make sure that we don’t 
infiltrate them so completely that you can’t tell the good guys from the bad 
guys.395 
 
 This was new – as was much of what Nixon’s team was doing – by virtue of 
television media’s lesser dominance during previous administrations.396 Nixon’s aides 
were now carefully and strategically creating visual news narratives of their own. Of 
course, they had always been concerned with Nixon’s appearance on television – 
particularly physically, but this was a different area of manipulation. They had spent the 
better part of the year studying the tendencies of the news media and now, they would 
force the television media’s hand. The had control of Nixon and wherever Nixon was, the 
camera would follow. They just needed to make sure that Nixon wasn’t the only layer on 
their visual storyboard. Nixon’s aides wanted more than just a change in how the news 
covered Nixon, they wanted a change in how the press, covered the news – another 
indication that 1970’s media strategy was becoming less about the newsmen and more 
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about the news industry.  
 By the end of September, word spread, among Nixon’s aides, that purchasing a 
television station might be possible. A September 21 memo from Haldeman to Charles 
Colson, Special Counsel to the President, displayed words in blue handwriting scribbled 
across the top, “Eyes Only.” “As you know a number of people have been dabbling 
around the idea of trying either to purchase one of the television networks or to set up 
another network – Billy Graham, Tom Dewey, etc., have been talking about this,” wrote 
Haldeman.397 “Would you please run a hard check on this and see if there is any 
possibility of pulling this off. I would like your analysis and recommendation in this 
regard.” 
 Four days later, Colson responded. Colson committed to finding out the ownership 
situations at each of the major networks. “CBS and NBC are subsidiaries of larger 
companies and, therefore, could only be purchased from the parents, a very unlikely 
prospect. ABC has been for sale from time to time…but I don’t know its current status. It 
wouldn’t do us much good to buy ABC since their coverage has been reasonably fair. 
Although, of course, I would to have one of the networks in very friendly hands and ABC 
is probably the only possible target.”398 Colson professed to know nothing about the 
process of starting a new network. This would be something that Roger Ailes, a Nixon 
friend and adviser, and future CEO of Fox News, develop.  
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 This exemplified the level of dedication that the Nixon Administration had to 
solving the “news problem.” What it also did was make very clear the Administration’s 
view of an overwhelmingly powerful media. Not only was the Nixon Administration 
looking to manipulate the media, they were looking to become it. The discussion among 
Nixon’s aides, at least up to this point, showed little evidence of a consuming hatred of a 
medium and a closing of all doors to those who operated it. Certainly, attitudes were 
formed and strategies in place that would eventually move the Administration in that 
direction, but the endgame was far larger than the often-amplified petty squabbles 
between Nixon and broadcasters.  
 Nixon’s team had a significant amount of faith in his ability to come off favorably 
during spontaneous events.399 Planned press events seemed to agitate him, but when he 
didn’t feel the lens and the lights, he often came off as much more agreeable. While most 
of the year had been focused on content management and produce successful internally 
produced television events, Nixon’s inner circle were also figuring out just how much 
they cared to include the press to any degree. There had been an understanding that the 
press should be dealt with, but Haldeman himself was beginning to express doubt as to 
whether they should be invited at all. “Probably one of our keys here is to forget about 
our great feelings of responsibility to the press – informing them of all our movements in 
advance and not catch them off guard,” he wrote to Robert C. Odle Jr, a staff assistant to 
the President. “Some of the most effective things that we have done in this field have 
been the ones where we haven’t told the press in advance and have allowed them to 
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discover what we are doing. This ties into the fact that we probably are pulling simply too 
much gimmickry with the press and the public, and we should try to reach for more 
spontaneity.”400  
 As the end of the year approached, attention turned to the creation of a list of 
personalities in television and radio that were “absolutely in support” of the President. 
Chapin and his team were waiting for a tightening up list to take into the strategy for the 
New Year.401 Likewise, Haldeman, Ziegler, Klein and Chapin were reviewing 
Haldeman’s “Approach to the Media,” a proposal for how the interaction between the 
press and the President should move forward. Despite a year of careful investigation into 
reporters, discussions around purchasing one of the Big Three networks, as well as 
removing the President from any social event with members of the press, the team 
seemed open to the President interacting with the press – so long as the press members 
had been carefully vetted as his supporters.  In-depth discussions between the President 
and friendly members of the press were to be integrated into the emerging strategy. 
“While this is something that we don’t want to do during the next week or two, because 
of the TV interview, it is a long-range program that we should try to develop and, when 
the time seems right, work in a group of press people,” he informed the team. “Please put 
this in your planning apparatus and, at the next opportunity that seems appropriate, let’s 
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raise this as a possible scheduling activity.”402 
 Haldemen reached out to Klein the next day regarding their plans for the media. In 
it, Haldeman went through each aspect of the approach and noted his thoughts on what 
should be done. From dealing with the “hostile press” to pushing for greater relationships 
with local television newsmen and managing calculated leaks of information, he carefully 
outlined what should be done. However, the last line of his response was perhaps the 
most telling. It reflected the building tension between Klein’s press strategy and Ziegler’s 
position as press secretary. “NOTE TO ZIEGLER: In light of the fact that I have received 
no response from you on these matters – I assume that you are not interested or have no 
ideas. I will therefore deal exclusively with Klein unless I hear otherwise from you.”403 
1971 would see a greater split between the two managers of the press.   
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CHAPTER 5 
MEDIA AND THE PRELUDE OF WATERGATE 
The years of 1971 and 1972 were turning points in the Nixon presidency. Nixon 
announced the opening of China, and there is little doubt that media relations were 
central in the cultivation of the President’s daily decisions at the time. Nixon had sent 
Kissinger to China secretly and then informed the nation of his own visit, an electrifying 
moment in U.S. history. Also on network television, Nixon would inform the nation that 
he had ordered the mining of North Vietnamese ports and the bombing of military targets 
in North Vietnam. There is no shortage of analysis of the events as they occurred but 
little that addresses just how these moments were orchestrated.  
As Nixon opened up the world, the Administration contended with the end of 
theirs. While it is known that the Pentagon Papers seeded the Watergate horrors, more 
than this occurred. Taping systems were activated in the White House and Camp David. 
June of 1971 would include the birth of the “Plumbers,” created to stop media leaks. 
Most notably, on June 17, the arrests of James McCord, Frank Sturgis, and others inside 
the Democratic Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C. would reveal 
one of the largest scandals in U.S. political history. Just days after, Nixon would order 
Haldeman to tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation to stop investigations into Watergate 
and later in a news conference, say that no White House staff were involved. In 
November 1972, Nixon won the election with over 97 percent of the electoral vote. The 
following day, ask for the resignation of all agency directors, department heads and 
appointees. Conventional telling’s of these events leave major gaps in the backstory, 
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focusing more on the scandal and its mismanagement and less on the documented 
attitudes of those in the White House at the time.  
The Nixon Administration attempted to argue that the release of the Pentagon 
Papers would do harm to the nation's involvement in the Vietnam War. The tactic of prior 
restraint under the illusion of national security is not a new notion, nor was during 
Nixon’s terms. James Madison, following the Sedition Act of 1798 suggested that such a 
tactic may forever be used in times of war. President Nixon himself was particularly 
distrusting of the press and dissenters. However, the groundwork that allowed him to 
operate off this attitude was laid by his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson created 
a distinct narrative within the “with us or against us” model that has long been part of the 
American military lexicon. Johnson argued that even well-meaning protesters could be 
influenced by Communists. This movement from straight affiliation with communist 
organizations to susceptibility to being influenced by communist mentality fed into a fear 
narrative that would become part of the support for suppression of expression in times of 
war. Like a type of socio-political osmosis, one might go from God-fearing American to 
a comme virtuoso. Nixon’s presidency was marred by protest and scandal, largely in part 
due to his attitude toward the former that planted the seeds for the latter. Nixon’s open 
distaste for dissent and increasing propensity for secrecy within his Administration in 
light of an already unpopular war deeply affected public trust of his Administration. Even 
when the Administration was telling the truth, the public no longer believed.  
In 1971, Nixon would create the “Plumbers,” a program whose purpose was to 
root out and seal media leaks. The Nixon Administration was so adamant about 
controlling the media that they would attempt to meet with national press and 
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preemptively control stories. It is of significance to note that the media coverage of the 
Vietnam War was far different than the media coverage of more contemporary conflicts. 
The coverage depicted distinct brutality and terrors of war that had never before been 
seen by the American public and arguably, may never be seen in quite the same way 
again.  
Nixon’s use of secrecy and other tactics were not necessarily unique. As seen 
through the myriad of cases, the norm for the United States has always been to limit 
speech. In fact, the Nixon Administration was the first to see a significant move by the 
courts to secure the First Amendment rights as seen through the New York Times case. 
The case established an important moment for the American public in its perception of 
the First Amendment and placed emphasis on the responsibility of the Supreme Court to 
uphold it. The contents of the Pentagon Papers played a significant role in the outcome of 
this case and the attitude of the Nixon Administration toward the press and the people 
certainly added to the perception that First Amendment rights were perhaps most 
important to support in times of war.  
A Year of Building 
By the Administration’s own admission, 1971 was going to be a year of 
rebuilding. Building the President’s image was at the forefront of discussion as it had 
been from the start. So much of media discussion from the White House revolved around 
how Nixon appeared, not necessarily the fair coverage of policies or Presidential events. 
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This year, the idea that Nixon was the hardest working president was an important notion 
to be conveyed. Haldeman tasked this to Chapin’s team again.404  
In early January, Nixon conveyed to Haldeman that he saw benefit in coverage for 
“quickie events” and meetings that could draw some positive reporting in regard to 
Nixon’s human-interest side. Haldeman felt that there should be an effort to get more 
mileage out of routine activities. In order to do this, he proposed to Ziegler that one 
reporter from each wire service would sit in on the meeting. The President was open to a 
third, but would certainly not go beyond that. The right atmosphere would be crucial and 
even with three, there were concerned as to whether not more reporters would disrupt the 
intent.405  
On January 7, 1971, The Washington Evening Star ran a piece on the performance 
of the President. It was in reference to the “fireside” press conferences for which the team 
had pushed. The review was somewhat favorable, pointing out how well the President 
had performed in this one particular instance. However, it turned to an overall criticism of 
the method by which the President was performing. “The ambience of polite informality 
is the proper vehicle for Mr. Nixon, better than the prepared text and infinitely better than 
the press conference, in which the President generally appears to be as relaxed as a fox at 
a convention of hounds. The formula is, in fact, ideal – except for one flaw that 
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transforms the admirable showcase into a needlessly dangerous game.”406 The flaw that 
the Star was suggesting was the fact that the address was a live broadcast instead of a 
taped event. There was simply too much risk in doing so, and it put the President in a 
dangerous position. One slip of tongue could potentially derail the entire event and 
tarnish the President’s image. Regarding the review, Charles Colson wrote to Haldeman, 
“Save us from our friends.”407 This was simply another example the Administration 
would use to illustrate their larger point: the media would take any instance to criticize 
Nixon. “I knew that sooner or later some wisecrack would turn what should be a very 
positive story into a negative – I have just been waiting for the attached [article]. I figures 
(sic) for sure it would come from the New Republic or the Washington Post. Unhappily, it 
was in the first edition of the Star that has come out since their strike. The way things are 
going with the Star we would really be better off if they had remained on strike. Ouch!” 
wrote Colson.408 The Administration knew which media outlets were generally kind, but, 
they also knew that there would be those that would tow the line. Loyalty was rewarded 
for those who reported positively on Nixon consistently but the Administration was not 
necessarily loyal in the same way.  
By mid-January Chapin was working on drafting internal television production 
details, including a preliminary assessment of the resources available through the United 
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States Information Agency (USIA). The USIA was established in 1953 by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Its mission was "to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in 
promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and 
U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad." The USIA had been used to create and 
establish an image of the United States, largely for foreign audience, but also to bolster 
the American image. What better a vehicle than that to promote the image of the 
President himself. The USIA produced material to be distributed through the Motion 
Picture and Television Service Division, employing 279 people in the Old Post Office 
Building on Pennsylvania Avenue. The building housed two television studios. Bruce 
Herschensohn was director at the time. Special programs, generally those with longer 
lead time, were commercially contracted but a USIA project supervisor would oversee 
the project to ensure the USIA maintained control. Scribbles on the margins of Chapin’s 
memo regarding the production suggested that acting experience was something to 
discuss, and small notation on the upper right-hand corner suggested a theoretical budget 
of $12,000.409  
As Chapin started the year evaluating the internal options for media production, 
Klein started out by complimenting the President on his remarks at the dedication of the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Center National Republican Center on. Nixon had said, “…ours 
should be the party of the open door, open to all people, all parties, all faiths, all races.”410 
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Klein was often looking for moments and sound bites that could be used to create a 
thematic narrative for Nixon and the Administration. This one was right on target. “I 
thought your remarks at the dedication of the Eisenhower Center regarding an ‘open 
door’ set a long-range theme for the Republican Party, a theme we must carry forth on an 
immediate basis,” Klein wrote to the President. One of the ways to push forth that 
narrative was to ensure that nothing else coming out of the White House would 
overshadow it. “We kept all news down today so that television and others would center 
on this theme.”411  
Chapin was also busy demonstrating how presidential popularity was influenced 
by TV appearances. He provided data on previous presidents. On December 17, 1962, 
after two years in office, John F. Kennedy was interviewed by Bill Lawrence of ABC, 
George Herman of CBS, and Sander Vanocur of NBC. The three networks aired “After 
Two Years – a Conversation with the President.” The Gallup Poll found that before the 
television appearance, on December 5, 1962, the approval rating of JFK was at 74 
percent, 15 percent “disapproved” of the President and 11 percent had “no opinion.” 
After the appearance, in January of 1963, JFKs approval rating jumped to 76 percent. 
There was no change in the “no opinion” percentage. Lyndon B. Johnson saw a similar 
bump in his approval rating after he was interviewed by Bill Lawrence of ABC, Eric 
Sevareid of CBS and David Brinkley of NBC on March 14, 1964. Prior to the 
appearance, on March 11, 1964 LBJ’s approval rating was 73 percent, disapproval rate of 
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9 percent and 18 percent had no opinion. Following the appearance, LBJs approval rating 
increased to 77 percent, disapproval rating stayed the same and those with no opinion 
dropped to 14 percent.412 The same day that Chapin provided this information, Haldeman 
reached out to him regarding a conversation that Nixon had with Colson. Nixon wanted 
to move forward and set up meetings with three network executives from each network, 
CBS first, followed by ABC and then finally NBC following his State of the Union 
address.413  
Klein’s Growing Concerns 
Klein and his team were on a constant look out for “little lies” that appeared in 
daily news reports. It wasn’t the big things that always concerned the team. Often times, 
it was the little things that, when repeated, created a prevailing narrative that was harder 
to shake than to dispute major discrepancies. For this reason, the daily News Summary 
that Nixon had been given each day from the start of his presidency was regarded as a 
significant tool. Mort Allin would add notations to the summaries of news coverage, 
identifying untruths that needed correcting and reporters that needed a little or sometimes 
lots of pressure to make those corrections. Klein felt the news summary system was 
enough to identify and work toward correcting the little slips. Perhaps in the past it had 
been underdone, but now, Klein suggested, it was overdone. He expressed this 
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Haldeman. “1) This should not be worrying you – let McGruder [and] staff handle it. It’s 
exactly the wrong use of your time – and mine. 2) The P. wants the Monday report – so 
we’ll need to do it – but you should forget it,” Haldeman noted on the side of Klein’s 
memo.414 Klein’s position in the Administration was shaping up a little more clearly. The 
News Summary, a significant part of the Administration’s strategy at the start of Nixon’s 
presidency was now more of a secondary element of news management. It served as a 
signal to those in the President’s inner circle to begin to distance themselves from Klein.  
Nixon was still willing to give the press play, but on his conditions. On January 
19th, in reference to a visit at a San Clemente school, Nixon made it clear that in regard to 
the media, trips like this one would have to be done his way. Ziegler had recommended 
that the press pool come along on the visit but that they would need to stay outside of the 
room itself. Nixon agreed. The press following him into the room with the children would 
ruin the feel of it. The press could however be allowed in the room after the President’s 
departure, to speak with the children and teachers about the visit. Someone from the 
Administration would join him for the purposes of getting the story out. Nixon felt that 
Moore, Klein, Rumsfeld or Finch might do a good job. On the other hand, never would 
Safire, Price or Buchanan be allowed. This was an important distinction, as the latter 
three were more involved in building the rhetoric of the President and the former group 
dealt more with managing the press. Regardless, someone, for this purpose exactly, 
should remain with the President whenever an “off-beat” trip like this one was scheduled. 
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For all intents and purposes, this “anecdotist” would require some degree of skill and 
would need to be promoted himself.415 
Nixon began 1971 at Camp David with advisors Ehrlichman and Haldeman. 
Something was troubling him. “The P was very upset by a report in the sports section 
today that the Stanford football team was running around their hotel in sandals and shorts 
and that their quarterback had enjoyed posing for pictures with topless dancers from San 
Francisco. The story was trying to make them out as being good guys because of this, and 
sneering at Ohio State as squares because they were wearing neckties and blazers. The P 
said for the first time he was going to root for the Midwest team in the Rose Bowl,” 
wrote Haldeman in the January 1 entry of his diaries.416  
Of course, this wasn’t all that was concerning Nixon. There had been stories in 
the press about the Administration’s decision to not invite the Edmund Muskie to the 
Clean-Air-Bill signing that had taken place the previous day. The President wanted 
Ziegler to respond immediately and note that Nixon was the most “gracious, nonpolitical 
P in history in terms of treatment of his present, future and past opponents.”417 Haldeman 
wrote in his diary entry for the day that this was true. According to his notes, Eisenhower 
never invited Truman and Johnson and Kennedy never hosted Nixon at the White House. 
Nixon, on the other hand, extended invitations to Truman, Johnson, Muskie, Teddy 
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Kennedy at the White House. “Then we get one little incident like this,” Haldeman wrote, 
“and we’re stabbed unfairly.”418  Nixon wanted to make clear that 1971 would be no 
different than the previous year – the press would not be accorded leeway. Nixon wanted 
his team to work hard to position the President as the world leader. Former French 
President Charles De Gaulle had died in April of 1969 so the stage was set for Nixon to 
take the spotlight, he just needed to ensure that his image was secure and that his 
Administration was doing everything it could to push against media activity that worked 
contrary to the image he wanted to sell.  
Haldeman called John Connally on January 11, 1971 to speak with him about 
Presidential PR. Connally spoke highly of the President, according to Haldeman. Nixon 
knew people’s strengths and weakness, both of his own and those of his adversaries. “He 
also made a fascinating political point, which is that there is nothing wrong with having 
certain elements against us,” Haldeman wrote. “He said this in the context of the press 
conference and its adversary nature, which he thinks is good. His point is that the basic 
political rule is to pick your enemies carefully and then hang on to them, but be sure 
they’re always the same ones. This is something we haven’t conscious or adequately 
done.”419 Connally’s advice would be taken to heart by the Nixon Administration. Klein 
and others would later compile Nixon’s famed “Enemies List.”  
Fine Tuning the Tactic 
                                                
418 Diary Entry: Jan 1st 1971, H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection. Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. 
419 Diary Entry: Jan 11th 1971, H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection. Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. 
  217   
The morning of Nixon’s State of the Union address Nixon called Haldeman. 
“What in the name of good God hell is going on!” he asked.420 The New York Times and 
the Washington Post had leaked details about the reorganization plan regarding the 
formation of the Department of Natural Resources as well as the organization of 
economic and social programs. Nixon felt this was one secret that had been really well 
kept. The President decided he didn’t want to give the text of the speech to the press 
before he delivered it. Despite eventually agreeing to release it, Nixon felt a great deal of 
apprehension where the leak was concerned. He called Haldeman several times before 
the address, at one point expressing his distaste for wearing make-up. Despite many 
conversations with the President regarding his physical appearance on television, make 
up seemed a continuing struggle for him. Haldeman turned to Carruthers to push the issue 
further. Finally, Nixon conceded.  
Coverage following the State of the Union address on January 22, 1971 spurred 
an initiative to get Administration spokesmen on major television programs. Klein would 
be tasked with ensuring that everyone was well prepared and properly selected to create 
the optimal impact and best appearance for the Administration and the President. In 
moments like these, when the Administration was available to press interviews, Klein 
was often pulling the strings. The result would be 34 appearances by spokesmen between 
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the address and the end of January. Of 16 available spots on the Today Show, the Nixon 
Administration filled ten.421 
At the end of January, Klein was asked by NBC to make a five-minute televised 
statement on the President and the press and on public information. He felt as though a 
statement would be more challenging than a standard question and answer session. The 
situation triggered an increasingly uncomfortable dynamic within the White House. As 
television became a more prominent, and it became clear that press dealings with 
broadcast and traditional print press was split within the White House, between Ziegler 
and Klein. “I am willing to do it and it will give me an opportunity among other things to 
praise Ron,” Klein wrote to Haldeman. “I also don’t want to offend Ron, but I suspect I 
can handle the television better.”422 
There was a culture of cultivation in the Nixon White House. Newsmen and 
industry leaders weren’t simply researched, vetted and manipulated. Those within the 
industry were carefully monitored. Those who were in positions that could potentially 
help or harm the desired legacy of the Nixon presidency were kept track of. At the start of 
February one of those individuals was Sheldon Fisher, President of McGraw-Hill. Colson 
pushed for him to be invited to a State Dinner. Not only was Fisher, a major publisher, 
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but there was talk about him moving into the broadcasting business. Colson felt that it 
would be a good opportunity to begin to cultivate Fisher.423  
While the President was making attempts to become more comfortable with 
television, or at the very least, more prepared to appear comfortable on television, his 
team was continuing to focus on radio as well. Haldeman expressed to Chapin another 
area for consideration, including placing microphones in the Cabinet Room during the 
times when the President meet with various groups, allowing for radio coverage. “The 
point being that radio microphones would create less self-consciousness than the 
presence of television cameras but would still give us a way of getting the content and 
flavor of those meetings out. After all – there was little chance that Nixon would allow 
for television cameras to be around all the time. The Administration was very particular 
about that type of exposure, largely because Nixon had a well-documented discomfort in 
front of the camera. Radio offered a useful alternative – exposure of the issues without 
exposing Nixon’s weaknesses.424  
Nixon sought advice from his team on his television appearance. He asked to be 
told everything that needed to be done, from getting off the Air Force One to walking 
across the garden. Anywhere there was television coverage, Nixon wanted direct and 
specific instructions from either Carruthers or Goode, who worked alongside Klein on 
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press-related tasks.425 “The President would like you to give some carful thought to the 
question of colors and styles of suits, shirts, ties, etc. that would be best for his 
appearances on television,” Haldeman wrote to Carruthers. Nixon wanted information on 
everything from color, style, and patterns to textures and fabrics. “He will then follow 
that very specifically and literally, so be sure you are coming up with what you really 
want. You may want to have some test runs on various things to develop your case. In 
any event, be sure when you come through with it, you come through as authoritatively 
as possible.”426 Nixon took this seriously and Haldeman was determined to ensure that 
the staff took it seriously as well.  
Carruthers took responsibility of even the slightest analysis. Even a 40-second 
piece in which the President appeared on February 8 on revenue sharing was scrutinized. 
“[Nixon] would like your reading on how it went with the technical aspects or were there 
any other things we should have done differently,” Higby wrote to Carruthers. Klein and 
Chapin would take care of the larger external and internal television strategies 
respectively while the rest of the team, including Carruthers, would look at the specifics 
of the technical aspects of television.427 The nuts and bolts of how things appeared and 
what looked best were crucial pieces of the puzzle. 
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 Both internal and external forces were contributing to the careful cultivation of 
Nixon’s press image. Billy Graham, a well-known Christian evangelist, was an informal 
advisor to Nixon and a close friend. In early February, Nixon had a conversation with 
him about television production. Graham had a connection in North Carolina to a 
television man who strongly felt as though the President should use a teleprompter. 
Graham himself told the President that he always used a teleprompter whenever he was 
filmed. The President was happy to entertain the suggestion. If the teleprompter would 
improve his performance, he was willing to use it. There was a deliberate attempt from 
the President’s Administration and from his external, informal advisors, to clean up his 
television delivery. 1971 was shaping up to be a year of details and fine-tuning.  
Preparing for the Next Four Years 
 Early February, Nixon’s Administration was preparing for the 1972 Republican 
National convention. Bill Gavin, a speechwriter for Nixon, made clear the need to 
prepare for two different Republican Conventions. “There will be, of course, two 
Republican conventions: the one in some city and the same one as it appears on 
television,” he wrote to Frank Shakespeare, a former CBS Television president and then-
director of the USIA.428 Gavin believed that the convention needed to be built around the 
use of television. In the past, he felt as though television served the convention, not the 
other way around. In doing so, the RNC could potentially prevent the commentators from 
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utilizing stale moments to cut in and provide commentary.429 “The American people are 
bored to death every four years with party platforms – or else the networks simply switch 
back to Dave and Chet or Walter or somebody who usually then starts some interpretive 
mischief because there is nothing else to do.”430  
 As campaign fever was overtaking the White House, Klein was consistently 
working to keep the White House open when there were clear indications that it was 
becoming a closed shop so to speak. The President had declined an invitation to the 
National Newspaper Association early in 1971. Klein reached out to Haldeman. “The 
President in his inaugural address expressed his belief in the importance of the small city 
dailies and suburban and country weekly publications, and we have received a flood of 
letters in support of this statement…This is why I am asking for a reconsideration,” wrote 
Klein.431 The event would include small newspaper leaders from 48 states across the 
nations and Klein knew that small newspaper editorials had a greater impact per reader 
than the larger publications. He felt that an opportunity was being neglected. But focus, 
as it often did with Nixon, turned to national press. It had been Nixon’s experience that 
smaller publications treated him well but it was the “Eastern Establishment” press that 
could make or break his image. His legacy might live in the pages of small-town weeklies 
but his image would be dictated by national press.   
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 The Nixon Administration’s television strategy was developed through more than 
mimicry and manipulation. Nixon’s aides carefully monitored new methods by which 
television technology was measuring and increasing efficiency of messaging. One way 
that was done in 1971 was through a survey technique called “matching samples.” For 
example, panels of, 200 homes a piece would be selected. These groups would be 
demographically similar. One of the groups would be polled before a broadcast and the 
other would be polled a day or two after the broadcast. The technique was said to have 
produced fairly informative and accurate information on whether the viewers were 
positively or negatively influenced by the broadcast. Higby suggested that this system 
might be good to implement with White House broadcasts. “If it works it could perhaps 
give us some important guidance for television during 1971 and 1972,” he wrote to Dr. 
David Derge, a leading Republican pollster.432 
 On February 18, Joe Garagiola of the Today Show mentioned that he would like 
the President to talk about sports for 20 minutes. Nixon was a huge sports fan and this 
was an excellent opportunity to promote the more “human interest” side of the President. 
With so many issues exploiting opportunities to make the President more likeable and 
accessible, Chapin and Haldeman considered the idea seriously, though the aides 
hesitated when it came to the length.433 After all, Nixon could handle instances like this 
one in relatively small doses and though this was something the team had been trying for 
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years to teach Nixon to manage, they were still apprehensive when opportunities arose. 
Even with topics like this, preparation was not to be overlooked and often debated. There 
may not have been a great deal of danger in terms of presidential politics, but there was 
always a great deal of danger in terms of presidential image.  
 The image of the press team was of concern as well. By the end of February, 
Ziegler was at work on creating a foreign policy message to the Congress. The message 
was undoubtedly going to gain press attention, but Ziegler supported the strategy that 
would not reorient attention to the message itself. He felt the message was not a hard 
news issue, and that if it was presented as hard news by the White House and its media 
team, the press would see this as self-serving. The message essentially was a document 
that articulated the philosophy of the Administration regarding foreign policy and how 
that philosophy was formulated in the first year of office. Naturally, Nixon and his aides 
would be looking at a way to capitalize on this and great press opportunities to promote 
the work done by the Administration. Ziegler had his concerns and expressed them to 
Haldeman in a lengthy three-page memo:  
It is my view that it is too obviously self-serving for the President to go on 
television to restate his philosophy and to state, with the Foreign Policy Message 
as the vehicle, what he has done in this area. I feel this would have the opposite 
effect of building the President as a world statesman. Indeed I think it would tend 
to erode this because we would be putting the President forth to great numbers of 
people in a way that would tend to, I feel, suggest that he was simply saying, 
“look at me and look at what I have done.  
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Haldeman returned the memo to Ziegler with his signature notes on the upper 
right-hand corner, “You could have won this on one page w/o all the BS.”434  
Ziegler was generally perceived as creating less pushback, but when he did offer 
his suggestions, they were met with little enthusiasm. It was becoming clear that tensions 
were rising and Klein was pushing Haldeman in another area. Vice President Agnew had 
turned down a dinner with the Radio-TV Correspondents Association, a group of 
broadcast journalists from around the world. Klein had been pushing the Vice President 
to attend and felt it was “an absolute essential.”435 He asked Haldeman to use his 
influence to get the Vice President to agree. Klein was quickly falling out of favor. 
Though he was pushing forward with encouraging a greater openness and better 
relationships with the press, he was also more closely watched and criticized by Nixon’s 
inner circle.  
 Colson was attempting to gauge the Administration’s success with television. 
Colson approached Howard K. Smith, an ABC news reporter, as a friend, not as a 
newsman. He wanted his advice as to how well the Administration was doing on getting 
their information to TV commentators, particularly in comparison with other 
administrations. Smith said that the Nixon Administration was actually doing poorly 
compared to others. Colson documented the outcome of the conversation. Apparently, 
Smith had only two calls from Klein in the past two years and said that Colson had 
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actually reached out to him more in the past few weeks than anyone had in the first two 
years of the Nixon Administration. “He was quick to point out that he was not sure, 
except in his case, how much good it does since most TV journalists are dead against us,” 
wrote Colson.436 The bottom line was that Smith, from his perspective as a newsman, felt 
that the Nixon Administration fell short when it came to outreach but emphasized that he 
wasn’t sure if there was a way for anyone to “do a good job” in the current media 
climate.  
 Colson sought ways to rectify what Smith felt was a significant oversight. As the 
Administration had done routinely when it came to dealings with the press, he compared 
their activities with the actions of President’s who came before, and who Nixon felt were 
better received. Johnson, according to Smith, cultivated the press personally and he 
would welcome them regularly, “talk to them, plead with them, cajole them, befriend the, 
and then when Johnson realized that this wasn’t turning them around his sense of 
frustration grew so great that he simply decided to quit the Presidency.”437 Smith 
suggested that the Nixon Administration had, at least thus far, taken a more balanced 
view and that Nixon had avoided falling into the Johnson trap. Smith debunked the major 
concern of the Nixon Administration that they were somehow a target for the press that 
had not targeted other administrations. Still, he confirmed another, that the press itself 
was inherently at fault. Smith suggested that the Administration “…should not despair 
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over the fact that we have been treated so badly by the press and the media. He believes 
other presidents were treated just as badly, including JFK. He believes, as Moynihan 
argues, that this is something endemic to the entire profession.”438 
The Office of Communications Searches for its Footing on Unstable Ground 
 Klein’s position as the Director of Communications was finally beginning to take 
shape. It was the first time an Administration had a position like this one and because of 
that, there was a significant learning curve. Everything that was being done by Klein’s 
office, was in some way “a first” – even if just for the fact that the Office was new. At the 
beginning of March, Klein wrote a detailed memo to the President to appraise him of the 
work that had been done and started by simply stating that his office was both innovative 
and ultimately helpful to the “Presidency, the Government and the Citizenry.”439 Klein 
documented the ways in which his office operated -- as a media liaison, a cabinet 
department liaison, a planner and project developer, in the area of correspondence, as a 
speakers’ bureau, a mailing and distributor coordinator, as a research arm as well as in 
various other areas of media and public relations.  
 The biggest area of concern for Klein was perhaps the Office’s role as “media 
liaison.” In his memorandum, he informed Nixon that as director he had led the “Use of 
all media to present the Administration’s case and to avoid domination by the 
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Washington press, which is essentially negative at the reportorial level.”440 Klein 
documented that his office was the first “fully-coordinated use by an Administration of 
all aspects of national TV and the first development of broad use of regional TV.” Where 
his personal activities were concerned, Klein informed the President that he had worked 
through intense activities to reach the public as a spokesman through TV and print media. 
It was also important for Klein to position himself carefully in relation to Ron Ziegler and 
his role. “This has allowed us to go beyond the activities of the press secretary, who, in 
my opinion, does an outstanding full-time job under tough pressure in fulfilling all his 
duties with the White House Press Corps. We supplement and assist.”441  
 Klein’s office had four primary functions. It was designed for briefing and 
planning with newsmen in Washington. It also functioned to handle departmental stories. 
Klein sought, in many cases personally, to develop relationships with broadcasters and 
newsmen across the country and to focus on both national and regional television. By this 
time in the Presidential term, the new Office, handled up to 100 calls a day from 
newsmen. Klein held regular meetings with columnists and bureau chiefs – on average 
seven to 10 per day. Calls were made from the Office of the Communications to suggest 
favorable stories. This type of outreach had never been done before. “The whole area 
relating to the White House and other Departments to decision-making news executives 
across the country is new to government and was originated by this office, which you 
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created.”442 Klein felt as though he had more contact with more newsmen across the 
country than anyone else – in or outside of the government and that as a result, the Nixon 
Administration could count more people on network specials and talk shows than any 
previous Administration.  
 Where previous administrations may have been wise to the coverage of major 
news outlets, Klein was focused on his office as fully able to establish trends in the 
editorial opinions of news outlets and of those who ran them. This, was a first. Of 
greatest importance however, was that the Office was by the press as a primary tool and a 
representation of the Administration as one that was open. “Newsmen have come to 
regard this office as a key tool in carrying out your policy of an open Administration,” 
wrote Klein to Nixon.443  
 Klein took credit personally for ensuring that the Administration appeared on air. 
He documented his early morning and late-night television appearances from the Tonight 
Show to Meet the Press. “…I have appeared on national television more than any other 
figure in the Administration other than the President and probably more than almost 
anyone other than the actual performers.” Klein counted 27 major-length prime-time 
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appearances and various appearances on special commentary and news shows. He also 
appeared on 152 regional TV programs and eight foreign TV programs.444 
 He would also spend ample time meeting with executives and assessing their 
concerns. One such meeting was with CBS on March 9, 1971. Klein and CBS executives 
discussed four things including the Fairness Doctrine, the role of the networks, legislative 
and political broadcasting and domestic satellites. A major concern of the network 
executives was the Fairness Doctrine as it applied to television commercials. The 
commercial aspects of the interpretation were deeply concerning for the TV executives. 
“If the courts were to rule in a way which would require free answers to ads, this might 
well require the Congress to pass legislation to counter such a ruling which would almost 
certainly be fatal to broadcasting. I think we should side with the networks against such 
an anti-commercial ruling which would damage all of business,” Klein concluded.445  
 The entire Nixon White House was still gaining its footing in a tumultuous time, 
even nearing the end of their first term. However, Klein’s office was unique in its 
position. It was the first time an Office of Communications had existed in the White 
House and Klein was its founding director. Among the internal television team, the Press 
Secretary and his team, and Klein’s operation, there was much to navigate and roles to be 
carefully defined. Klein’s report to Nixon served two purposes. First, to carefully 
document the tasks and role of the new office, and second, to continue to advance the 
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idea that Klein’s efforts to communicate with the press were serving a positive and 
important purpose. Still, the reality was that Nixon’s other teams seemed to fall more in 
line with the emerging way of thinking in the White House, and garnered far less 
pushback than Klein. Klein was much more inclined to advise than to execute orders. 
Unfortunately, advice was not necessarily what Nixon wanted in the coming years. 
Radio, Perhaps 
 In early March, Nixon’s aides discussed harnessing the impact of radio through 
regular talks by the President. It had been a discussion point for months, but there was a 
clear push to develop a strategy around the use of radio. The advantage – namely, the 
medium allowed the President to avoid the sometimes-debilitating awkwardness that 
followed him in the presence of a camera – had another less obvious impact. By utilizing 
radio, the aides could produce material that television stations would be inclined to pick 
up. Fridays and Saturdays addresses would provide stories for generally light news 
weekends. But none of the aides felt it particularly beneficial to engage in regular 
addresses via radio. It was assumed too lessen the value of each address.446  
Exclusive Presidential broadcasts on radio allowed for a tactical advantage. 
“When a Presidential speech is carried on radio (but not on television) I note that the 
radio stations tend to give it much more attention in terms of announcements before the 
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broadcast and news excerpts afterward,” wrote Moore to Chapin.447 Haldeman was on 
board with trying the President out on radio as a well-developed strategy. While this was 
something organized and researched by Chapin and his team focused on the internal 
production of television and radio productions, it aligned closely with Klein’s operation. 
Klein offered his advice. He felt that Nixon would do best on radio in short spurts only 
and on an irregular basis. He pushed for two-way communication through a chat format, 
with farmers, consumers and youth, rather than one-way speeches.448 The informality of 
it would allow Nixon to “appear” authentic on radio.449 Klein, as always, was particularly 
cognizant of the impact of the audience. As a former newsman, he understood that this 
type of communication would be well received by a particular group of listeners and that 
taking that into account was paramount. Perhaps, Klein thought, this could be Nixon’s 
“Fireside Chat.”450  There was a distinct understanding that while these productions 
would be in-house, how and when they were used would directly affect the way in which 
they were covered. This fact would be of great concern to Klein and the rest of the 
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Administration. In this way, the teams worked together, without directly working 
together. There was an understanding that anything and everything would eventually 
intersect where press attention was concerned.  
Aides Enter Spotlight 
Earlier in Nixon’s first term there was an effort to keep his staff away from the 
press. The President wasn’t interested in creating a multitude of Administration 
spokesmen and increasingly concerned about potential information leaks. In 1971, this 
began to change. There were discussions early in the year about the promotion of the men 
around the President.451 By creating more attention around others in the Administration, 
there was hope that the Administration itself would seem more transparent.452 Increased 
concerns of secrecy were playing poorly in the press. Haldeman reached out to Ziegler in 
early March to push for meetings of staff with the press, but only reporters and editors 
vetted as objective or favorable in their coverage. “You should begin to work more of the 
White House press corps in to meet with members of the White House staff. The 
reporters that you bring in should be ones that rank in the ‘objective to fair’ classification. 
In other words, let’s not start running our arch rivals.”453 Haldeman wanted members of 
the staff to drop by the Press Center on an informal basis simply to share a cup of coffee 
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or whatever other opportunity would allow for a casual chat. Haldeman made a point to 
Zielger to push this type of co-mingling. This was the type of co-mingling Klein had been 
doing, and advocating since the beginning but the pursuit now was motivated not by 
Klein’s steady advice, but Haldeman’s self-preservation. 
 By mid-March of 1971, the President’s popularity dropped significantly according 
to polls.454 Determined to put a spin on the coverage, Safire reached out to Haldeman to 
discuss the emerging narrative. “Now and then a reporter puts a couple of facts together 
and reports a trend; the rest of the wolf pack sniffs this and goes bounding off in the same 
direction. It then becomes Established Truth,” wrote Safire.455 The two facts to which 
Safire was referring were a dip in the Gallup Poll along with demonstrations that were 
occurring by laborers and “hippies” against Nixon. Safire concluded that two newsmen 
who had approached him were developing a clear narrative that would be reported as a 
trend. “This will be a vague, mood thing – a basis for stringing together worry about 
Laos, the two facts mentioned above, fear of demonstrations in the spring, the seeming 
bogging down of the revenue sharing and reorganization of initiatives. Taken together, it 
makes a story, and we can expect plenty of it because it will be ‘trendy,’” wrote Safire.456  
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 The Administration was becoming better versed in utilizing their conversations 
with members of the press to gauge emerging trends in coverage. The analysis of the 
types of questions that were asked allowed them to more quickly respond to narratives 
they wished to stifle. Before coverage was even broadcast or printed, the team had 
prepared responses and put systems in place to ensure that the journalists and their 
organizations heard from them immediately. Safire used this opportunity to develop a 
counter – a psychological play that he felt would do well in undermining the ego of the 
press. “Let’s point to the ‘here we go again’ trend of reporting – show how everybody is 
enticed by an angle and proceed to exaggerate it,” he suggested to Haldeman. Safire felt 
this would make reporters self-conscious about jumping onboard the narrative and would 
ultimately offer them a perfect peg to go “against the grain.” He also suggested what he 
referred to as the “Ides of March Syndrome,” suggesting that it might be best to float the 
idea to the public that Washington reporters who are tired of long, gray winters transfer 
their own gloomy ethos to the national “mood.” However, one concern remained. It was 
important to the Administration that Nixon’s increased openness to the press was not 
interpreted as a reaction to the reports of lessening popularity. The openness of the 
Administration needed to exist independent of the swaying of the press.457 To appear as 
though there was a direct relationship between negative coverage and access to the White 
House would fundamentally undermine the system. Haldeman scribbled on the top right-
hand corner of the memo, “Absolutely right.” 
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 Those at the center of this system were showing signs of stress. Colson reported 
to Haldeman regarding his personnel report on March 11. After spending a significant 
time with Ziegler, he came to the conclusion that though the two of them had different 
ideas at the beginning of their meeting, they found significant common ground by the end 
of it. The opposite seemed true with Klein. There was increasing evidence that a 
divergence between the two began to take a more obvious turn in 1971. Colson’s 
relationship with Ziegler was a positive one. He felt as though Ziegler could productively 
handle his responsibilities. However, Klein was a different story. Of Klein he said, 
“There is no change in the Klein situation. He shows signs of being very unhappy. I am 
being untypically diplomatic and accommodating but must hold my ground – and 
will.”458  
 1971 revealed a much more proactive stance by Nixon’s aides. Part of this 
strategy were steps to permanently establish a role for themselves in proposing special 
TV pieces directly to the networks. Networks would reach out to the Administration and 
the Administration wanted to create a two-way street. In mid-March, there were specific 
stories that the Administration felt they could exploit by creating appealing stories for the 
press. One was the anniversary of Cambodia. However, the team felt it important to keep 
a close eye on Laos before suggesting it. Another idea was a story about reactions at 
college campuses one year following the Kent State shooting. However, there was 
concern that the risks might out way the possible benefits. “There is no telling what kind 
                                                
458 Charles Colson to H.R. Haldeman, 11 March 1971; folder Action Memos Richard Howard 1971-1973, 
March, 1971: Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Richard Howard; Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California 
  237   
of reception our people would get at the universities, or how the networks would elect to 
edit the material. Usually, as you know, they go for the action... I think we should be 
shoving forth our own ideas for TV stories, and our TV planning group out to have this 
on the agenda on a regular basis,”459 Snyder wrote to Magruder.  
 While there were undoubtedly instances where Nixon’s aides were working 
toward creating an open environment for those who had a good relationship with the 
Administration, for those out of favor, the response was harsh and divisive. At the end of 
1970, Nixon’s aides were compiling a list of individuals who qualified as the latter. By 
the middle of March 1971, the rhetoric had become more direct. Haldeman began a 
memo to Colson, with “Now that we have the list of our natural enemies and opponents, 
what do you plan to do with it?...We should have a plan in this area to make sure that we 
do nothing whatsoever to build them up and that we take them on whenever it is in our 
interest to do so.” Haldeman believed the list should be used to develop a coordinated 
program of monitoring the actions of the individuals and groups on the list, hitting them 
whenever an opening presented itself. Too often, the Administration had been reactive 
and this list would allow them to be proactive. “Let’s come up with an approach that 
systematically excludes these groups from White House events, monitors their activities 
(placing someone on the inside if possible), and identifies possible points of weaknesses 
that we can attack.”460 Conversations like this between Haldeman and Colson became 
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commonplace. Conversations between Klein and Haldeman were rare. With diametrically 
opposing perspectives on dealing with the press, Colson seemed to align more closely 
with Haldeman than had Klein. He was more willing to take the hardline approach to 
strong-arming the press while Klein continued to advocate for an open relationship. It 
seemed as though the more involved Colson became; the further Klein was pushed away.  
 The list to which Haldeman referred included academics, businessmen, 
celebrities, labor leaders, media, organizations and politicos. Each category had a list of 
people of one page or less with the exception of politicos (two pages) and media, which 
was the longest at three pages. Television news executives, Julian Goodman of NBC and 
John Macy of the Public Broadcasting Corporation were on the list including Marvin 
Kalb and Daniel Schoor of CBS, Lem Tucker and Sander Vanocur of NBC.461 On March 
19, Ziegler sent a memo to Haldeman that included a list of columnists and commentators 
in which he said, “It is very difficult to list the powerful national TV commentators who 
are for us. It is much easier to approach this list, and I think it would be more meaningful 
for us to ask, ‘Who are the five most powerful TV commentators who aren’t necessarily 
against us?’”462 The list included Howard K. Smith, Walter Cronkite (except for on 
IndoChina), Dan Rather, Harry Reasoner and John Scali (who had limited impact, but 
more than most, he noted).  
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 Concern was brewing over the coverage of Laos. Nixon’s aides felt as though 
they were getting clobbered. The issue was that coverage like this played on one of 
Nixon’s biggest concerns, the credibility gap. His aides were concerned because the 
instability of the situation didn’t allow for a definitive strategy to be created. Where the 
tendency generally was to react swiftly, Nixon’s aides chose to handle Laos differently. 
Their response was that the conflict required a long-range strategy and those results 
would be demonstrated in time.463 
 Meanwhile, Magruder had taken the media to task on his own. He had been 
pushing for Congress to approve a Super Sonic Travel program since 1970 and had done 
so unsuccessfully. In late March, he appeared on the Dick Cavett Show, after he had filed 
a complaint with the FCC saying that the program only showed the negative side of the 
initiative. This was just another example to which the lengths that Nixon’s aides would 
go when they felt their views were personally attacked by the media. Magruder, who was 
becoming a more significant part of Nixon’s team, had his own experience with fighting 
back when necessary, and using the FCC as a way to do it. This would be a significant 
tactic that would reemerge on a much larger stage, much to Klein’s dismay. 
Learning from the “Enemy” 
 On April 7, the President gave an address on Vietnam from the Oval Office. The 
set up was to be done in a very particular way and Mark Goode was responsible for what 
would appear flawless on television. However, concerns arouse and so did tensions. 
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Goode made choices that went against the system that Chapin and his team had in place 
for internal television productions. Instead of using a blue curtain behind the President, 
Goode opted for gold with the intention to signal that the President was in the Oval 
Office. Chapin reprimanded him after the broadcast in a memo saying, “You should 
know and would have known from talking to anyone here that the last time the gold 
curtains were used as a backdrop, we received numerous complaints, we had a lousy 
picture and the President came off poorly.”464 Goode was relatively new to the process 
but Chapin was swift in pointing out that previous advisers to the President on television 
matters handled things far better. “The most distressing problem last night was the 
attempt by Steve Bull, Ron Ziegler and me to try and find you once the President had 
arrived in Alex Butterfield’s office. You were nowhere to be found. I cannot remember 
one episode of us trying to track down Roger Ailes,” wrote Chapin. When it came to the 
crucial minutes before the President was to appear on television, it was vital that Goode 
be there to provide explicit direction and to answer any of his questions. Goode had failed 
to do this. Carruthers, Nixon’s television adviser, was alerted. He had been away for a 
TV taping in Hollywood and left Goode in the position he would otherwise have 
overseen. “It’s Bob’s feeling that whenever an event such as this is scheduled, we must 
have you on the spot,” Chapin wrote to Carruthers.465 
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 The charts that were prepared for the President’s address were satisfactory at best, 
at least according to Goode, but subpar according to Chapin. The type was too small to 
have been legible to viewers. The press had done a better job in creating charts for the 
public and Chapin made note of this. He suggested that Goode look at the post-coverage 
by CBS to see what had been done and what the team could learn from the clarity and 
simplicity of the charts they used. Goode suggested that future addresses utilize 
professional television graphic artists to ensure that what the internal team was using was 
equivalent, if not superior to, what the press was able to produce themselves.466 Any time 
there was an opportunity to mimic the success of television networks, Nixon’s team took 
full advantage. The better produced a Nixon White House program, the less opportunity 
or need there would be for the networks to add their own material or provide additional 
commentary and that was of utmost importance to the Administration. 
 Chapin and his internal team took the aesthetic preparation for these types of 
addresses very seriously. In early April, a lighting training program was conducted for 
members of the White House Communications Agency. Upon completion of the three-
week program, Goode felt the results well-prepared the trainees. “…the men who were 
enrolled in it are now qualified to light the President in any type of location situation we 
may encounter. He fully covered the best types of lighting equipment which can be 
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employed for our particular purposes and using this equipment to its best advantage,” 
wrote Goode to Chapin.467 
Humanizing the President 
 Efforts to get the men around the President to share their perception, thus 
allowing the public to see a different side of the President, was increasingly more 
organized. On April 9, Haldeman sent a memo to 23 members of Nixon’s Administration, 
including Chapin, Klein and Ziegler. “Effective immediately, we are starting a new 
program designed to tell the story of Richard Nixon through the eyes of his staff. It will 
be a dramatic story – and certainly one that will interest the American people,” wrote 
Haldeman. Haldeman called for all staff members to come up with a story they’d like to 
share about the President. The general narrative had been decided and the importance of 
those around the President was due to their unique ability to speak to the qualifications of 
the President as a leader of the nation. Through interviews with the press, Haldeman 
called for the staff to tell stories about the “decisiveness” of the President and his ability 
to “take a situation in hand and furnish the spark needed to get the job done.” The 
President’s programs were also to be touted. “Some interviews should be pointed in that 
specific direction. Humanize them,” wrote Haldeman. Haldeman noted that the American 
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people wanted to know the story of how the President interacted with his staff, and this 
project was to make sure that the public was privy to those relationships.468  
 Somewhat uncharacteristically, in an April 9 memo from Haldeman, he pushed 
the staff to talk to the press about their relationship with the President. He wrote, “We 
have no desire to deny newsmen access to WH officials. To the contrary, we want to 
expand access. We want to get the story of our Administration across.”469 This message 
went out to 11 of Nixon’s core staff, including Chapin, Colson, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, 
Klein and Ziegler.  
In the vein of trying to get the President’s narrative out through his close staff, 
Haldeman himself was considering going on the Today Show and sharing home movies 
of the President as well as being interviewed by Barbara Walters.470 Colson encouraged 
the idea, suggesting that it might help with the effort to get more people from the Nixon 
Administration on television.471   
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Equal Time and the FCC 
Meanwhile, Klein was expressing concern to the President over the challenges 
facing his “friends in the broadcast industry.” First, there was concern over the role of 
community access television (CATV) in regard to the major networks. CATV had 
provided local stations with the opportunity to reach their audiences in cases where 
receiving a clear signal was a challenge. With FCC leanings toward the expansion of 
cable, local stations were concerned that the big networks would invade their market 
areas. This would ultimately lead to the death of the local stations or so they believed. 
Nixon and his aides found great significance in local broadcast networks and in many 
ways considered them to be a better way to reach their public than the major networks. A 
threat to local networks meant an additional obstacle in Nixon’s leveraging of broadcast 
media and a danger in the expanded power of his opponents at the Big Three networks. 
Klein understood this, and suggested that Nixon make an effort to challenge some of 
these FCC moves in order to preserve the helpful influence of local news.472 
 While prevailing narratives suggest that Nixon’s aides were rash in their decision 
to go after networks, there is evidence to suggest that they were far more calculated, 
though they did seem to play defense. It was suggested at times that if one network set an 
example of how to “attack” the Administration, it was likely that the others would follow. 
At the end of April, the Nixon Administration was facing an “equal time” issue with 
ABC. ABC had allowed Democrats equal time following a Presidential address, despite 
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the fact that the Presidential address was in response to the time given to the Democrats 
regarding an issue they had lodged. The dilemma they faced was simple. If they 
challenged ABC with the FCC and lost, they would hurt themselves by disturbing a 
satisfactory state of laws. However, they could gain thirty minutes of time by going after 
the FCC. They felt as though they could win, but remained uncertain – too uncertain for 
the decision to be an easy one. Their relationship with ABC could be damaged, resulting 
in disruption of any good relationship that had developed. If they didn’t challenge ABC, 
they worried that NBC and CBS would feel as though they could do the same thing. 
“They can, of course, take the same clever approach; that is, they recognize the law, 
agree with it, but feel for whatever reason they would just like to slip in one program here 
or there. There would, in effect, be a de facto deterioration of the legal principle we care 
about,” Colson wrote to Haldeman. “Everyone will be watching this one because of the 
very novel and clever approach ABC has taken in responding to us.”473  
On the flipside, Klein had approached the President about the Fairness Doctrine 
as it applied to TV commercials. He was concerned that if the courts ruled in support of 
free advertisements, Congress might be required to pass legislation to counter the ruling, 
which he felt would be fatal to broadcasting. While a blow to broadcasting may not have 
been seen as a problem to Nixon himself or some of his aides, Klein advised Nixon side 
with the networks against the anti-commercial ruling suggesting that it would damage all 
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business.474 In Klein’s eyes, a fatal blow to broadcasting would be a travesty for the 
image of the Administration. In Colson’s, it was a favorable byproduct. 
 On April 26, Nixon’s aides received a detailed description of a study they had 
commissioned to evaluate the methods of utilizing television by President Nixon. The 
goal was to determine which method was most successful in projecting Nixon’s “ideas, 
policies, personality and ‘image’” for the voting population. “It is concerned, not with 
Mr. Nixon’s personal style or the content of this announcements, but rather with 
‘formats’ which can best be used to maximize his credibility and impact and to convey 
the most positive impression of the man…” according to the study outline.475 The 
extensive study was designed to ensure that for 1971 and the years that followed, the 
Administration would be best prepared to use television in the most effective and 
efficient way to reach voters. The budget was between $16,000 and $19,000 for the first 
phase of research. The first phase was designed to “examine in depth – with small groups 
of respondents – alternative TV formats which could be utilized by Mr. Nixon and to 
evaluate various strengths and weaknesses of each format.”476 
 Chapin felt that the study could illuminate the way in which the team could 
generate the best effect on the television audience. There were two ways to go, the “hard, 
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fast, antagonistic approach” or the “low-key, calm, approach.” Depending on the results 
of the study, the team could adjust press conference formats, making them more 
conversational. They could also work in humor, and personal items if that proved to 
appear more authentic to the television audience. The ultimate question for Chapin was 
“Is the President too quick on answering questions and how does the public react to quick 
answers.”477  
Again, the push for the image of the President took priority over the content of the 
President’s messages.478 While on the surface, the beginning of 1971 showed evidence 
that Nixon’s aides were neither pushing away the press nor shunning television as a 
medium, a deeper investigation into the intentions reveal their strategies to be both 
meticulously formulated and self-serving.479 Additionally, the development of those 
strategies reveals a growing shift in the position of Klein and emerging tensions among 
Nixon’s inner circle.  
Fighting Protesters through Television 
The end of April 1971 was rather tumultuous for the Administration. Protests by 
veterans were winning full coverage from major networks, drawing unwanted attention 
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on the choices of the President to maintain troops and continue fighting in foreign 
engagements. Mort Allin reached out to Colson describing in great detail what he termed 
the “9 days of conscious or unconscious erosion of national policy and spirit” by network 
news. He chastised networks for the dramatization of the protests and questioned the 
“propagandistic” use of marketing ploys by network news. “Advertisers use its every 
advantage to utilize their dollars most effectively. Camera work and narration or dialogue 
are brilliantly used for dramatic thrills on shows like Mission Impossible. Should the 
assets which TV possesses as a medium be used by the TV news shows? As propaganda 
– i.e. to push one controversial point – it would seem journalistically irresponsible,” 
wrote Allin.  
The Administration was becoming privy to the increasing changes in the 
production of broadcast news. While they continued to contend with the emerging 
commentary culture, they were now facing a different beast entirely – new graphics and 
great emphasis on the visual production of news programming injected in a new degree 
of concern for Nixon’s aides. News programming was now able to go beyond creating a 
simple story into providing an entertaining narrative that had a great influence on 
attracting viewers and swaying their opinions. “No American, outside of the 
unreconstructed hawk, could not have come away from last week’s TV news without 
deep doubts as to the wisdom of the President’s policy of gradual withdrawal and 
questions of the value of the immense effort in lives, money and material we have 
expended in VN,” continued Allin.  
There were a few ways that the Administration could address the onslaught they 
felt from the networks at the time. Allin suggested that they incite insurrection among the 
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affiliates and even pressure the networks, perhaps through internal means – “FCC and 
Justice are in our control,” he wrote.480 He suggested that aides might quietly go to 
advertisers who bought time on news shows and have them turn the heat on networks.  
 Colson’s frustration with the news media was clear. When the 1971 Pulitzer Prize 
was announced, he wrote to Ehrlichman, “This is probably the first time in history that 
the award hasn’t been given for excellence in journalism, but rather for skill in grand 
larceny. The two top winners were those who demonstrated that they were more adept at 
theft than at original writing or reporting.” Colson suggested to Ehrlichman that the line 
of “award for grand larceny” would do well to promote the idea that journalism standards 
of the day had hit an all-time low.481 Colson’s intention behind writing to Ehrlichman 
was not to vent his frustration, but to establish a theme or sound bite that could be best 
proliferated through Nixon supporters. Nixon’s team, was stacked with former admen 
and communications experts and the vernacular provided by the inside was important in 
establishing the attitudes of those on the outside. However, this frustration was 
increasingly apparent, but the Administration or at least the entire team, had not yet 
decided that the entirety of the press was a problem.  
 Still, Colson was agitated by how the press were portraying the policies of the 
Nixon Administration. On May 13, he expressed that frustration to Haldeman. “We got 
killed on the networks last night on the economy...” he wrote, “…a plan we have had in 
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the works for a couple of days now will probably help counter this.”482 Nixon’s aides got 
to work. Immediately following the negative coverage, assignments went out to provide 
internal briefings on the Gross National Product (GNP) figures and to identify all the 
erroneous areas of interpretation by the networks. A talking paper was produced to be 
distributed to the staff and a press conference to address the economy was planned. This 
immediate process was a something that Colson hoped would become regular practice. 
“Last night’s network treatment is precisely the kind of problem we have to avoid or be 
in a position to correct immediately,” he wrote.483  
Introducing Richard, Again 
Protests, credibility questions, secrecy and a host of other political concerns were 
putting significant strain on Nixon’s press teams. They needed a way to create significant 
content and news around “Nixon the man” while “Nixon the President” navigated murky 
political waters. When it came to planning Nixon’s TV and radio specials, it was 
important that they were well-thought out and done with the right people involved. 
Additionally, they had to cumulatively promote or enhance the preferred image of the 
President. By May 4, there were 17 additional specials laid out for consideration for the 
remainder of the year. A Mother’s Day radio message could be delivered and released to 
all networks on May 9. On the President and Mrs. Nixon’s anniversary, an interview with 
David Frost would give the public insight into the Nixon’s marriage, family, and careers. 
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Frost was chosen for the interview because Goode and Snyder felt as though “the three 
network talk show hosts [were] primarily comedians, and the danger of ill-timed or 
disrespectful quips could be a problem.”484 Nixon wasn’t particularly gifted in 
unpredictable situations and the team avoided moments where his awkward demeanor 
might be exploited.  
 The Fourth of July was another prime opportunity for a television appearance. 
The idea was to place Nixon in a small town, celebrating with regular folks, riding rides, 
judging contests and talking to children. It was designed to show the President in a more 
personable light, outside the Washington pomp and circumstance. Goode and Snyder also 
felt as though a tour of the Western White House in San Clemente would be a good 
opportunity. This was particular significant in light of previous years’ criticism of 
Nixon’s use of the space when he wasn’t in Washington. The press had suggested that it 
was too costly and the team worried that the perception that Nixon was not working as 
hard there as he could at the White House was a narrative they hoped to squash.  
 Proposed Labor Day radio spots would be done as two-or three-minute traffic 
safety messages that would be prerecorded by the President and then played throughout 
Labor Day. The reconvening of Congress on September 8 provided another chance to get 
the President on TV. A television press conference that was restricted to reporters who 
regularly covered Capitol Hill might provide a good way for the President to talk policy 
to a crowd with whom he felt accustomed. The President’s family was also tapped for 
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opportunities as well. Doing so provided a great interest and insight into Nixon as a 
family man and aided in the development of a different type of relationship between the 
people and the Office of President. Julie Eisenhower appearing on several episodes of 
Sesame Street was suggested.  
Because the President was a sports fan, discussions with the press about sports 
were not uncommon. In hopes of taking a step away from political discussions in the 
press, it was suggested that the President give an interview to a well-known sportscaster, 
perhaps Joe Garagiola, at the opening of football season. The team also sought a 
Presidential appearance on The American Sportsman on ABC Sports. The show aired for 
a period of three to four months each year, featuring celebrities who hunted and fished. 
The President could talk about fishing, perhaps just appear as a visitor. The hope was that 
the backdrop of that particular show could be done in a wilderness area, providing an 
opening for discussions on the environment.   
Efforts to show a personal side of the President would continue throughout the 
year, but those efforts would sometimes be made by those who surrounded him. His team 
had consistently tried to move Nixon’s aides into the forefront. However, a segment on 
NBC’s First Tuesday was crafted to show the personal side of the President by 
individuals like his tailor, valet, housekeeper, chef and photographer. Those who knew 
him, outside of political relationships, would be encouraged to discuss his “taste in 
clothing, food, furnishings, gardens,” and other similar subjects.485 Another suggested 
special would be the appearance of Nixon’s secretary Rose Mary Woods on This Is Your 
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Life. This would provide insight into Nixon himself, who would make a special 
appearance on the episode.  
A televised press conference with the Fellows of the Washington Journalism 
Center would provide Nixon a forum to talk to young people, a connection he was eager 
to pursue following continued unrest on university campuses across the nation. Every 
year, the Center would provide fellowships for 16 working journalists as well as a 
number of accomplished African American students who were interested in becoming 
journalists. The Fellows were assigned a “program of observation” at government 
agencies as well as an internship at Washington new bureaus.  
Finally, a segment for the Today Show or Sixty Minutes on the President’s daily 
schedule could provide a look into the “average” working day of the nation’s highest 
office. The segment would begin with a Cabinet meeting and then a series of 
appointments with Congressional leaders of both parties, representatives and minority 
groups. The segment wasn’t meant to show an extremely demanding day, instead it 
would be designed to show the diversity of the President’s activities and feature the 
people responsible for his schedule.  
The suggestions for the year weren’t meant to replace any of the team’s regular 
plans. They were additions. The plan would proceed to push for the President and his 
team to remain visible throughout and reactive to the day’s events. However, specials 
provided prime opportunities for the team to control the Presidential image in ways that 
daily events didn’t always allow. In that way, they were extremely important.  
 The Administration’s relationship with the press was complicated. While there 
were efforts to cultivate the relationship, the appearance of a pandering Administration 
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raised its own concerns.  June 7 was the “Freedom of the Press Day.” Nixon’s aides 
discussed whether something should be done on that day to show support from the Nixon 
White House. The day had nothing to do with a Presidential Proclamation and it hadn’t 
been formally acknowledged by presidents in the past. Price found the idea of making 
any sort of statement on the day a mistake. “I vote strongly no. Against the background of 
our attacks on the press, it would sound phony and be smeared [illegible]. I’m in favor of 
saying good things about the media but NOT on Freedom of the Press day,” he scribbled 
at the bottom of the memo from Colson.486 Safire had a similar opinion and felt as though 
no comment should be made. It would feel too much like pandering, he suggested. Dick 
Moore thought the timing was wrong and that recent statements by Cronkite and other 
network newsmen suggesting that the Administration was “plotting to intimidate the 
networks and the press” would make it appear as though the President was making a 
statement in response to that very criticism. Instead, a statement on July 4 on the freedom 
of the press would be more appropriate for the Administration.487  
In fact, of the five individuals Colson had asked for their opinion, only one said 
that it might be a good idea. Klein felt as though it might be a good opportunity to make a 
positive statement. However, the fact that the day was sponsored by the Inter American 
Press Association created some concerns. “The IAPA has many leading U.S. publishers 
and probably has been most effective for freedom of the press in Latin America. It has 
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been a participant in many of the battles concerning Latin American dictatorships. If such 
a statement is issued, the above fact should be kept in mind, so as not to project the 
President into a hemisphere debate,” he wrote. Klein’s differing opinion from the others 
was not unusual. In fact, it was more common as the years progressed. However, of 
significance to note is the concern of Klein not in the appearance of pandering or defense, 
but rather in the political ramifications of the particular press organization.488 
Colson’s Reprimand 
 Equal time on the networks was an ongoing battle in 1971. Colson was keeping 
careful track of TV appearances by opponents and making sure that there was someone 
from “Nixon’s side” ready to counter opposing spokesmen at each occasion. This would 
become the reigning strategy for the Administration. Not an uncommon tactic, but as 
were most actions by Nixon’s team, a very deliberate and intentional one. Not only was 
each situation countered, but each individual selected to represent the Administration was 
scrupulously chosen to “answer the charges” that were laid out against the policies of the 
Nixon Administration.489 
 On May 28, Colson discussed the Administration’s troubles with Common Cause. 
Common Cause was attempting to use the major networks to promote their “End of War 
Amendment.” Common Cause sought half-hour segments for a show but were turned 
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down by all three. Colson suggested that the reason was because action taken by the 
Administration the previous summer in regard to buying time. The networks, supposedly, 
would no longer sell controversial topics. Rebuked by the networks, Common Cause 
would instead record the programs and take them to local networks. They bought time in 
approximately 100 markets. In response, Nixon’s aides contacted each of the stations and 
asked for free time to respond. Colson received approval from a couple right away, and 
expected more to fall in line. “This is one of those happy times when we suck the enemy 
into spending a lot of money and then getting coverage ourselves with what I think will 
be a better product,” Colson wrote to Haldeman.490  
 Colson was working fervently to take advantage of every opportunity, but the 
structuring of Nixon’s aides in the area of television management was becoming a little 
crowded. Haldeman discussed with him a re-organization of the team. He wanted Colson 
to get take on the role of “quiet insider” and perhaps felt that he was “out front” too 
much. “…it is obvious to me that I have failed to convey to you the degree to which I 
have retreated into my shell since the so-called reorganization,” Colson wrote 
Haldeman.491 Colson expressed his frustration, noting that he was only speaking to the 
press in instances where “no one else could do it.” Haldeman circled the statement and 
chided Colson through a scribbled note on the side of the paper. “This is not really even 
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the case,” he wrote. Colson ended his case by saying, “…I understand the inside role and 
I think am more conscious of it than you realize that I am.”492 
Klein Further Alienated 
 The beginning of June isolated Klein even further from his peers in some ways. 
He was always more accessible to the press and in return, they came to him for help when 
it was needed. The situation with the FCC had been creating major concerns. Local 
newspapers were pushed, by FCC efforts, to sell their TV properties or radio and TV 
properties operating within the same city. Klein wrote directly to the President on the 
matter. “You expressed yourself as strongly opposed to actions which would cause 
newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune to divest TV,” he wrote. “On May 18, the anti-
trust division of the Justice Department acted exactly contrary to your position and what I 
believe is the position of the Attorney General.”493  
 The FCC issue was this: the combination of a TV stations and a daily newspaper 
in the same local market presented a serious issue in competition. This presented an issue 
of advertising dollars. It also presented an issue in diversity of information sources and 
thus, competition in advertising. Without economically effective choices for advertisers 
seeking to reach their particular markets due to lack of competition, problems emerged.  
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Klein sought the President’s response on the position of the Justice Department 
and if the Administration would “consider espousing a case by case position concerning 
newspaper ownership to the FCC by another agency such as the Department of 
Commerce.” Klein suggested that if the ultimate solution to the problem was legislation, 
it may be possible, should the Administration choose, to support a request to Congress 
that the TV-newspaper relationship be considered on the merits, so that there was not a 
broad prohibition against newspaper TV ownership.494  Klein’s suggestion was not taken.   
Everything is a Press Opportunity 
 Troop withdrawal coverage played a central role in news reports. Colson and 
Scali were working toward the promotion of more media covering the withdrawal of men 
and equipment from Vietnam. There was little division over whether this was necessary, 
but it was clear that the Administration would have to do more to prevent it from 
appearing as though it was simply another ploy to promote its accomplishments. 
 Achieving this would take a little work. For one, the individual who would 
promote the withdrawal could not be based in the Pentagon. Instead, it would need to be 
someone who was based in the field, preferably attached to the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) headquarters495 in Saigon. The assignment would be kept 
secret so as not to reveal the Administration’s efforts to disguise its self-promotion in the 
press. However, it was imperative that a few key people knew of the plan to ensure that 
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there would be a constant flow of ideas as to how to expand coverage. The goal would be 
made clear to Abrams, MACV and a few other key individuals. The person in the field 
reported to Dan Henkin496 and Henkin was to be in direct contact with Scali at all times. 
Simultaneously, Henkin could advise, albeit quietly, the members of his Southeast Asia 
unit at the Pentagon. They would craft additional ideas to move the story forward. This 
would be conducted completely by phone and without any memoranda exchanged. Scali 
understood that exploiting the withdrawal rate in a believable way would be a challenge 
but felt it possible despite the fact that between then and September the withdrawal rate 
would drop from an average of 14,300 men a month to approximately 10,000. Why? 
There was a need to keep men in place before the elections in October. In mid-
September, Scali noted that the rate was to go up sharply before the end of October 
balloting. Between June and September, the main focus was on shipping equipment back 
to the United States – providing ample opportunity for coverage and the promotion of 
evidence that there was a continuing withdrawal.497 
 By June, increased attention was paid to the perception that the broadcast news 
media was giving undue attention to unemployment, something that the Administration 
was quick to attempt to dismiss. Mort Allin, who put together the President’s News 
Summaries, responded to a memo on the subject distributed by Colson. His response 
reflected the perhaps jovial, yet tense atmosphere, permeating the White House. “It might 
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lessen the increasing paranoia in our resident asylum here,” he wrote, “if it is noted that 
in February the lead story was the astronauts landing on the moon. You may pass this on 
as you desire.”498 
 The President’s list of individuals he felt were against him was growing. Perhaps 
one of the more interesting individuals on the list was Jane Fonda. Fonda was 
investigated for smuggling pep pills into the United States. As it turned out, ABC and 
CBS had briefly noted that she had been cleared of her drug charges and that the pep pills 
were actually vitamins. Jon Hunstman499 informed Colson, on June 5. Underneath he 
wrote, “It was suggested that you note the above as obviously a fix to cover up.” Colson 
scribbled at the bottom of the memo a note to John Dean500, “Can you chew this out with 
customs – was she cleared?”501 Dean had sent some information to Colson regarding it on 
June 10. To that, Colson replied, “We might be able to have some real fun with this in the 
press if we can use it.” Colson also noted that the original document from Dean had no 
“Confidential” markings. Dean scribbled on the memo he received from Colson and sent 
it back. “Naturally is confidential,” he wrote.502 Colson had actually reached out to 
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Huntsman the same day. He let him know that the Justice Department had dropped its 
charges against Fonda because it felt there wasn’t good cause and did not want to provide 
a forum for Fonda within the Federal Court system. However, Colson surmised there may 
be information in Fonda’s file that could be “leaked out to friendly reporters.”503 Nixon’s 
aides were not just working on a compilation of individuals who they felt damaged the 
image of the President; they were also working on ways to use the media to damage those 
individuals.  
Programming the Media 
 It was not unusual for the President to meet with network executives and in those 
meetings, suggest individuals who would make good interviews. Understandably, this 
was done with a particular purpose. Nixon’s aides would be prepared to contact those 
individuals, if they hadn’t already done so, and program them to speak in ways that 
would favor the President and the aims of the Administration. On June 11, Nixon 
suggested to NBC executives that they should consider interviewing Norman Borlaug. 
Borlaug was the inventor of “miracle wheat,” and a 1970 recipient of the Nobel Peace 
Prize. The President, who had an extensive environmental platform which he was 
attempting to promote, suggested that Borlaug had, in effect, saved millions of lives from 
starvation through his invention. Nixon felt as though he had strong ideas about the 
environment and eliminated pesticides. Julian Goodman of NBC seemed receptive to the 
idea and Colson suggested that Snyder follow up on it. “Borlaug, if he goes on, should be 
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thoroughly programmed to talk in a very positive and complimentary way about his 
meetings with the President, what the President is doing and be very sure he gives us 
some strong plusses,” Colson wrote.504   
The Pentagon Papers 
 While Klein had been pushed from conversations on some of the efforts to 
alienate and attack the press, Klein was heavily involved in the fallout after the printing 
of the Pentagon Papers. Klein held meetings with other aides, including John Mitchell, 
Melvin Laird, Ron Ziegler among others to develop a strategy. At the time, Klein was 
most concerned about keeping the American public’s support of the Administration’s 
stand on the Vietnam War. Mitchell advocated the attempt to prevent publication. Klein 
felt that publication of the papers was “right” had the newspaper cleared it – because they 
were aware of a rule to clear classified documents – but they hadn’t done that.505 The 
Administration went with Mitchell’s position despite Klein’s objection. The President 
himself would ask Klein why he wouldn’t just stop talking to the press but Klein ignored 
comments. “I never stopped talking to any reporter because I was ordered to,” he said. 
“And I always found that with the President that sometimes he would say things to me 
which might have been harsh and if I just ignored him a couple of days, he would say, ‘I 
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see that you didn’t really do that,’ and I would say ‘No I didn’t,’ and he said, ‘That’s 
fine.’”506  
 Klein’s refusal to respond to Nixon’s outcries helped him manage the emerging 
stressors in the Nixon White House. After all, he had spent many years with Nixon and 
knew how to cope with Nixon’s mercurial nature. He attributed issues of the staff to their 
inability to take Nixon’s harshness with a grain of salt. Colson, he said, would take a 
harsh statement and make it worse. Colson’s attitude was a serious point of contention for 
Klein. Klein believed that Colson was a problem and objected to many of things that he 
did. In fact, Klein speculated that the pressure Colson put on Jeb Magruder led Magruder 
to “some of the things he did on the getting okay on the break-in,” that became the 
Watergate scandal.507 Klein felt that Colson knew Magruder was not strong enough to 
resist the pressure to take “cutting edge” action in regard to election intelligence 
gathering. Klein believed Colson manipulated Magruder and took advantage of him.  
Chapin was keeping an eye on the polls. The “freedom of press issue” was a 
major factor. The Gallup Poll figures from June 5 and 6 showed a 49 percent approval 
rating for the President with 37 percent disapproving of the President’s performance and 
another 14 percent offered “no opinion.” The next poll was scheduled for June 22, six 
days after Chapin reached out to Haldeman regarding the fact that it would include a 
question regarding the New York Times’ publication of the Pentagon Papers. Gallup had 
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said that it would run a freedom of press question. Chapin had objected, concerned that it 
would come out in favor of the press, something that wouldn’t surprise him. Chapin was 
adamant that the question be reworded on the poll.508  
 “I’m convinced beyond doubt that my programmed visits with media leaders 
across the counter is working quite well,” Klein wrote to Nixon in a June 24th memo. 
Klein laid out the considerable pressure he felt to provide information where others 
wouldn’t. “This is difficult at best without backup, but I think I am succeeding, judging 
from coverage,” he continued. Klein felt as though leaders in media were always eager to 
see him and that the idea of a two-way conversation between the President (through 
Klein) and media leaders was something they found particularly flattering and should 
continue. Since the start of the year, Klein visited 19 states, making three to six visits per 
state according to his count. He would address editors and publishers at broadcast 
meetings and hold both private and public meetings. In his time with the press he felt two 
major issues were troubling. “One is the New York Times case. The second is perhaps of 
more long-range importance: the proposed FCC action separating newspapers from TV 
ownership within their cities. Both are looked at by many as a breach of faith by us.”509 
Klein had spent the last three days doing a series of public appearances in Chicago, St. 
Louis and then Washington and reported that the Times and the Pentagon Papers case was 
stressed most in his conversations. People wanted to know the Administration’s side of 
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the case. Klein had echoed the standard response, that it wasn’t about freedom of 
information but that the government was “executing its duty to protect national security,” 
that it wasn’t “secrecy for secrecy’s sake.”510  
Haldeman responded to Klein’s overview of meeting with media leadership in 
major cities days later. “…you should concentrate more on the secondary markets,” 
Dayton, Memphis, Tallahassee, and others required attention. Nixon was going to be in 
those areas over the summer. Haldeman wasn’t suggesting Klein stay away from major 
markets altogether, but he encouraged him to shift his emphasis to secondary markets 
“for the next couple of months.”511 This would be one of the many shifts of Klein away 
from major interactions with the press. Regardless, Klein pushed ahead on the New York 
Times case issue. He believed that it was now time for a brief Presidential comment on 
why the Administration was pursuing the case. “I would not suggest an attack on 
newspapers, even the New York Times, but I think that at this moment, some Presidential 
clarification would be helpful with both editors and the public in general.”512 Klein was 
acutely aware of the potential for the Pentagon Papers case to create a problem for the 
Administration and he was vigilant in his commitment to encourage Nixon to remain 
open to the press.  
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The Administration wasn’t overly concerned with the long-term optics of Nixon’s 
relationship with the press, but more so with the general optics of his appearance in the 
polls, something that had become a bit of an obsession. Chapin had spoken to George 
Gallup Jr. about the latest poll and determined that Nixon’s approval and disapproval 
ratings seemed fairly unchanged by the “Pentagon Papers” case. Though he did voice 
concern over Gallup’s intention to compare the approval ratings between Nixon and the 
four previous presidents. Nixon’s approval rating at 48 percent was far lower than LBJ’s 
67 percent, JFK’s 61 percent, Eisenhower’s 69 percent and Truman’s 55 percent. “The 
way the story’s headed, it will not be positive for us,” Chapin wrote.513  
  As the Pentagon Papers case was a continuing thorn in the Administration’s side, 
reporter Jerry terHorst (who would later become Ford’s Press Secretary and then resign 
due to Ford’s pardon of Nixon) contacted Charles Colson to ask about setting up an 
interview with the President on the occasion of the third anniversary of his nomination to 
office. This would serve as a reprieve from the influx of questions regarding the 
Administration’s position on the New York Times case. Ordinarily, Colson felt something 
like this would not be worthy of a response, but the Administration liked terHorst. He 
was friendly and non-threatening and this could be a welcome distraction. “terHorst is not 
the best journalist,” he wrote to Ziegler, “but he is a friend. I will leave this with you, 
however, I have promised I would get back to terHorst with an answer.” At this point, 
dealings with the press were going through several people and Colson was taking on an 
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increased role. Dwight Chapin and Herb Klein were copied on the memo but a 
handwritten note on the document from Haldeman reaffirms his growing confusion over 
responsibility. Haldeman circled the word “I” in “I would get back…” and scribbled 
underneath, “Not you – Z – This should have been referred directly to Ron.”514  
 Colson was becoming more aggressive toward the people in the media, at one 
point even suggesting that television personality Dick Cavett was a “dedicated enemy of 
the President and the Administration,” and that the Nixon White House would do well by 
continuing to “neutralize him.” Throughout his time working alongside Ziegler, he was 
frustrated with press coverage and was vocal about it. When he criticized the press, it was 
biting and his expectations were low even after positive gains were made in bolstering 
Nixon’s image following meetings with journalists. “I don’t expect great things,” he 
wrote to Haldeman. “This is typical of the pattern…we got a rash of very good coverage 
for a few weeks thereafter before they fell back into their old ways.”515  
 Colson’s problem with Klein was becoming bigger when it came to press 
responsibilities. “I really think the level of backbiting in the White House staff has 
reached new highs,” he wrote to Haldeman on August 5. “I have the Klein problem, as 
you know; Buchanan’s morale is bad, highly critical of everyone around the place; Safire 
has been grumbling; there’s a real bitter feeling between Connally and Shultz which has 
surfaced a couple of time in sessions I have been in. There is really not an upbeat team 
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kind of spirit,” he continued.516 Colson asked Haldeman to solve the problem. He urged 
him to get the team dealing with the press and media together and to “read them the riot 
act” to “fight back positively and not take our petty bitches out on each other in the 
newspapers.”517 Colson made a list of everyone he thought should be required to attend 
the meeting including Klein.  
 Haldeman too was growing frustrated with the tension within the team, and with 
the way the situations were handled. “Even a quick glance at the News Planning 
Calendar” would indicate there isn’t any news planning…” he wrote to Colson just days 
later.518 The note was not well received. The next day he sent a message to Ziegler, 
Safire, Howard, Moore, Desmond Barker519, and Scali. He attached Haldeman’s memo. 
Haldeman was holding Colson accountable. “We’ve got to do a better job of developing 
good stories for those days when there are no known events,” he wrote to the team.520 
The next day, he addressed Haldeman directly. “…it is not correct to say that there ‘isn’t 
any news planning.’…If I have erred, it has been on the side of giving you less 
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information in terms of ‘game plan.’” Colson went on to document, in three densely 
packed pages, how the news planning meetings functioned and that the news plans were 
streamlined to only included things important enough to make legitimate news. “We 
could always pump a lot more ‘junk’ into the news plan which would give it the 
appearance of more substance, but we would then only be kidding ourselves, which is 
silly…I was well aware that the current news planning calendar…contained some very 
large holes, therefore, I was not too surprised to receive a ‘Haldeman needle.’ I hope this 
memo is not an overreaction…” wrote Colson.521  
 Careful consideration was now placed on the roles and responsibility of the teams 
dealing with the press. 1971 had already been filled with political landmines where the 
press was concerned and the “credibility gap” was becoming a greater consideration. 
Klein was trying to negotiate his way to China. He asked Haldeman if he could join the 
team that was going but was careful to position himself as an asset but also out of the way 
of Ziegler. He noted that he was the only one with experience in negotiating with a 
Communist country, citing his time with Nixon during the then Vice President’s trip to 
the Soviet Union. He knew, however, that he would need to assure Haldeman he 
wouldn’t interfere with Ziegler’s role. “I am not, in any way, suggesting interfering with 
Ron’s role, which would be the key one, but I do feel that behind the scenes, in all 
aspects, I could be particularly helpful…to both Ron and the President. Ron would, of 
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course, be in charge of the press,” he wrote.522 Klein made repeatedly clear that he had no 
intention of interfering. Klein was allowed to travel to China as part of Nixon’s team, but 
not before he advocated for his own usefulness. The carefully worded memo serves as 
another indication of the tension that existed within the Administration, particularly 
where his role was concerned and how adamantly he was attempting to retain some 
relevance in a tightening circle.  
 Still, he persisted. On October 5, Klein reached out to one of Nixon’s other 
“palace guards,” Ehrlichman. He had been trying to advise the President on dealing with 
the decision on anti-trust and the networks to no avail. He spoke directly with the 
Attorney General and found that despite his advice the Attorney General felt it necessary 
to move ahead with it. Klein was to meet with network presidents in New York later in 
the week. He shared his concerns with Ehrlichman. First, he was concerned that the 
networks would use the decision as proof that the Administration was attacking all of 
broadcasting by hitting a vital economic vein at a time when network income was down 
following the loss of cigarette advertising. He noted that this could be politically 
damaging to the Administration. 
Second, the reduction of prime time from three and a half hours to three hours had 
occurred too recently to measure if it was actually beneficial in the creation of more 
original programming, as intended. Klein argued that this indicated that the public had 
not yet benefited from “prying time lose” from the networks. Klein felt a decision like 
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this one, already delayed for over a decade, could be put off further, until 1973. “I do not 
see how we will gain politically, and I do see how we can be seriously hurt with our 
friends in the media at the local level. It could be a public issue where we are accused of 
seeking to suppress a free press. Having made the argument here, and seemingly lost, I 
obviously will carry out the approved decision in my dealing with the networks. (As you 
can see, I am not arguing the law, but the politics). This, as you know, is my normal 
policy,” he concluded.523  
 At the same time, Klein reached out to Haldeman to request a meeting with the 
President. He had been asked by Nixon to speak with the network presidents and let them 
know that the decision was not an attempt to “injure them on a personal basis.” Klein 
made it clear to Haldeman that he had no intention to argue his view point in front of the 
President after already having done so to Ehrlichman and the Attorney General. But he 
wanted to know exactly what the President wanted said so that he could interpret it to the 
network heads precisely.524 His reluctance clear, Klein followed through on something he 
clearly felt could be intensely harmful to the Administration.  
 The clashes between Klein and Colson became even more pronounced. The two 
offices were not working together well and Klein felt he needed ground rules. “Recently, 
there has been a steady deterioration of relations between your office and mine which has 
not been in the President’s best interests. Basically, the problem is a lack of coordination 
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and, I believe, your unwillingness to cooperate,” he wrote. He noted that Colson would 
boycott meetings that Klein had invited him to and that he was excluded from meetings 
that Colson would lead. Klein could feel that Colson was impinging on his territory. “As 
you are aware, most of the techniques we use – mailings, briefings, calls, TV placement, 
etc; were originated by me and my staff before you were at the White House,” he 
continued. Colson had overstepped boundaries and Klein was making it known. Colson 
had given orders to Klein’s staff to call hostile newspapers following a Presidential 
announcement using Klein’s name. “I deal with these news people day in and day out. I 
can’t do this well if you are moving behind my back in each crucial moment…This is 
injurious to the President,” he scolded. “You know such procedures are not good for 
effectiveness or morale.” Haldeman received a copy of the memo and wrote his own note 
to Colson in the margins. “Colson – There is considerable merit in Klein’s case. Please be 
sure to get together with him promptly to work this out.” He continued his remark on the 
bottom of the page, “It is very much in your interest to do so.”525 
Colson responded. He felt blindsided by Klein’s remarks, though his earlier 
correspondence with Haldeman would indicate that he was aware of Klein’s concern over 
his actions. He contended that he knew nothing about meetings that he had apparently 
“boycotted” and that he thought that whatever issues the two had were in the past. He 
alluded to a particular project with George Bush that Klein had felt Colson had fumbled. 
“If there was a communication problem here,” he wrote, “it rests with you and not with 
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me.” Colson felt Klein was too possessive of his staff and that he wasn’t willing to work 
with other offices in the way that he should. “I don’t seem to have this problem with any 
other office in the White House,” he wrote. “On the few occasions when I have talked to 
people from the press and they have asked ‘are you taking over Herb Klein’s operation?’ 
I always say no, downplay my own role and build yours up…By the way, I am not 
sending a copy of this to Haldeman so he has read your charges but not my answer. I 
don’t follow that procedure.”526 
 Colson was injured by Haldeman’s suggestion that there had been considerable 
merit to Klein’s remarks.  “I don’t know whether the state of my morale is of any great 
concern to anyone, but I have to say that one of the most disheartening things to me is 
when people get one side of a story and make an instant judgement from it,” the memo 
began. He assured Haldeman that he would go the extra mile to keep Klein happy but felt 
that Klein was unhappy, and had been for some time, due to frustrations that had little to 
do with him. “If I didn’t want badly to keep the peace, I’d let him have it but good,” he 
wrote. He suggested he had wanted to keep Haldeman out of the bickering between the 
two. “I, therefore, would never think of presenting to you all the little idiocies that 
occasionally crop up with Klein, nor would I send you a copy of the kind of memo Herb 
sent to me. My restraint, however, in doing this prevents you from getting ‘my side of the 
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case’ on something like this latest Klein memo…I’m not going to waste your time 
perpetuating the back-biting.”527 
 As 1971 was ending Klein made a concerted effort to reach the President 
regarding a possible deterioration in the Administration’s relationship with the press on 
the local level. Local news organizations had been friends of the Administration and 
Nixon had long been more interested in working with local entities. However, issues with 
decisions that affected the economic lifeblood of those organizations was creating a rift 
Klein was concerned would be unable to fix. Klein wrote directly to the President on 
November 8, “I think you should know that because of various general departmental 
actions in the Government in recent months, there is confusion, and there probably will 
be injury to our friends at the local level in the broadcast and newspaper industries. This 
is damaging our relationships. Many or most of these things are contrary to your own 
philosophy, I believe.”  
 Klein outlined the fallout he was witnessing. First, the FCC gave strong 
indications of ruling that newspapers may not own TV stations in their cities. Second, 
newspapers and magazines were hit by increase in postal rates. Third, recent court action 
upgraded the challenge procedure against local stations and license renewals became 
instable with the FCC, creating a multitude of other issues. Fourth, the Federal Trade 
Commission was making moves against advertising, a major source of revenue. Fifth, the 
antitrust Department of Justice was sending questionnaires to newspapers exempted by 
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the Failing Newspaper Act and putting forth a new set of regulations for applicants of the 
exemption. Finally, Klein was asked, after 11 years of delay, to announce to network 
presidents that the Justice Department was to take antitrust action against their program 
production procedures.528 To Klein, it seemed like a perfect storm leading to failed 
relationships he had worked years to cultivate. Nothing seemed to favor his promise to 
maintain an open White House. If anything, it was the opposite.  
By 1972, Klein’s involvement seemingly dwindled significantly as Colson, and 
Klein’s Deputy Director from February 1972 through January 1974, Ken Clawson took 
on greater roles. Colson advocated for Clawson to take over Klein’s responsibilities: 
Ken Clawson very much wants to succeed Herb Klein if Klein leaves. Since you 
are shuffling the bodies around, I simply want to strongly urge that Clawson be 
put into this spot. Clearly he is the best man we have for it on the White House 
staff. He is totally loyal and given the right kind of staff, could handle it with 
great skill. Since you and I are the ones responsible for bringing Ken in, I hope we 
can follow this through, unless the Klein situation is unsurmountable.529 
 
 While Clawson’s role began to dwarf Klein’s earlier, he would officially assume 
his title of “director of communications on January 30, 1974. “By 1972, Haldeman was 
trying to be more dominant,” said Klein. An already tense relationship between the two 
resulted in a significant curtailing of Klein’s duties. In fact, when Klein would be asked 
to do things with which he didn’t agree, he would admittedly follow through with the 
necessary paperwork but then not follow through on the tasks.530  
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Still, he continued to alert Haldeman to the deteriorating relationship between the 
Administration and the press. Several situations had occurred that involved newspapers 
that he felt played very badly, and he had not been consulted. He had been receiving calls 
from the press who were voicing their deep concern over the way the Administration was 
handling things and noted considerable resentment was building. On June 14, 1972, he 
sent a message to Haldeman. “When you and I discussed similar problems some time 
ago, it was determined that actions dealing with newspapers would be cleared here with 
me or with Ken Clawson so that we would have all factors of news judgement involved,” 
he wrote.531 
In some cases, Haldeman was keeping Klein in the loop, but on an extremely 
short leash. On October 29, Haldeman sent a memo to Klein ordering him to contact 
newspaperman John Knight.532 Haldeman wanted Klein to tell Knight how disappointed 
he was in an editorial he had written. Additionally, Haldeman stated that Nixon felt Klein 
should make calls to major editors across the country making a point that “we’ve had 
enough of this kind of thing now, that this Administration has been maligned…”533 The 
memo included pages of “Allegations” against the press, followed by exact “Responses.” 
No longer was Klein in the positon of advising the Administration on how to reply to 
                                                
531 Herbert Klein to H.R. Haldeman, 14 June 1972; folder Memoranda 1972, June, 1972: Box 2; White House 
Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Herbert Klein; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California 
532 John Knight was a newspaper man, publisher and editor. By 1973, Knight’s newspaper chain, Knight 
Newspapers, included fifteen newspapers. He later co-founded the Knight Foundation with his brother 
James L. Knight.  
533 H.R. Haldeman to Herbert Klein, 29 October 1972; folder Memoranda 1972, October, 1972: Box 2; White 
House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Herbert Klein; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California 
  277   
issues with the press, he was now used to push the exact agenda he had worked to change 
throughout his time in the White House.  
After the second term campaign for Nixon’s presidency, Haldeman called the 
meeting right before Klein was set to take a week’s vacation with his wife. By this time, 
there had been a significant rift between Haldeman and Klein. Klein received a call that 
he should go to Camp David a few days later for a chat. Klein said:  
“…I got there and Haldeman met me and said he thought I ought to resign and 
that, did I want to become the ambassador to Mexico or did I want to head the 
USIA, but they wanted to have more control over what was happening in the 
press office. And I said, ‘Well, I don’t feel that way, and I want to hear it from the 
President if that’s the case.’ And so I talked to the President, and the President 
was surprised, and he didn’t really ask me one thing or the other. He just talked to 
me. But I knew then that I was on my way out.”  
 
Klein had planned to leave at that point, but as the Watergate scandal became a 
larger issue, Haldeman, and others on the staff encouraged him to stay for a bit longer. 
Klein agreed to stay until perhaps October but he ended up leaving in July. He knew he 
would leave government, so he made his intentions to resign known early in order to 
encourage job offers. He received at least 32 upon announcing his intention. In his initial 
November 10, 1972 letter of resignation, requested by Haldeman to the entire staff, Klein 
wrote to the President: “I am among the more fortunate, having had a chance to play at 
least a small part in your plans for 26 years from your earliest days as a Congressman…I 
submit my resignation at the pleasure of the President.”534 
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At the start of the new term, Klein discussed a reorganization of his office. He 
wanted to take what he had learned over the previous four years to bolster the impact that 
his team could have on press relations. His plans retained the current layout, two offices 
(his and Ziegler’s) both reporting to the President. However, when he was discussing the 
plan with Ziegler, he noticed Ziegler’s discomfort. “I’m not sure what is going to happen, 
Herb,” Ziegler said, “but I want you to know I have nothing to do with it. You may not 
like the meeting or the President’s ideas today, but whatever, I want you to know I am 
not part of the plan.”535 When Klein began to speak to the President himself about the 
plan, the subject was changed, and Nixon began to speak about cutting staff and 
reorganizing departments. Haldeman broke the news that the cuts would mean Klein’s 
staff would be smaller and the new plan required he report to Ziegler, not directly to the 
President. “That meant I had lost the power struggle in which I wanted to strengthen the 
scope of my office. I was out,” Klein wrote. “I considered such a blow a possibility as 
Haldeman moved, impersonally, to consolidate his power as chief of staff by eliminating 
some of us he could not control completely.”536 
Klein would continue to work for the Administration, despite the blow to his 
plans, but documents provide little on the depth to which he was involved. He traveled, at 
the request of Nixon, to China and Vietnam with Henry Kissinger, though he was 
uncertain of whether he truly wanted to with Watergate and his departure looming. Still, 
he did. He had anticipated, following his return, that his last few months at the White 
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House would stay calm. He again was mistaken. Watergate was now a daily concern and 
in all headlines. Magruder was questioned by a federal grand jury, John Dean was talking 
to prosecutors and Haldeman and Ehrlichman were asked to resign. At the behest of 
Ziegler, Klein decided to stay a little longer. He also aided Alexander Haig, the President, 
Ziegler and others in an attempt to contain an extremely volatile situation. He advised the 
President that the best way to regain trust was to fire those on the staff who might have 
been related to the cover-up in the slightest and to “start a new campaign of openness 
with the public and the press.”537 According to Klein, the President created a plan with 
Haig to do just that but that he never executed. Klein and Ziegler then came up with a 
plan of their own. That plan also died.538  
By July, Klein was on his way out and Ziegler asked for one final favor. Haig and 
Ziegler wanted a summary of what cabinet officers, public opinion makers and Klein’s 
public relation friends thought about the President’s situation. Klein took on the lofty 
task, eventually arriving at the conclusion that it seemed as though Nixon’s “Tricky 
Dick” image was reemerging. Klein also noted that the press was showing clear “anti-
Nixon bias,” even going as far as writing, “This is not a time the media can be proud of,” 
when he noted that the press was going after innocent members of the Administration.539 
On June 5, 1973, Klein resigned effective July 1. At no point did the President ask that he 
stay any longer. “…I was pressured by Haig to stay ‘a little longer,’ which I did, but the 
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President at the time did not ask me to change my decision to leave eventually. Had he 
done so, I might have stayed one more year. Fortunately, I did not.”540  
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CHAPTER 6 
KLEIN IN CONTEXT  
 Following his resignation from the Nixon White House, Klein returned to the 
newspaper business. However, he wouldn’t fully disconnect from the unraveling of the 
Administration until years later. Upon his resignation, Klein lamented the position itself. 
“The difficulty right now is whether or not you can do [the job] with an individual with 
this much responsibility; I think probably not, and the structure will change some. But, 
the thing that’ll go forth will be the systems we have and the goals we have. It’ll be a 
matter of more people doing it, not all under one person,” he said in his exit interview.541 
 While a member of the Nixon White House, Klein’s contributions were 
overshadowed by those who were more prominent and less friendly than he toward the 
media. In fact, Klein is sometimes referred to as “the press man’s press secretary” despite 
never serving in the position under President Nixon. His disconnect on press engagement, 
particularly from H.R. Haldeman and Charles Colson, pushed him outside the inner circle 
that basked in attention as presidential aides.  
 Though he may not have developed lasting relationships with many of those he 
worked with, praise from his relationships with the press, and even those outside of 
Nixon’s inner circle were not lacking. Klein’s efforts to keep the Nixon Administration 
open did not go unnoticed by his friends in the press. “You have fulfilled a great and 
demanding role with dignity and graciousness. Everyone who has come in contact with 
you has nothing but admiration for your integrity and skill,” wrote Vice President and 
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Editorial Director Emmett Dedmon of the Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Daily News, 
in a personal letter to Klein following the announcement of his departure.542 Carl 
DeBloom, Executive Director of The Columbus Dispatch, wrote that he’d miss Klein’s 
“valuable help as a member of the administration over the years.”543 Attached to his letter 
was a copy of the papers’ June 27, 1973 editorial on Klein’s departure:  
Saturday marks the last official day on duty for a most valuable servant in the 
White House – Herb Klein. Richard Nixon and Mr. Klein have been friends for 
nearly three decades dating back to the days when Mr. Nixon was running for his 
first seat in Congress and Mr. Klein was a $25-a-week newspaper reporter in 
California…Throughout it all, Mr. Klein has made and kept friends by a simple 
formula – being open and candid and answering both questions and affronts with 
an unruffled directness…Watergate may have delayed [Klein’s] departure a little 
but not because the Klein name was tainted. It was not. In fact, he was generally 
excluded from the heel-clicking clique which preferred its own brusk, 
domineering approach to Mr. Klein’s low-key candor…Mr. Klein served on many 
occasions as the lonely fireman who doused brush fires created by less astute 
Nixon aides. It was Herb Klein who could be depended upon to set the record 
straight…When the Watergate-types began edging Mr. Klein away from the Oval 
Room he would take to the road, stroll into newspaper offices across the country 
and tell the story. The mere fact he was greeted with “nice to see you again, Herb” 
both after and before his visits is evidence he was a Nixon aide who could be 
believed.544 
 
 Felix R. MicKnight, co-publisher and editor of the Dallas Times Herald 
expressed his gratitude toward Klein, noting his “magnificent service.” The Herald 
printed an editorial on Klein that noted how Klein emerged from the Watergate scandal 
unscathed.  
In the flame and smoke of Watergate the name Herbert Klein has been 
conspicuously absent. Which surprised absolutely no one in the nation’s 
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press…The American press thanks Klein, a man who has been to all the 50 states 
explaining and interpreting newsworthy functions of government, for his service. 
Too bad there weren’t more Herb Kleins around the White House.545 
 
 Another of Klein’s supporters was Hugh Sidey of Time magazine. In his editorial 
he wrote of Klein, though not without bristling criticism of Nixon’s Administration: 
…for 27 years [Klein] has been a considerable chunk of Richard Nixon’s better 
nature…He is a rather remarkable story. He was, these last years, abused and 
downgraded and ignored by Nixon and his supermen and yet he has stayed loyal, 
kept his honor, and goes off as one of the President’s few remaining displays of 
decency and good humor…When they finally pushed him farther and farther form 
the Oval Office he hardly complained. He was no saint. Nor was he the best 
White House aide in all history. But he was an oasis of consideration and 
sympathy in a Teutonic desert of heel clicks and “Yes, sirs…here was one of the 
few men around Nixon who gave more than he took.546  
 
 Sidey’s “rival” Howard Flieger of U.S. News and World Report wrote to Klein 
and attached Sidey’s editorial. “I absolutely loved this piece,” he wrote. “…and I’m not 
in the habit of saying nice things about the opposition.”547 To which Klein replied, 
“Obviously, I deeply appreciate the Sidey piece, but more so, I appreciate both our 
personal friendship and the continuous good relationship with U.S. News.”548 The Denver 
Post sent their opinion piece to Klein directly. “We don’t know whether anyone [in the 
White House] really appreciates the quality of the job [Klein] did for the President. But 
many in the press know and they, at least, will miss him,” they printed, of Klein’s 
                                                
545 “A Trusted Servant." The Dallas Times Herald (Dallas), June, 1973.  
546 Sidey, Hugh. "So Long to Old Herb Klein." Time, June 18, 1973.  
547 [Box 54/Folder#5], Herbert G. Klein papers, Collection no. 0345, University Archives, Special Collections, 
USC Libraries, University of Southern California. 
548 [Box 54/Folder#5], Herbert G. Klein papers, Collection no. 0345, University Archives, Special Collections, 
USC Libraries, University of Southern California. 
  284   
departure.549 Some even went as far as to say that had Klein been listened to, the fate of 
the Nixon Administration may have been different. Joe McCaffrey of the Evening Star 
Broadcasting Company in Washington D.C. wrote to Klein a short two-line letter that 
read “I have great admiration for you, and I regret you are leaving. Had more people 
listened to Herb Klein more often things would not be as they are.”550 Mims Thomason of 
United Press International wrote to Klein in a similar vein, “In many ways, I hate to see 
you leave the government, because President Nixon needs you.”551 Ward L. Quaal of the 
Tribune Company in Chicago thanked Klein for his service and friendship and wrote in a 
letter to Klein, “Nixon needed you so very, very much and you never failed him. As I told 
you, you were a ‘bright spot’ among some people for whom I had very little respect and 
confidence and that is why I know what you meant to the President all along.”552  
Newsmen weren’t the only ones singing Klein’s praise. One significant figure 
who noted Klein’s unique service was then Representative Gerald Ford who expressed 
his appreciation for Klein in a tribute on the House floor. Ford later said of Klein, 
“[Klein] was a long-time very close personal friend…about the only one [around Nixon] 
that I really felt comfortable with. He was and is an outstanding person.”553 Assistant 
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Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Jerry Friedheim wrote Klein a handwritten note 
on June 5, 1973. “Just a note of good wishes for the future…you certainly accomplished 
much for profession and country and there are lots of us who know that!”554  
However, Nixon’s critique of Klein is perhaps the opinion most cemented in 
historical memory. Famously, Nixon was exposed speaking ill of Klein in released White 
House recordings following Klein’s departure. After the conversation between Nixon and 
Klein’s adversary Charles Colson where Nixon could be heard saying “Klein just 
doesn’t’ have his head screwed on” was released, Klein received a call from Nixon.555 
Nixon’s Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren would later go on the record to say that 
Nixon had a great deal of respect for Klein and considered him one of his “closest 
friends.”556 “You can laugh about it…and it can be taken out of context,” said Warren. 
“But I want you to know it is my firm belief that Herbert Klein understands what is 
behind it. Herbert Klein has the kind of mind to put that in perspective.”557 This seemed 
to be true. Klein heard about the remark while he was playing golf with friends. A 
reporter called to inform him of the recorded conversation. Klein dismissed the comment 
as “locker room” conversation but admitted he was bothered by it. Nixon called Klein 
four days after resigning and apologized for the comment. Klein stated that he felt it was 
“one of the more noble things that he did.” Years earlier, in the midst of a tightening 
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inner circle, Nixon expressed his admiration of Klein in a letter dated November 16, 
1972. He started with a sports analogy, a common way of conversing between Nixon and 
Klein:  
You are one of the few who have been active in my campaigns from the very 
beginning, going back to 1946. As I have often said, we have won some of we 
have lost some, but batting over 600 in the big leagues is a pretty impressive 
record. Your campaign efforts were outstanding in every respect. The work that 
you did in enlisting the support of newspaper editors and publishers throughout 
the country probably has never been equaled in the past and will never be 
surpassed in the future. In addition, your speeches and your television 
appearances probably made more news more often than any of our surrogates, 
which is a tribute to your great understanding of how to get across a point in a 
way the papers or radio or television will pick up. Incidentally, while the last 
campaign was undoubtedly the best, the first was probably the more exciting 
because the thrill that comes from winning the first time out can never be 
exceeded.558  
 
Klein saw Nixon frequently following the President’s resignation in 1974. Klein 
visited Nixon “quite often,” often relaxing into the old dynamic they had perfected in the 
small coffee shops of Southern California when Nixon was campaigning as a young 
politician. “I think he enjoyed the fact that, part of our friendship was always talking 
about sports, so we’d talk about sports quite a bit when we were together any time...I 
wanted to talk to him about the Middle East; we had to talk about sports for about 20 
minutes. That was the way he was,” said Klein.559  
                                                
558 Box 145/Folder#16, Herbert G. Klein papers, Collection no. 0345, University Archives, Special Collections, 
USC Libraries, University of Southern California. 
559 "Oral History with Herbert Klein." Interview by Timothy Naftali and David Greenberg. Transcript. February 
20, 2007. 
  287   
Lending a Hand During Watergate: The Frost Interview 
Despite being pushed from Nixon’s inner circle, Klein was asked to consult on the 
growing scandal resulting from the Watergate incident.560 Klein was in Montreal, Canada 
when he received a call from Haig requesting that he meet with the President in Key 
Biscayne, Florida. He had become aware of a rumor that the Administration was hoping 
he would return to handle Watergate. But after starting his position at Metromedia and 
considering his previous challenges, Klein had little desire to return. After fielding calls 
from several people, including Leonard Garment,561 Klein flew to Key Biscayne, feeling 
a great deal of pressure from Haig and Ziegler to rejoin the Administration and to handle 
the Watergate fallout.562  
Credibility was lost and Ziegler’s diminishing control over the press, as his 
relationship with Nixon, became more tumultuous. Klein had long been tasked with 
fixing the Nixon “credibility gap” and a return to the role under the circumstances would 
not have been unusual. However, he resisted any return citing an obligation to his new 
position at Metromedia and to his family. Still, when Nixon asked, “I know you got a 
new job and what do you think?” Klein responded, “I think it would be a real hardship on 
me. I don’t like to tell you no because I’ve never said no to something you’ve asked me 
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to do that I thought was reasonable.”563 Klein recalled that Nixon did not push him 
further or pressure him to return. He did not directly speak to Klein about the Watergate 
situation. Klein noted that Nixon never really spoke to anyone directly about Watergate 
and that even after leaving office, getting him to admit any wrongdoing regarding it was 
extremely difficult. He did, however, believe that an interview he helped facilitate was 
perhaps the closest Nixon came to admitting fault.  
Klein was involved in arranging Nixon’s interview with David Frost.564 “I thought 
Frost would be tough and whatever he did with Nixon would be believable. And he came 
close to saying he was wrong, but he didn’t actually say it directly.”565 Frost had 
approached Klein saying that he wanted to interview Nixon. Klein had known Frost for a 
long time and felt that he could handle the interview honestly. “…he would be a tough 
questioner, and I knew Dick Nixon was always at his very best, the tougher the 
questions...” said Klein.566 Klein convinced Nixon to take the interview. There had been 
an immense amount of pressure on Nixon to go on television and admit that he was 
wrong and an equal amount of reluctance on the part of the Administration. Klein himself 
discussed the need for Nixon to address the public in this way, just before the interview. 
The President had told him that he probably would, but made no promises. When asked if 
Klein felt that the President truly felt he was wrong, Klein responded, “I think he thought 
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that Lyndon Johnson and Jack Kennedy had got through with a lot of things. He didn’t 
realize the full force of an antagonistic Congress and a press that was out to get his blood 
because they had missed the story in the first place. And I don’t think he realized the 
force of that would force him into the position he was in…”567 Klein felt as though Nixon 
thought he’d simply “get away with it all.” 
Despite what Johnson and Kennedy had “got through,” Nixon’s was a different 
type of corruption. Klein felt Nixon didn’t fully understand this. “Johnson’s people were 
stealing money, and you had a lot of questions about his broadcast license, other things 
like that. That’s an entirely different thing. When he said, ‘I’m not a crook,’ he really 
believed he was not a crook. He didn’t steal anybody’s money. What he didn’t realize 
was that he was exerting power that he didn’t have,” said Klein. The Frost interviews 
would remain one of the most memorable moments of Nixon’s legacy and, according to 
Klein, Nixon himself seemed pleased with the outcome.  
Though Klein Struggled, the Press Ultimately Prevailed 
In the telling of Herbert Klein’s involvement in the Nixon White House and his 
attempts at promoting an open relationship with the press in a closed Administration, it is 
important to contextualize Nixon and his Administration’s response to dissent. The era in 
which Nixon’s presidency existed was one fraught with protest. From the emergence of 
the counter-culture to uprising against the Vietnam War, dissenters were a familiar part of 
the Nixon narrative and the Administration’s response to dissenters played heavily into 
the construction of Nixon’s preoccupation with image. Nixon’s awareness of the social 
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construction, or deconstruction, of his time provided him insight into the need for a 
communications apparatus beyond what had existed in the White House prior to his 
presidency. To Nixon, Herbert Klein and his Office could fill the need to manage 
information, not merely respond to the press. To Nixon, Klein’s operation could manage 
emerging and progressing opinions that were critical of the President or of his policies.  
However, where some narratives suggest that Nixon was unparalleled in his 
response to those who disagreed with him, this researcher suggests that the American 
political response to dissent, particularly in times of war, has long been contentious. The 
Nixon Administration was marred by protest and scandal, largely in part due to his 
attitude toward the former that planted the seeds for the latter. Immediately before his 
presidency at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois, Nixon established 
his opinion on dissent stating “...this is the way civilizations begin to die.”568 In his 
address to the nation on November 3, 1969, he stated that the threat at home were the 
dissenters. This was followed however by the moratorium, the largest anti-war movement 
in U.S. history. It was after this that the Nixon Administration set its sights on the 
American press.  
The summer of 1970 would result in another layer of the Nixon/Dissenter 
narrative that would parallel the attitudes of administrations before him, but perhaps with 
far more vigor. After a flood of demonstrations, Nixon suggested that the demonstrators 
would “serve as the villains, the object against which all our supporters could be rallied,” 
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as Nixon’s speechwriter William Safire would recall.569 He froze out the press in the 
invasion of Laos. Nixon’s open distaste for dissent and increasing propensity for secrecy 
within his Administration in light of an already disliked war deeply affected public trust 
of his Administration. As Stone would suggest, even when the Administration was telling 
the truth, the public no longer believed. Nixon’s low approval rating arguably planted the 
seeds for Watergate. Nixon, though unique in his own political context, simply added to a 
long history of aggression toward dissenters. 
Providing a historical context by which to evaluate Nixon’s responses informs the 
work presented in this dissertation and as such, is included here. It also adds depth to the 
understanding of Klein’s environment. An aggressive push for managing information 
likely should not have been a surprise to someone in Klein’s position, particularly with 
his breadth of political experience nor should it be considered entirely out of place 
considering political response to eras that exhibited similar types of socio-political unrest.  
For example, evaluating the Administration’s response to the release of the 
Pentagon Papers as somehow born only from Nixon’s distrust of the media or desire for a 
lack of transparency is both reductive and irresponsible. The Nixon Administration 
attempted to argue that the release of the Pentagon Papers would do harm to the nation's 
involvement in the Vietnam War. While some narratives may paint Nixon as being a lone 
aggressor in this attempt to silence a truth, history tells a very different story. The debate 
of prior restraint embroiled America’s founding fathers. The tactic of prior restraint under 
the illusion of national security is not a new notion, nor was it at the time of Nixon. James 
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Madison, following the Sedition Act of 1798 suggested that such a tactic may forever be 
used in times of war. Madison was a believer that the truth would prevail over error 
where free discussion was allowed, suggesting that perhaps regardless of the potential 
harm that could be done, discourse would correct for the error and set everything back on 
the appropriate course. Jefferson unequivocally believed that the essence of liberty was 
dependent on the freedom of the press and that the freedom of the press if limited, like 
through prior restraint, would be lost altogether.  
While President Nixon himself was particularly distrusting of the press and 
dissenters, the groundwork that allowed him to operate off this attitude was laid by his 
predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson created a very distinct narrative within the 
“with us or against us” model that has long been part of the American military lexicon. 
Johnson argued that even well-meaning protesters could be influenced by Communists. 
This movement from straight affiliation with Communist organizations to susceptibility 
to being influenced by Communist mentality fed into a fear narrative that would 
increasingly become part of the support for suppression of expression in times of war. 
Johnson relied heavily on the narrative of dissenters of the war as Communist supporters. 
In fact, when CIA Director Richard Helms submitted a report to Johnson saying that 
there was no significant evidence that would prove Communist influence on the United 
States peace movement and that the protests would have occurred regardless of the 
Communist element, Johnson chose to ignore this, and likewise, so did Nixon.  
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Nixon’s attempts to limit speech were not necessarily unique. Historically, the 
norm for the United States has always been to limit speech.570 In fact, the suggestion that 
such acts are abhorrent was arguably solidified by the Nixon Administration’s attempts. 
For example, the Nixon Administration was the first to see a very significant move by the 
courts to secure the First Amendment rights through the New York Times case. The case 
established an important moment for the American public in its perception of the First 
Amendment and placed emphasis on the responsibility of the Supreme Court to uphold it. 
The case fortified the public accord that First Amendment rights were perhaps most 
important to support in times of war, not less.  
Nixon’s attitude toward dissent is not tangential to the overall narrative of Klein 
in the White House. It is essential. Removing Nixon from the greater context of United 
States political and journalistic history and viewing him and his aides as anomalous, 
skews the assessment of his Administration’s historiography and by extension, the study 
of Klein himself. Klein as a formative figure does not exist without the Nixon’s attitude 
toward press and political dissent. Likewise, Nixon’s actions did not occur within a 
vacuum, devoid of foundations laid by previous administrations.  
The Closed White House: Emergence of Secrecy and Skepticism 
Klein’s primary goal during his time in the Nixon Administration was to maintain 
an open White House, allowing the press access to the President and access to 
information pertinent to the informing of the American people. Klein, himself, had 
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reported on politics throughout his career, and fundamentally understood the significance 
of authentic and transparent communication. The relationships forged between members 
of the government and the press could, and inevitably would, play an important role in 
the solidifying of the Administration’s legacy. Nixon and his inner circle, independent of 
Klein, chose to walk a more precarious path.   
Following Nixon’s tenure as President, the Pentagon Papers and Watergate, the 
news media was dramatically changed. Nixon’s policies and enforcement of strict secrecy 
within the White House and the freezing out, wiretapping and threating of the press 
changed the dynamic in which the press operated. In previous administrations, like that of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the press enjoyed more 
freedom and civil relationships with the White House. Every member of the press knew 
that Roosevelt suffered from polio, but kept it a secret from the public. Most members of 
the press were too aware that Kennedy enjoyed some philandering but also kept it a 
secret.571 Following Nixon, a distrust and skepticism emerged between the press and the 
Administration. Future administrations would become more secretive, building on the 
groundwork laid by Nixon, and the press so too would become more aggressive, ushering 
in a new era of investigative reporting that sought to uncover similar political scandal and 
corruption. It is perhaps this larger legacy left by Nixon that provides a fruitful area for 
researchers of journalism history today.  
The significance of Herbert Klein in the origin of this legacy is not to be 
overlooked. Klein is the very character that personifies the tumultuous relationship of 
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Richard Nixon and the establishment media. A researcher can follow the thread of 
Klein’s relationship with Nixon throughout his political career and see the parallel 
narratives of their relationship and Nixon’s growing distrust for the major press outlets. 
Klein’s failed efforts to ensure that the press would retain access to the Office of the 
President mark the beginnings of a more secretive White House and diminishing trust 
between the Office and the press. More so, Klein’s early departure marked the beginning 
of a series of press men who would prematurely leave the Office of Communications 
suggesting an inherent and perhaps impossible conflict between protecting a presidential 
image and producing an open and transparent line of communication with a more 
aggressive press. Further research into the subsequent holders of Klein’s position could 
shed light on this struggle in the modern American White House.   
Emergence of the Propaganda Apparatus 
Perhaps of greatest significance is the emergence of the propaganda apparatus 
during the Nixon Administration. Despite Klein’s attempts to establish an open White 
House, the Administration’s preoccupation with image and the perpetuation of that image 
disallowed it from authentic forms of communication. This was a result of Nixon’s 
insecurities and the moments in his political career that accentuated them. The 
propaganda apparatus was nonexistent before the Nixon Administration but is now a 
permanent fixture within the American political system.572 As such, a historical 
reassessment of the legacy of Nixon reveals legacies that are potentially far more 
reaching than those that are commonly assessed in the telling of Nixon’s history. 
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Klein’s role in the Nixon Administration was constricted largely because of the 
building of Nixon’s “propaganda apparatus.” Nixon had desired, as seen through the 
correspondence of his closest aides, for the media be controlled and managed. Image 
reigned supreme and facts were used not to illuminate truths, but to support a desired 
image.573 When Klein pushed against the prioritization of image and proposed 
reorganization of response to the press to address concerns over a growing credibility 
gap, Nixon’s aides pushed back with fervor. To provide the press with greater access to 
the President meant that the White House lost control over Nixon’s image, something 
they viewed as uniquely their own. Of course, the press as a representation of the people 
felt Nixon was, and should be, rightfully theirs. This control of image spilled over into all 
aspects of the Administration. Nothing was to be seen that could reflect badly on Nixon 
as a leader and in an era polarized by war and social reform, nothing could be seen at all.    
Hugh Sidey of Time magazine wrote a critique of the Nixon Administration published on 
March 19, 1971, unabashedly referring to propagandistic tendencies: 
The trouble arises, too, from the picture of unrelieved perfection and happiness 
which comes from the White House propaganda apparatus day after tedious day. 
The descriptions speak of the President and his men in total control, winning 
success after success, never doubting or discouraged – this in the face of facts that 
everybody must live with: unemployment, congressional stalemate, inflation, 
helicopter losses, pollution and the disintegration of city structures. In this 
atmosphere of make-believe, larger successes like the very substantial withdrawal 
in Vietnam are lost from view. Euphoric press-agentry may have been effective 
25 years ago, but it is nothing short of poison today…574 
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Nixon’s aides were committed to shaping the way in which the press could and 
would report on Nixon, not to establishing how the Administration would control its 
image in light of press coverage. Klein was committed to remaining open, building a 
relationship with the press, and when needed, correcting press inaccuracies. Klein’s aim 
was to provide and respond. His colleagues aim was to control and dismiss. These 
drastically different aims were inevitably unable to be rectified. For Klein, the 
manipulation of the press was contrary to his principles as a former newsman. What 
Klein was unable, or unwilling, to accomplish was creating an agenda against the press 
built on inaccuracies in reporting or particularly harsh perspectives of the President or the 
Administration. Later administrations would attempt to accomplish this.  
Contemporary parallels have been drawn between the Nixon Administration and 
the Administration of Donald Trump. While on the surface, both Administrations have 
exhibited a similar contention toward the press and a technique of aggressively attacking 
media, distinct differences remain. For one, it is significant to note that the 
communication apparatus that was set up during the Nixon Administration has since 
taken on numerous forms and is unlike the system that Nixon had in place during his 
presidency. Klein was the first to hold the office of Director of Communications and 
since his founding of the Office, administrations have built on and modified the 
responsibilities that it comes with. As such, comparing Klein’s role to present-day 
Directors of Communication within the White House creates some inherent challenges.  
Likewise, comparisons between Nixon and Trump are problematic. While 
obvious assessments are made of their preoccupation with image and the media, their 
backgrounds, political experience and private versus public persona’s differ greatly. 
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While Nixon was acutely aware of press coverage surrounding him and policies, he was 
not, by most historical accounts, a ravenous consumer of news. Trump, is largely 
reported as being the opposite, at times being accused of getting important information 
straight from broadcast news sources. Trump’s preference to use Twitter as a method of 
communication that bypasses traditional press can be viewed as a parallel to Nixon’s use 
of broadcast media to bypass the mainstream press of his time. However, this comparison 
is reductive. While Nixon sought to use broadcast media to speak directly to the public, 
he meticulously prepared for his appearances and his aides regularly discussed the 
potential for too many appearances to cheapen Nixon’s message. Trumps regular and 
sometimes unedited Tweets intimates a limited degree of preparation, suggesting that 
image is less of a concern than is pushing forth an agenda. Nixon feared press 
manipulation arguably to a point of paranoia while Trump seemingly assumes 
unequivocal press manipulation. Still, on the surface, similarities abound. The handling 
of Nixon’s image by Haldeman, and the veiled, and sometimes not so veiled, threats via 
memorandum, made against the Eastern Establishment seem to read almost as a first draft 
of the Trump Administration’s public and unabashed battle cry against mainstream news.  
However, as mentioned previously, the reality of an administration pushing 
against the press is not a new one. Nixon was not the first and it is unlikely the current 
administration will be the last. In fact, it is more likely that current administrations will 
use the blueprints left from previous administrations to build upon. While outside the 
scope of this study, a comparison between the Nixon and Trump Administrations as it 
relates to the Office of Communications may provide insight into the evolution of the 
Office of Communications. This study remains focused on its founding and the unique 
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contributions of Herbert Klein. It is possible, however, that had Klein stayed within the 
Nixon Administration, or had he not been pushed from the inner circle, Nixon’s 
propaganda apparatus would have failed to reach the stature it did. After all, other aides 
functioned as contributors to an image-making machine and Klein’s perspective would 
likely have served as a balance, keeping the precariously balanced scale from tipping in 
the disastrous way that it had. This type of speculation, while not easily substantiated, 
provides worth food for thought and furthers the significance of Klein’s exit, as well as 
his entrance into the Nixon White House.  
Klein’s office has become a staple not only in the modern White House, but in 
companies and organizations, largely functioning as public relations mechanisms. Klein 
was frustrated by the overwhelming responsibility of the new Freedom of Information 
Act during his tenure, something that is now a staple in the relationship between 
politicians, the press and the public. Further investigation into the evolution of the Office 
of Communications in the modern White House would add to the understanding of the 
lasting legacy of the Nixon Administration in the area of media management and press 
relations. The varying use of the Office as well as the individuals who followed Klein 
would provide valuable insight into the ways in which the image of the Presidential office 
contends with the desire of the public for truth.575  
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The Challenges of Investigating the Nixon Administration’s Media Legacy 
Because this dissertation attempts to add to the historiography of Richard Nixon, 
it necessary to identify the unique challenges of assessing the Nixon presidency. While 
Klein emerged as a formative figure through the investigation of primary sources dealing 
with the press, the aides surrounding Klein and Nixon himself immediately and directly 
impact the relevance of Klein. As such, this study would be remiss if not to address the 
surrounding context of the Nixon Administration’s media legacy.  
The presidency of Richard Nixon is perhaps best described as contradictory. 
Nixon was only as conservative as he was allowed to be and as liberal as he had to be. He 
was tactful in his domestic policies. Nixon was able to fundamentally disagree with 
something but, in an election year, support it for the sake of votes.576 Nixon himself noted 
in his memoirs that his personal standpoint on particular issues was less important than 
his legacy as a whole.577  
 Despite his early years as a politician, support from members of the press elevated 
his career and notoriety, as a whole, Nixon felt as though the press was ultimately against 
him. Klein was one of his biggest cheerleaders as a young reporter, elevating and 
complimenting Nixon whenever the opportunity presented itself. Nixon visited local 
press outlets and sat with editors, reporters and even toured printing facilities, but where 
the national press was concerned, Nixon’s relationship quickly soured. A particular 
turning point in Nixon’s relationship with the press was after the trial of Alger Hiss. 
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Nixon recorded that he felt as though the media had turned on him and that the Eastern 
Establishment and intellectuals couldn’t bear a fight and certainly couldn’t bear to lose 
one.578 He suggested that they had established a personal vendetta against him.  
The difference in Nixon’s relationship between the local press and the Eastern 
Establishment press is an important distinction. While prevailing narratives commonly 
suggest that Nixon had a general distaste or hatred for the press, this study focused one of 
his oldest aides, establishes a slightly different understanding. Nixon did feel strongly 
about the Eastern Establishment press, but he also felt as though the local press was a 
strong and necessary tool for reaching his constituency, and perhaps not as savvy as 
national news organizations in distorting his message. A broad and sweeping suggestion 
that Nixon hated all media and had a contentious relationship with the press in general 
would appear to be a gross misrepresentation and colors his actions differently than 
perhaps is accurate. Klein’s work in the Office of Communications provides ample 
evidence of the efforts Nixon’s Administration made to connect and retain relationships 
with local media, though at times crossing traditional boundaries of a press-politician 
relationship.  
 The Pentagon Papers are often discussed in the context of Nixon’s relationship 
with the press. The Pentagon Papers had a significant impact on Nixon’s presidency and 
his goals for reelection. After the release of the papers, Nixon’s distaste for the elite and 
Eastern Establishment was further solidified. Information regarding Vietnam and Nixon’s 
attempt at stopping the information from getting to the public, further painted him as a 
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sinister character. The focus again turned from Nixon’s political accomplishments to his 
attitude toward dissent and what he viewed as personal attacks. Nixon’s approval ratings 
began to sink and concerns over his ability to win a second term emerged. The 
Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) more fervently fought to secure the 
presidency, to infamous ends. Nixon became adamant about freezing out the press, 
sealing media leaks through the creation of the Plumbers.579 He believed his greatest 
defense was an offense and so his Administration pushed boundaries for what Nixon felt 
was the greater good, the securing of and success of his policies and the establishment of 
his rightful political legacy.580 
The extent to which Nixon disliked and distrusted the media, and broke with 
Klein was laid bare following the release of the “Nixon Tapes.” His anger throughout his 
term reached a pinnacle during the release of the Pentagon Papers when he stated that he 
would use whatever means possible to shut down the press, including challenging the 
Washington Post’s TV licenses, a move that almost bankrupted the Post entirely. 
Nixon’s resentment and anger toward the media seemed to have gotten the best of 
him throughout his presidency and his trend of self-victimization and paranoia perhaps 
put the nail in the coffin of his Administration. Nixon, in his memoires, exposed his 
tendency toward self-victimization. The entirety of the introduction of his autobiography 
carefully documents the number of pages he was forced to “give up” to explain 
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Watergate, not as a duty but because he was defamed and was forced to discuss 
something that he felt had little significance in light of his overall contributions as an 
American politician and “peacemaker.” Throughout his life, post-presidency, Nixon 
downplayed the events of Watergate and what they exposed of his Administration.  His 
biography itself reads as a defense. Mimicking his campaign strategies, his defense is an 
offense and his offense is putting out his narrative, on his terms and telling Watergate in 
great detail as a self-sacrificing measure to ensure that the “facts are straight” and that his 
legacy was secure.  
It is significant to note that Nixon’s accomplishments as President were not few. 
He appeased his liberal counterparts through the development of policies and projects, 
like the Environmental Protection Agency. Largely considered a liberal move, Nixon 
noted that he created the EPA only because it allowed him to avoid the implementation of 
more liberal options. He intended to move the country to the right, and he ultimately did. 
Domestically, Nixon ended the Selective Service, expanded Social Security benefits to 
the disabled, increased funding to the arts, reorganized the postal system, and lowered the 
voting age to 18-years-old. He accomplished significant gains at home but it is perhaps 
his foreign engagement that provides a richer narrative in the telling of his history. 
Nixon’s accomplishments in foreign relations during his presidency were striking as well. 
He ushered in nuclear disarmament with the Soviet Union, opened relations with China, 
  304   
and created the Nixon Doctrine581, which would prove to be influential to future 
administrations. 
What makes Nixon’s legacy so interesting is not that it is wrought with scandal, 
secrecy, and intrigue but rather that it is ripe for the taking. Even a major biographer of 
Nixon’s takes different perspectives on how his presidency should be viewed. For the 
most part, as Stephen Ambrose suggests in his three volume Nixon biography, that 
Nixon’s legacy is filled successes and failures. How he is remembered is determined by 
what is written of him. Nixon was accurately aware of this. What newspapers wrote of 
him during his presidency would ultimately reflect what historians wrote of him after his 
presidency. If historians are to look at his legacy from a domestic perspective, they will 
note many successes. If they look at his foreign policy, so too are there many indications 
of movement from the Nixon Administration.  
However, if historians are to focus more on Nixon’s relationships with the public 
and with the press, the narrative is far different and the legacy is far more sinister. Nixon 
himself, as expressed through his memories suggests that that persona is far less 
important and relevant in his legacy and goes on the defense by presenting the offense 
that he is, inherently misunderstood and misrepresented. The historiography of Nixon and 
the media will certainly be built upon, but contributions to the literature may have less of 
an impact on his legacy than the angle by which the research approaches it. Investigating 
Nixon’s history through the lens of scandal and press manipulation inherently limits the 
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scope by which to evaluate a significant time in the history of politics and journalism. 
While this is unavoidable to some degree, it, as a result, obscures attention from 
individuals, like Klein, whose contributions to both fields were unique and worthy of 
scholarly investigation. For all the effort that Nixon made to write and control his own 
legacy, it is perhaps one of the most uncontrollably and widely contested narratives of a 
presidential figure. 
In his farewell address following his resignation, Nixon suggested that giving in 
to the hate of one's enemies, letting them know that you hate them as well, will be the end 
of oneself. This poignant statement suggests that Nixon became aware of the impact of 
his self-victimization and how it was his attitude toward those who felt hated him that 
eventually brought forth his end. It was certainly a sentiment that Klein had, in one form 
or another, preached throughout his relationship with Nixon. This realization, however 
came too late. Nixon’s self-victimization was not one that originated in his tenure in 
public service. In fact, it was a narrative that began as a child. Coming from a poor 
family, a working-class father, and two brothers who died of tuberculosis informed a 
young Nixon’s life in ways that were significantly different than perhaps many of his 
political peers. This also informed his opinions on the “elite” and the Eastern 
Establishment. He never fully grew out of the awkwardness and self-loathing that 
plagued him as a child and this subsequently fed into his over analysis of the perception 
of those around him. Despite all his success, Nixon never truly fit into political life in a 
way that would allow him to engage in a way that resonated with the masses through a 
mass medium. Instead, he was far more concerned with the matters of politics than the 
manner of it. This, combined with his distrust and distaste for the press and those who 
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dissented against his ideas and policies, would cause him to take opposition far more 
personally than perhaps warranted. 
In the understanding of the Nixon White House, and its media legacy, there is 
particular importance in the narrative of Herbert Klein. While Klein resigned before 
Watergate and enjoyed less privilege in the White House in the later years, this 
investigation into his contributions in the Nixon White House sheds a considerable light 
on a missing narrative. The role of the Director of Communications, and the origin of this 
role, is significant. While Klein did not serve as Press Secretary, the reasons are 
significant to note. Nixon’s choice of Ziegler over Klein, and his positioning of Klein are 
just as informative, if not more so, in how Nixon viewed his relationship with the media. 
The marginalization of Klein, a longtime friend and confidant of Nixon, should not be 
mistaken as a lack of importance of Klein. On the contrary, knowing what is known 
about Nixon’s relationship with the media, the removing of Klein from Nixon’s inner 
circle should warrant a great deal of curiosity and motivate further investigation into the 
man, and the office he created. 
While it is true that Klein’s influence diminished and that his connection with 
Nixon weakened as the years went by, it is important to evaluate this alongside the fact 
that Klein was perhaps Nixon’s oldest adviser. From his earliest years in the political 
scene, Nixon shared his feelings, ideas and frustrations with Klein. From his earliest 
campaigns, he personally asked for Klein to take sabbaticals from his work as a journalist 
and help guide his campaign. Though he understood that Klein might be too much like 
Hagerty, he still made room for Klein in his Administration, even creating a new post for 
which he would serve as Director. Granted, Nixon had conceivably developed this post to 
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stifle Klein, he could have so easily eliminated Klein from his team from the start, 
entirely. This foray into Klein’s historical narrative perhaps opens the door for more 
questions than it answers. However, of great significance is the preliminary investigation 
of Klein as both long-time friend and White House foe, as well as cursory understanding 
of the challenges that emerge when Presidential image and journalistic ethics meet in a 
heavily politicized setting. 
Rise of Technology 
As discussed in this study, new media technology created a unique challenge for 
Nixon and his Administration. Nixon was, for lack of a better term, traditional. His 
political style lacked the youth and vigor of a Kennedy and as such, he was far less 
prepared for the shift from a traditional newspaper press relationship to a television press 
relationship. The introduction of immediate commentary following speeches and events 
was seemingly jarring for the President. Discussion regarding his appearance was 
unsettling and fed into his growing perception that he was being “picked on.” Just as the 
modern White House deals with the onslaught of social media, Nixon’s White House 
dealt with the heyday of broadcast television news. However, suggestions that Nixon 
disliked broadcast television are reductive and somewhat misleading. Nixon was aware of 
the benefit of the medium and its power to influence public opinion. He was determined 
to learn how to use it to his benefit.  
Nixon’s first request to Klein following his election was that the Administration 
find a way to use television to its advantage. Nixon learned that the medium was a 
powerful tool and that controlling the technology meant he could reach the people 
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directly. This was something that the press did not allow him to do. It would appear as 
though Nixon valued television a great deal and sought to use it whenever he best could. 
As established in this work, Nixon’s aides studied the way in which broadcast news 
functioned, including typical lengths of segments, how stories were slated and audience 
retention as guidelines to best produce Nixon’s communications.  
In fact, one of the most iconic moments the media legacy of Nixon was during 
Nixon’s campaign with Eisenhower as his vice-presidential running mate. The press 
exposed accounts that suggested that Nixon was provided money for living expenses. The 
stories almost cost him his place on the ticket. Nixon famously gave his “Checkers” 
speech, and for the first-time, a politician used the new technology of television as a 
political weapon. His efforts were wildly successful and he would utilize the medium to 
bypass the press many times. These events would further solidify, in the mind of Nixon, 
that his enemies were in the press. If Nixon’s direct statements to the people were 
received well in the press, but those edited for news programs and woven with 
commentary were not, the lesson was clear: the press manipulated what the people would 
have supported. This notion would elevate a dislike of the industry during his campaigns, 
to an outright war on its practitioners during his presidency.582 This is precisely why 
Nixon wanted Klein. He needed a veteran reporter to delegitimize the press, and do so in 
a way that was methodical while using knowledge of its systematic process to create an 
alternative means of communication with the American public.  
                                                
582 Small, Melvin. A companion to Richard M. Nixon. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.  
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 Nixon’s reluctance to bypass the press manifested itself in other ways as well. 
During his presidency, Nixon held the fewest number of press conferences of any 
president from FDR to Carter and the most number of presidential addresses of any 
President. He would speak directly to the American people 14 times in the first 19 
months in office. This, scholars suggest, brought a whole new meaning to the term “bully 
pulpit.”583 Nixon used Vice President Spiro Agnew as a battering ram against the media. 
It was Agnew who suggested that the news media was liberal and elitist. The Nixon 
Administration introduced “liberal-elitist media” into the contemporary political lexicon. 
It is still a term widely used today. Nixon froze out reporters whenever he could. Few 
press conferences meant that when the press did have the opportunity to ask the President 
questions, they often appeared unruly. So few opportunities presented themselves that 
reporters would fight to have their questions heard. Nixon pointed to this as an example 
of how the media was boisterous and aggressive towards him. In some cases, Nixon and 
his Administration would go as far as to wiretap reporters.584 
 Nixon’s relationship with the media would further sour after the printing of the 
Pentagon Papers. Significant on its own, Nixon’s attempt at stopping a national 
newspaper from publishing, was not entirely surprising. While this is commonly focused 
on, less discussed are the actions taken after an attempted injunction failed. Nixon turned 
to more subversive methods that proved his prowess in understanding the emerging 
power of new media technology on the financial stability of the industry. Similar to his 
                                                
583 Grossman, Michael Baruch., and Martha Joynt. Kumar. Portraying the president: the White House and the 
news media. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.  
584 Ibid. 
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dealings during the controversial Hiss trial, Nixon had the office of the psychiatrist of 
Daniel Ellsberg, the individual who leaked the Pentagon Papers, searched illegally. To 
Nixon, Ellsberg represented the typical elite, a Harvard graduate and former employee of 
the Brookings Institute, and The New York Times and The Washington Post represented 
the Eastern Establishment. Perfectly packaged, the Pentagon Papers case solidified for 
Nixon the fact that the press was out to get him.  
 When news of the Watergate incident hit the papers, Nixon froze out the media.585 
Nixon, went after the moneymaker of the Post, it’s television stations. FCC investigations 
were made into the licenses of two of the Post’s stations in Florida. The investigations 
cost the Post nearly $1 million in legal fees and their stocks dropped by 50 percent. 
Owner Katherine Graham said in her memoir that existence of the Post during that time 
was at stake.586 The impact was not on the Post alone. Broadcast stations, fearing that 
their licenses might be terminated or otherwise investigated became less inclined to 
report on Watergate or the Nixon Administration. Understanding that such FCC 
investigations could bankrupt the station, attention was turned to other stories. 
Newspapers faced less of a risk and so continued to report on Watergate and the Nixon 
Administration.587 The “Nixon Tapes” would later reveal the depth of Nixon’s disdain for 
                                                
585 Rather, Dan, and Mickey Herskowitz. The camera never blinks twice: the further adventures of a television 
journalist. Thorndike, Me.: Thorndike Press, 1995.  
586 Graham, Katharine. Personal history. New York: Knopf, 2001.  
587 Small, Melvin. A companion to Richard M. Nixon. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.  
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the “elitist” press.588 Nixon expressed his complete efforts to devastate the media, lest it 
destroy him.  
Conclusion 
The aggressive prominence of Nixon’s personal insecurities has long framed 
historical narratives. However, recent years, and the emergency of new primary sources 
have shed new light on how others in his Administration influenced, or attempted to 
influence his decision-making. Individuals like Klein, while often times relegated to the 
indexes of Nixon’s historical narratives, were not only significant because of their 
proximity to the President, but because of the circumstances by which they were pushed 
away from Nixon during his formative years in the White House. As this research 
documents, Klein’s standing in the Nixon Administration, both as a longstanding fixture 
in Nixon’s political life and his position as the first ever Director of Communications in 
the history of American politics, warrants a continued excavation of his historical 
significance. When further investigating the conflict between truth and image in 
American politics, Klein and others in his position provide important information on how 
the historical narratives surrounding the two are influenced by the personalities and 
attitudes of those at the center.  
Following his resignation, Nixon’s farewell speech included perhaps the most 
poignant statement of his political career. He said that it was the hate for those who show 
you hate that will eventually destroy you. This was something Nixon had learned too late. 
His presidency was bookmarked by Klein’s initial promise to the press following his 
                                                
588 Safire, William. You could look it up: more On language from William Safire. New York: H. Holt, 1989.  
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inauguration; that the Administration would be open and accessible, and Nixon’s lesson 
learned; that one should be careful not to let enemies (his in the press) dictate one’s 
legacy. Despite Nixon’s long political career and his rather significant domestic and 
foreign accomplishments, the historiographical legacy of Richard Nixon is relegated to 
the singular moments that were defined, if not a result, of his adamant fight against those 
who felt were out to get him. Despite those in the White House like Klein who tried to 
reframe Nixon’s perspective on press coverage, Nixon and his team focused so 
extensively on negative daily news coverage, feeding into self-victimization. Nixon’s 
long and sometimes contentious political past, and dismissal of Klein’s suggestions (as 
evident during his “last press conference”) brought additional scrutiny of Nixon’s actions. 
While this study focuses primarily on Klein, it is a challenge to provide a 
historical narrative of Klein and the press without addressing Nixon’s personality and 
personal history. The key players in the Nixon Administration profoundly affected the 
ways in which Klein could and could not operate. The intense desire for control over 
Nixon’s image inevitably encroached on Klein’s ability to allow access and transparency 
as promised.  
The introduction of lesser recognized figures into prevailing historical narratives 
presents a unique opportunity to fill gaps within existing literature. This preliminary look 
at the involvement of Herbert Klein accomplishes several things. For one, it sheds 
necessary light on an individual who had a unique and long-lasting relationship with one 
of the most controversial politicians in American history. Additionally, it brings attention 
to the creation of a fixture of American political life, as well as public life, the Office of 
Communications. Alongside these two important entries into the discussion, Klein’s 
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relationships with those within the Nixon White House present additional avenues of 
research. In the context of a complex subject like presidential image and press 
relationships, no singular figure can effectively wield all the power, as Klein himself 
noted. The President was not entirely in control of the Administration’s relationship with 
the press, nor were Haldeman or Ehrlichman, as traditionally thought. History 
continuously confirms Ziegler’s limited role and Klein’s adversary, Charles Colson, 
despite superseding Klein on various occasions and pushing for a more aggressive 
relationship with the press, had limited impact as well. The fragmentation of these 
influences on the overall historiography of the Nixon Administration’s relationship with 
the press is evidence that focus on individuals provides important context to the overall 
historical narrative.  
Klein’s involvement in the Administration contributes to the understanding of the 
challenges newsmen face in political Administrations, naturally, focused on retaining 
control of image and public trust. The time in which Klein served is significant in light of 
the strength of broadcast television and the shift from traditional newspaper coverage to a 
new media that the press, the public and the world of politics were all becoming 
accustomed too. Not unlike today with social media, broadcast television transformed 
both literal and figurative conceptions of image. Klein learned to wrestle with an 
emerging medium that was proving to be immensely powerful and having a lasting 
impact on public perception. Ultimately, Klein’s resignation resulting from his growing 
discomfort as part of the Administration and his unwillingness to see his Office 
downsized and placed under the control of Ziegler confirmed the inability for an 
individual seeking to create an open Nixon Administration to succeed.   
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For all the complications of the Nixon Administration, the greatest complexities 
are perhaps the ones that are most assumed but least investigated. Richard Nixon and his 
relationship with the media have undoubtedly changed the way in which the 
contemporary administrations operate. Where once a propaganda apparatus did not exist, 
after Nixon, it is now a permanent fixture in American politics. So too, a press that 
operated more conventionally as a checks and balance to and in conjunction with the 
functions of the government, after Nixon, became part of a more skeptical and closed 
relationship. The reassessment of these two areas of the Nixon White House provides a 
rich and unique narrative that sheds light on less explored areas of the legacy of one of 
the most controversial administrations. Herbert Klein stands at the intersection of both. A 
staunch newsman, a witness and participant in Nixon’s long political career situate him at 
an important crossroads in this historical narrative, one that warrants further research 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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